La tradition sociologique oppose généralement deux thèses : individualiste et holiste. Ces caractérisations laissent entendre que la première thèse s’attarde à l’action des individus pour expliquer la société. Ce style s’est développé surtout en Allemagne grâce à Max Weber. La thèse holiste prend une position plus globale en expliquant la société par des faits sociaux. Celle-ci est dite française par l’entremise du père de la sociologie, Émile Durkheim. Pourtant, plusieurs auteurs français ont snobé la tradition allemande pour ramener à l’avant-scène un compatriote qui s’est opposé à Durkheim : Gabriel Tarde. Ces réintroductions ont été produites pour s’opposer aux thèses durkheimiennes qui laisseraient l’individu victime du contexte social dans lequel il se trouve. La sociologie allemande propose déjà une opposition de ce type avec les théories postulant un objet réel et particulier à la sociologie. Pourquoi réintroduire un auteur disparu en sociologie pour prendre la place d’autres qui sont encore là? L’hypothèse serait que Tarde propose un individualisme différent qui se traduirait par une notion d’individu particulière. L’étude comparative du corpus durkheimien et tardien révèle pourtant que ces deux auteurs partagent la plupart des caractéristiques associées à la définition du sens commun de l’individu. L’opposition entre Durkheim et Tarde ne relève pas de la place de l’individu dans la science sociale, mais d’une interprétation différente de certains aspects de la théorie statistique. Ces théories sociales ont été construites grâce à cette notion ce qui laisse penser que certains des problèmes explicatifs de ces dernières pourraient être liés à cette base. / The sociological tradition generally opposes two theses: individualism and holism. The individualist wants to explain society through the actions of its actors. It has been upheld by the German tradition with Max Weber at its head. On the other hand, the holist thesis tries to explain society from above through social facts. The French sociology is central here with Emile Durkheim as its forefather. Despite this antagonism, some French authors have felt the need to reintroduce a forgotten figure from their past: Gabriel Tarde. German sociology already embodied the individualistic view, why then revitalize an old adversary of Durkheim? The working hypothesis was that Tarde might have some very good and different insight on the definition of what the individual needed to be. The comparative study of Tarde’s and Durkheim’s work demonstrates that it isn’t so. They share the same basic common sense definition of the notion of individual. Their opposition was based on some interpretation of statistical theory for sociology. This conclusion points toward the possibility that this notion is the basis for the theorization of sociology which might be a major source of its explanatory problems.

La tradition sociologique oppose généralement deux thèses : individualiste et holiste. Ces caractérisations laissent entendre que la première thèse s’attarde à l’action des individus pour expliquer la société. Ce style s’est développé surtout en Allemagne grâce à Max Weber. La thèse holiste prend une position plus globale en expliquant la société par des faits sociaux. Celle-ci est dite française par l’entremise du père de la sociologie, Émile Durkheim. Pourtant, plusieurs auteurs français ont snobé la tradition allemande pour ramener à l’avant-scène un compatriote qui s’est opposé à Durkheim : Gabriel Tarde. Ces réintroductions ont été produites pour s’opposer aux thèses durkheimiennes qui laisseraient l’individu victime du contexte social dans lequel il se trouve. La sociologie allemande propose déjà une opposition de ce type avec les théories postulant un objet réel et particulier à la sociologie. Pourquoi réintroduire un auteur disparu en sociologie pour prendre la place d’autres qui sont encore là? L’hypothèse serait que Tarde propose un individualisme différent qui se traduirait par une notion d’individu particulière. L’étude comparative du corpus durkheimien et tardien révèle pourtant que ces deux auteurs partagent la plupart des caractéristiques associées à la définition du sens commun de l’individu. L’opposition entre Durkheim et Tarde ne relève pas de la place de l’individu dans la science sociale, mais d’une interprétation différente de certains aspects de la théorie statistique. Ces théories sociales ont été construites grâce à cette notion ce qui laisse penser que certains des problèmes explicatifs de ces dernières pourraient être liés à cette base. / The sociological tradition generally opposes two theses: individualism and holism. The individualist wants to explain society through the actions of its actors. It has been upheld by the German tradition with Max Weber at its head. On the other hand, the holist thesis tries to explain society from above through social facts. The French sociology is central here with Emile Durkheim as its forefather. Despite this antagonism, some French authors have felt the need to reintroduce a forgotten figure from their past: Gabriel Tarde. German sociology already embodied the individualistic view, why then revitalize an old adversary of Durkheim? The working hypothesis was that Tarde might have some very good and different insight on the definition of what the individual needed to be. The comparative study of Tarde’s and Durkheim’s work demonstrates that it isn’t so. They share the same basic common sense definition of the notion of individual. Their opposition was based on some interpretation of statistical theory for sociology. This conclusion points toward the possibility that this notion is the basis for the theorization of sociology which might be a major source of its explanatory problems.

