Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Art History and Communication Studies. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/03/12). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 1997. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-82).

In Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Heidegger submits an attempt to think from a more original position within being by presenting ”a deeper form of questioning”. This attempt is supposed to serve as the final transition from what he calls ”the guiding question” to ”the basic question” and with that the final leap from the metaphysical tradition still present in Being and Ttime into ”the second beginning”, free from transcendental thinking. The intention of this essay is to observe how the being-historical questioning is presented in Contributions to Philosophy as it is contrasted with the position of the question in Being and time. In my endeavor to understand ”the questioning”, two of Heideggers lecture courses on Saint Augustine are presented. I show how Heidegger pinpoints Saint Augustine’s turn from searching for God as an object into forming himself into a question, and so in prayer becoming the very thing he is searching for in a deeper form of questioning. Furthermore he claims that Augustine’s ”not knowing” (nescio) has been consistently misread as a lack of knowledge, whilst it is in fact a pre-requisite for the real break through of true knowledge. I suggest that Heideggers re-reading of nescio can be helpful in trying to understand the preparation for the Event of the second beginning of which the questioning is a part.

The aim of this thesis is to find out whether Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be equated with a conceptual system or ”Begriffsschrift”, and what the function of such a representative system would be. How can solipsism, idealism and realism be understood given that interpretation? Wittgenstein’s early philosophical inquiry revolved around the same problem with which Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell had dealt with. But according to Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein forcefully questioned their idea that logic can constitute a general foundation and Wittgenstein was particularly against the idea that mathematics requires a foundation of logic. The thesis discusses how this can be deduced from a close reading of Russell’s introduction to the Tractatus. The results from this reading coupled with a review of the concepts of solipsism and subject give a divergent interpretation on what is complex and what can only be shown. The study indicates that what solipsism disclose is that a variable that consists of ”I”, referred to a subject, cannot be equated with a variable ”x” because ”I” include an unwanted function which gives rise to a nonsensical generality.

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<p>Uppsatsen skrevs under HT18. </p>

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-151).

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Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 143-144). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.