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Three types of logical theoryCunningham, Holly Estil. January 1918 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1918. / "Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries." Includes bibliographical references.
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Die Logik im XVII. Jahrhundert in FinnlandLounela, Jaakko, January 1978 (has links)
Thesis--Helsinki. / Summary in English. Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 146-161).
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Three types of logical theoryCunningham, Holly Estil. January 1918 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1918. / "Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries." Includes bibliographical references.
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Die Logik im XVII. Jahrhundert in FinnlandLounela, Jaakko, January 1978 (has links)
Thesis--Helsinki. / Summary in English. Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 146-161).
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Warrant and objectivityBarton, Jon January 2007 (has links)
Wright's 'Truth and Objectivity' seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. Dummett introduced 'anti-realism’ as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. 'Truth and Objectivity' proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics truth has, in a given area. This pluralism of truth is at odds with deflationism. I find fault with Wright's argument against deflationism. However, transmission of warrant across the Disquotational Schema suffices to ground Wright's proposal, which survives as a pluralism of classes of warrant. The two main debates concern whether truths are always knowable (Epistemic Constraint) and whether disagreements in an area must be down to some fault of one of those involved (Cognitive Command). I introduce Assertoric Constraint, relating to Epistemic Constraint, where truths cannot outstrip the availability of warrant for their assertion. I solve a structural problem by a comparison with a constitutive analysis of Moore's Paradox. The relativism of blameless disagreement is problematic. Wright's response invokes a sort of ignorance which he calls 'Quandary'. I criticise this before proposing an alternative. I agree with Wright that Dummett's original anti-realism does not belong among the positions which Wright seeks to systematise. However, two candidates show that the proposal suffers a weakness. Wright thinks Expressivism misguided, and implicitly rules out his earlier non-cognitivism about necessity. I argue that Expressivism has promise, and I endorse Wright’s Cautious Man argument for non-cognitivism about necessity; both involve play with 'direction-of-fit'. I conclude that this sort of anti-realist debate needs to be accommodated by the proposal.
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Foundations of intensional logicKaplan, David Benjamin, January 1964 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, 1964. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 179-182).
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Psychological reductionism about persons : a critical developmentBaggini, Julian Guiseppe January 1996 (has links)
There is a need to distinguish two questions in the philosophy of persons. One of these is the factual question of identity. This is the question of the conditions of personal identity over time. The other is the first person question of survival. This can be expressed as, "Under which circumstances should I consider a person at another time to be my survivor, who I have reason to care about just as much if he were me?" This second question does not presuppose that the survivor is numerically identical with her predecessor and is the question considered in this thesis. Answering this question requires us to resolve the tension in our concept of a person between, on the one hand, the view of persons as purely physical beings, no more than the sum of their particular parts, bound to the here and now, and on the other hand, as somehow transcendent, beings who exist beyond the here and now. The conception built upon is that offered by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Two errors in Parfit's account are explained and amendments suggested. The first is Parfit's explanation of the unity of a mental life over time in terms of connectedness and continuity between individual, independent thoughts, and secondly his account of connectedness and continuity itself. I suggest that psychological connectedness and continuity must be between persons-at-a-time, not individual thoughts, and that a unified mental life over time is not just a product of enough connections, as Parfit argues, but is determined by the kind of connectedness there is.
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Wittgenstein's Tractatus : a historical and critical commentaryShwayder, D. S. January 1954 (has links)
No description available.
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A study in early medieval mereology Boethius, Abelard, and pseudo-Joscelin /Arlig, Andrew W., January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 338 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 316-338). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.
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Towards a probabilistic semantics for natural language /Roberts, Lesley, January 2003 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Ph.D) - University of Queensland, 2005. / Includes bibliography.
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