Social science is in crisis. The task of social science is to study “man in situation”: to understand the world as it is for “man”. This thesis charges that this crisis consists in a failure to properly address the philosophical anthropological question “What is man?”. The various social scientific methodologies who have as their object “man” suffer rampant disagreements because they presuppose, rather than consider, what is meant by “man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that social science can provide no formal definition of “man”. In order to understand this we propose a phenomenological analysis into the essence of social science. This phenomenological approach will give us reason to abandon the (sexist) word “man” and instead we will speak of wer: the beings which we are. That we have not used the more usual “human being” (or some equivalent) is due to the human prejudice which is one of the major constituents of this crisis we seek to analyse. This thesis is divided into two Parts: normative and evaluative. In the normative Part we will seek a clarification of both “phenomenology” and “social science”. Due to the various ways in which “phenomenology” has been invented we must secure a simipliciter definition of phenomenology as an approach to philosophical anthropology (Chapter 2). Importantly, we will show how the key instigators of the branches of phenomenology, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre, were all engaged in this task. To clarify our phenomenology we will define the Phenomenological Movement according to various strictures by drawing on the work of Schutz and his notion of provinces of meaning (Chapter 3). This will then be carried forward to show how Schutz’s postulates of social science (with certain clarifications) constitute the eidetic structure of social science (Chapter 4). The eidetic structures of social science identified will prompt several challenges that will be addressed in the evaluative Part. Here we engage in an imperial argument to sort proper science from pseudo-science. The first challenge is the mistaken assumption that universities and democratic states make science possible (Chapter 5). Contra this, we argue that science is predicated on “spare time” and that much institutional “science” is not in fact science. The second challenge is the “humanist challenge”: there is no such thing as nonpractical knowledge (Chapter 6). Dealing with this will require a reconsideration of the epistemic status that science has and lead to the claim of epistemic inferiority. Having cut away pseudo-science we will be able to focus on the “social” of social science through a consideration of intersubjectivity (Chapter 7). Drawing on the above phenomenologists we will focus on how an Other is recognised as Other. Emphasising Sartre’s radical re-conception of “subject” and “object” we will argue that there can be no formal criteria for how this recognition occurs. By consequence we must begin to move away from the assumption of one life-world to various life-worlds, each constituted by different conceptions of wer.

The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories.

The Method and its Disappearance: Analysis between philosophies of social contract and classical sociologies. A Study in Epistemology Jan Maršálek Université de Franche-Comté/Charles University in Prague Supervisors: prof. Frédéric Brahami, prof. Miloslav Petrusek (†), dr. Jan Balon. Résumé: In a doubly disloyal continuity with regard to the French epistemological tradition, largely preoccupied with the formation of scientific concepts, the present work addresses the phenomenon of disappearance of 'analytical' method. Nevertheless, the present work does not constitute an historical investigation: its very goal is to show (within the works of T. Hobbes, J.-J. Rousseau, H. Spencer and E. Durkheim) the variation of the epistemological status of the analysis, and thus to set up the concept of an 'epistemological event'. Examining the disappearance of the analysis requires its identification in the theoretical work whereby its leverage remains unacknowledged. Thus, having the status of a method in the philosophies of the social contract of Hobbes and Rousseau, the analysis 'continues' to structure, in a tacit way, the work of Spencer and Durkheim, both of them founders of scientific sociology. Is it possible to claim that, in the 19th century, the analysis manifests itself in the sociology's common recourse to...

