The objective of this study is to provide the basis of demarcation between radically alternative philosophies, between different theories of society, and between competing politics, by rearticulating what-Althusser calls the Marxist Philosophy that Marx practices in his critique of capitalism. I argue and demonstrate how the Marxist theory of the condition of discourse about history illuminates the epistemological nature and political implications of various discourses, making coherent and effective praxis possible. Demarcation of radical alternatives is critical now more than ever because the alternative to the hegemonic practices, along with the very notions of demarcation and radical alternative, is severely undermined. As a case in which the alternative discourse and politics were sorely needed but conspicuously missing, I analyze U.S. public discourses about the North Korean nuclear program. The philosophical nature of the postmodern/poststructuralist anti-totalization needs to be closely examined and critiqued, because it has practically declared the death of Marxism as a critical theory of history and claims its place as the source of political inspiration for profound social change. I rearticulate the Althusserian Marxist theory of discourse in terms of the relations between philosophy and theory, between theory and the object of theory, between structure and a concept. From the perspective of the Althusserian Marxist theory of discourse and ideology, humanist notions of rationality and objectivity/subjectivity (that postmodernism and its critique have revived) are critiqued and juxtaposed with Althusserian concepts of 'determination of consciousness by ideology' and the 'relative autonomy of ideology and consciousness from the other historical conditions'. The central thesis of Marxist Philosophy is that determination and overdetermination are the key and organic properties of structure. It is also the basis of my critique of postmodern/poststructuralist anti-totalization. I examine the ways in which Foucault's Archaeology is an unwarranted return to the familiar empiricist inversion of Hegelian idealism. I argue that Derrida's deconstruction, his rejection of the very notion of philosophy that leads to sustainable knowledge, is based on the naturalization of the hegemonic philosophy in which the discursive universe consists of the dichotomy of empiricism and idealism.

<p> The field of environmental political theory has made great gains in its relatively short existence as an academic discipline. One area in which these advancements can be noticed is the strong discussion surrounding the foundations, institutions, and processes of Western liberalism and the relationship of these elements to issues of environmentalism. Within this discussion has manifested the bedrock assumption that the underlying components of classical liberalism &ndash; namely individualism, negative liberties, and instrumental rationality &ndash; preclude or greatly hinder progress toward securing collective environmental needs. This assumption has great intuitive strength as well as exhibition in liberal democracies such as the United States. However, in using this assumption as a launchpad for reconsidering elements of liberalism scholars have inadvertently closed alternate routes of analysis and theorization. This thesis aims to explore one such alternate route. </p><p> Libertarianism, the contemporary reincarnation of classical liberalism, has been generally disregarded in policy and academic realms due to its stringent and inflexible adherence to self-interest, instrumental rationality, and individualism; in discussions of environment, these complaints are only augmented. These criticisms have been validated by a libertarian scholarship that emphasized nature as a warehouse of resources specifically suited for human use. But from where in libertarianism does this ontology develop, and is it correct? This thesis carries this investigation through its overarching research question: can nonhumans have self-ownership within libertarian theory, and what would that mean for libertarian theory? </p><p> Part I of the thesis introduces us to the foundation, tenants, and overall logical structure of contemporary libertarian theory. Finding autonomy to be the key to moral standing, and finding autonomy to be a contested criterion, we discover the shaky ground on which the totality of libertarianism stands. After identifying the relationship of libertarianism and the environment &ndash; one of atomistic, instrumental, and anthropocentric utilization &ndash; we connect the current non-standing moral status of nonhumans in libertarian theory directly to criteria of autonomy. With autonomy acknowledged as a contested subject, we thus arrive at the conclusion that the lack of moral status awarded to nonhumans has arisen not through logical derivation but the reification of tradition. </p><p> Part II centers on the establishment of a proper framework for the task of evaluating libertarianism&rsquo;s main criteria of autonomy. This framework is grounded foremost in the recognition of the inherent social embeddedness within libertarian theory; this embeddedness is founded in the necessary <i> reciprocation</i> of liberty protections through the principles of non-aggression and non-interference and, while acknowledged by libertarian theorists, remained a largely undernourished portion of libertarian theory. To counter anthropocentric bias &ndash; in effort to ward off the influence of tradition &ndash; additional ecological criteria are added to this framework, culminating in an open, non-anthropocentric framework. Afterward, the chapter examines the Naturalistic Fallacy. Finding our answer in the naturally morally pragmatic nature of Man, this discussion finalizes our analytic framework by emphasizing the practical importance of moral reasoning. </p><p> Part III sets about the task of examining the criteria of autonomy utilized within libertarian theory. Two conceptions of autonomy &ndash; minimalist and prudentialist &ndash; are defined, with discussion showing libertarianism to rely, inherently and explicitly, on prudentialist forms of autonomy. The two primary criteria of prudentialism used, life-planning and reason, are then analyzed in turn; this analysis manifests the critique that in the practical usage of morality both criteria rely on and collapse into minimalism. Prudentialism as a standard is then examined to show its paradoxical reliance on pre-formulated conceptions of human lives, to the detriment of logical consistency and the virtues of negative liberty. Singer&rsquo;s criterion of suffering is then briefly examined, with discussion outlining its inapplicability within libertarian theory. Narveson&rsquo;s question of the moral egoist completes the chapter, with the linkage between nonhuman domination and human domination solidifying the argument that full nonhuman moral standing will reduce both to the advantage of libertarian society. From these critiques, then, we observe the critical failure of prudentialism to hold in praxis and see minimalist autonomy as the necessary foundation for libertarian theory. </p><p> Part IV outlines some consequences of minimalist autonomy within libertarian theory. The questions of reciprocity and nonhuman violence are examined, with discussions of complications and critiques following. These complications comprise the intersection of ecological libertarianism with extant issues within libertarian theory, such as Nozick&rsquo;s Principle of Rectification, the moral allowance of self-defense, and the question of the moral standing of children. Afterward, the broader conversation is considered along with specific consideration of the potential environmental impacts of an ecological libertarian theory. Lastly, some doors for future theorizing are opened &ndash; namely the conceptualization of nonhuman labor and nonhuman property rights &ndash; for future critical investigation. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.) </p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0507. Adviser: Nicholas C. Burbules. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-204) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1811. Adviser: Alexander L. Mayer. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 304-329) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Irvine, 2007. / (UMI)AAI3271310. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 2965. Adviser: Ellen Burt.

