Though artificial intelligence scientists frequently use words such as "belief" and "desire" when describing the computational capacities of their programs and computers, they have completely ignored the philosophical and psychological theories of belief and desire. Hence, their explanations of computational capacities which use these terms are frequently little better than folk-psychological explanations. Conversely, though philosophers and psychologists attempt to couch their theories of belief and desire in computational terms, they have consistently misunderstood the notions of computation and computational semantics. Hence, their theories of such attitudes are frequently inadequate. A computational theory of propositional attitudes (belief and desire) is presented here. It is argued that the theory of propositional attitudes put forth by philosophers and psychologists entails that propositional attitudes are a kind of abstract data type. This refined computational view of propositional attitudes bridges the gap between artificial intelligence, philosophy and psychology. Lastly, it is argued that this theory of propositional attitudes has consequences for meta-processing and consciousness in computers.

Social scientific measurement is much desired and much criticized. In this dissertation I evaluate one of the main approaches to social scientific measurement that has nevertheless been virtually ignored by philosophers - the psychometric approach. Psychometric measures are typically used to measure unobservable attributes such as intelligence and personality. They typically take the form of questionnaires or tests and are validated by statistical tests of properties such as reliability and model-fit. My thesis is two-fold. In the first, more critical part, I argue that psychometric instruments normally fail to fulfil plausible criteria for adequate measurement. To make this argument, I define and defend a conception of quantitative representation necessary for measurement. My definition is grounded in the Representational Theory of Measurement but avoids the main critiques this theory has faced. I then show that the typical psychometric process of measure validation fails to produce evidence of such quantitative representation. The upshot is that although a quantitative interpretation of psychometric data is common, it is largely unwarranted. In the second part, I argue that psychometric instruments are nonetheless apt for various other purposes. This argument hinges on a new outlook on how concepts should be formed for psychometric purposes. Philosophers have traditionally thought that concepts should cohere with intuitions and/or pick out so-called natural kinds, while many psychometricians argue that concepts should pick out real as opposed to constructed attributes. I argue that, when it comes to social scientific measurement, it is much more important to focus on the usefulness of the concept, where usefulness can take on different meanings in different contexts. Building on the defended outlook on concept formation, I show what useful functions psychometric instruments can serve even when they fail at quantitative representation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Committee on the Conceptual and Historical Studies of Science, June 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 71). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss., 2002 u.d.T.: Rudlof, Matthias: Männlichkeit und Milieus in der sozialen Arbeit

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2007. / "Publication number: AAT 3295533."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 1999. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (A.M.L.S.)--University of Michigan, 1951-52. / "Library Science 391."

In this thesis, the claim that a flourishing family life should be characterised as a social practice, according to Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of a practice, is defended. Furthermore, it is argued that the social practice of making and sustaining family life pursues certain goods, the achievement of which are constitutive of the family’s flourishing. The argument proceeds through the following stages. In the first part I focus on the Aristotelian premises of the argument and set out MacIntyre’s theoretical framework. I then apply this framework of the relationship between practices and institutions and internal and external goods to the family. In the second part I explore three important contemporary moral theories and how they address what a flourishing family life involves. In doing so, I look at how the Aristotelian approach adopted in this thesis compares to these approaches. The three approaches explored are contemporary liberalism (in particular liberal perfectionism), liberal feminism and feminist care ethics. At the end of this part of the thesis I argue that a synthesis of the Aristotelian framework and the particular insights of care ethics will provide a richer view of what a flourishing family life involves. In the final part of the thesis I provide an outline of some of the goods internal to the practice of life and the different activities and relationships which are constitutive of these goods. I then go on to suggest how families often fail to flourish as a result of the pursuit of external goods as ends in themselves or due to a lack of external goods. The conclusion of this thesis and its original contribution to knowledge is twofold: firstly, that MacIntyre’s contemporary Aristotelianism in combination with the insights of care ethics provides the tools with which we can identify the goods that contribute to and constitute familial flourishing. Secondly, that in order to identify the barriers to flourishing that families encounter, we must first understand what the goods internal and external to the practice are. We must then ensure that the institutions designed to sustain the family subordinate the goods external to family life to the internal goods, which only family members themselves can achieve through co-operative activity with each other.

The thesis strives to introduce and outline a new understanding of sociology based on the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The aim of the thesis is to differentiate the hermeneutical approach from the scientific and from the interpretative paradigm in particular. Hermeneutics does see sociology neither as a science nor as a science of specific (interpretative, hermeneutical, understanding or critical) type, which must be cleared out in the context of the sociological metatheory. I explain the key differences between scientific and hermeneutic point of view according to the works of Martin Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer. Heidegger is instructive for me in the way he reveals the metaphysical roots of modern science. He discloses science as a specific and historical dependent understanding of the world and the man within it. Gadamer's hermeneutics then proclaims understanding as a universal and more fundamental aspect of human being-in-the-world and expounds it with the notion of language, dialogue, the hermeneutical circle, the logic of question and answer, tradition or sensus communis. After differentiating hermeneutics from existing sociological streams of thought I try to use Gadamer's concepts to conceive of society and sociology. I propose to understand society as a historical...