No description available.

In this thesis, I argue for rationalism, the claim that political legitimacy should be distributed such that justice is promoted best. In chapter 1, I define legitimacy as the permission to rule. I deny that political institutions generally enjoy authority, which is the moral power to directly impose duties on others. I then describe how legitimate political institutions without authority are possible in principle. In the second chapter, I outline a major problem for rationalism. If individuals have strong, moral rights, then it seems that political institutions cannot legitimately operate without their subjects' consent. I describe the key assumptions in this argument, and discuss a series of unconvincing proposals in the literature to escape it. In chapter 3, I argue that we can solve the problem if we look at theories of the moral justification of rights. There are two major such theories, the interest theory and the status theory. I outline the interest theory, and argue that it allows for non-consensual but legitimate political institutions. In chapter 4, I describe a Kantian claim about the nature of rights, according to which our rights are fully realised only if there are political institutions. If we accept this thought, then non-consensual political institutions can be legitimate on the status theory as well. In chapter 5, I outline what it means to promote-rather than respect-justice, and argue that the promotion of justice enjoys primacy over other values. At first sight, rationalism appears to have very radical implications, given that it asks us to base legitimacy on justice. In chapter 6, I argue that this impression is mistaken. We should often pursue justice indirectly, for example, through methods which focus on legal validity or democratic procedure rather than justice.

The recent surge in academic theorizing of the nation and nationalism has made it difficult to isolate the actual phenomena from their constructions as objects of theory. This is all the more difficult because most contemporary theories are grounded in unacknowledged political agendas that to a significant extent generate the theories independently of the phenomena. Chapter 1 focuses on “antinational-ist” theories of the nation—theories that deny the reality of nations or fundamentally delegitimate them as retrogressive or inherently oppressive political forms. Such a theory rejects the nation primarily because it is inconsistent with the theorist's uncritically assumed political ideology. In Chapter 2, I examine theories that do not reject the nation, but rather control its form—again in line with a particular political agenda or ideology. Such a theory allows the reality and/or legitimacy of nations, but only (1) after theoretically misconstruing them as consistent with (and possibly servants of) the theorist's specific ideology or (2) by limiting approval to only those nations that are in line with this ideology. I stress the important practical consequences of this: when backed by powerful institutions and forces, such a theory of the nation supports the coerced transformation of minor or post-colonial nations to fit it. These critiques expose the complexities of nations and nationalisms that most theories fail to register, due to their limiting assumptions. In Chapter 3, I develop an account of the nation sufficiently comprehensive to capture this complexity. Perhaps most importantly, my account does not reduce the nation to just one type of social force, political relation, identity characteristic, narrative structure, or “false consciousness”—which virtually all other theories do. All “unity” associated with the nation is partial: any presumed universal unity is always cut by gaps or discontinuities. A nation exists where the discontinuities are bridged by some alternate connector, by another type of relation. I then consider the relationship of nation to race, gender, and sexuality, as well as to state and ethnicity. Finally, I develop a novel concept of national “self-determination” as conceptual self- definition, not territorial control.

If we are interested in questions about how we ought to organize our political lives, what kind of weight, if any, should we give to evidence about what people actually think? The thesis explores this question about the role of public opinion in normative political theory. First, I disentangle a number of distinct justifications for taking account of public opinion. Specifically, the thesis evaluates four views of the status of public opinion: as an epistemic resource; a feasibility constraint; a means of democratizing political theory; or constitutive of moral and political ideals. I defend the epistemic argument, outlining two forms in which popular attitudes represent a valuable epistemic resource. The thesis criticizes the feasibility and democratic accounts of the role of public opinion as these are presented in the existing literature, but suggests more convincing ways of reconstructing these arguments. Finally, I reject the view that public opinion constitutes the ideal of justice, arguing that such an account is subject to a fundamental tension. As well as clarifying the status of popular attitudes, the thesis addresses the methodological difficulties that arise when we seek to bring public opinion to bear on ideas from political theory, whose meaning and status in everyday political thought and discourse is often limited or uncertain. I outline two approaches to integrating normative theory with the investigation of popular attitudes that mitigate the methodological problems that often confront such projects. The second major aim is to situate the question of the role of public opinion in the context of wider debates about the aims and methods of contemporary political theory. In particular, I address recent demands for greater ‘realism’ in political theory, distinguishing two main strands of realist critique and drawing out their contrasting implications for the role of public opinion.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-253) and index.