The importance of philosophy and the philosophical is not on the lips of many library and information science practitioners and scholars, even though pervasive in information science theory and practice. This investigation focusses on the relationship between information science, philosophy and the philosophical thinking attitude revealed through theoretical and practical concerns. This includes theory generation arising from the philosophical in exploring the role of philosophy and the philosophical. It takes into account perceived problems in recognising, accepting and rejecting the role of philosophical approaches and the impact in determining the nature and the theoretical and practical aspects of information science. The problem posed by not recognising philosophical approaches, is that the benefits of philosophical thought cannot be drawn on to understand how knowledge, information and its communication manifest through language and language expression. Three pathways are used in order to reveal philosophy and the philosophical in information science, the connection between information retrieval and language, and philosophical thinking attitudes at theoretical and practical levels. The value of the study lies in contributing towards knowledge and awareness of the effect of philosophical theories on problems seen as central research areas in information science and its domains. The methodological approach gives preference to the comparative and pluralistic epistemology of a journey. The study examines Peter Ingwersen’s cognitive perspective and information retrieval interaction, David Blair’s treatment of information retrieval with natural language as primary concern, and Fanie de Beer’s contribution on the inventive act of reading and knowledge organisation, as representative figures. It is argued that information science cannot avoid philosophy in its different manifestations. By understanding how philosophy manifests in information science, such as the role of philosophy revealed through language and information retrieval, an opportunity is offered to reconsider the discipline’s interdisciplinary nature in the existing scholarly and societal environment, and the contribution of its historical development to the assumptions and philosophies underlying the discipline. A further empirical study on how philosophy and the philosophical are embedded in information science research is recommended. It could investigate the influence of philosophy on decisions made by South African universities to redesign information science research and study programmes. / Biblioteek- en inligtingkundige praktisyns praat nie dikwels oor die belangrikheid van filosofie en die filosofiese nie, hoewel dit algemeen in die teorie en praktyk van inligtingkunde voorkom. Hierdie ondersoek fokus op die verband tussen inligtingkunde, filosofie en die filosofiese denkhouding wat deur teoretiese en praktiese aspekte blootgelê word. Dit sluit die skepping in van teorieë wat uit die filosofiese voortspruit met die ondersoek na die rol van filosofie en die filosofiese. Dit neem kennis van vermeende probleme met herkenning, aanvaarding en verwerping van die rol van filosofiese benaderings en die impak op bepaling van die aard en die teoretiese en praktiese aspekte van inligtingkunde. Die probleem wat veroorsaak word deur nie die filosofiese benaderings te erken nie, is dat die voordele van filosofiese denke nie gebruik kan word om te verstaan hoe kennis, inligting en die kommunikasie daarvan in taal- en taaluitdrukking manifesteer nie. Drie weë word gevolg om die filosofie en die filosofiese in inligtingkunde, die verband tussen inligtingontsluiting en taal, en filosofiese denkhouding op teoretiese en praktiese vlak aan te toon. Die waarde van die studie lê daarin dat dit bydra tot kennis en bewustheid van die uitwerking van filosofiese teorieë op probleme wat as sentrale navorsingsgebiede in inligtingkunde en sy domeine beskou word. Die metodologiese benadering gee voorkeur aan die vergelykende en pluralistiese epistemologie van 'n reis. Die studie ondersoek Peter Ingwersen se kognitiewe perspektief en interaksie met inligtingontsluiting, David Blair se hantering van inligtingontsluiting met natuurlike taal as primêre belang, en Fanie de Beer se bydrae oor die vindingryke handeling van lees- en kennisorganisasie, as verteenwoordigende figure. Daar word aangevoer dat inligtingkunde nie filosofie in sy verskillende manifestasies kan vermy nie. Deur te verstaan hoe filosofie in inligtingkunde manifesteer, soos die rol van filosofie wat deur taal- en inligtingontsluiting openbaar word, word die geleentheid gebied om die dissipline se interdissiplinêre aard in die bestaande wetenskaplike en samelewingsomgewing en die bydrae van die historiese ontwikkeling daarvan tot die aannames en filosofieë onderliggend aan die dissipline te heroorweeg. 'n Verdere empiriese studie oor hoe filosofie en die filosofiese in inligtingkundige navorsing vervat is, word aanbeveel. Dit kan die invloed van filosofie op besluite wat Suid-Afrikaanse universiteite neem om navorsings- en studieprogramme vir inligtingkunde te herontwerp, ondersoek. / Bohlokwa bja filosofi le bja tiriso ya filosofi bo bolelwa kudu ke basomi ba bantsi ba dithutamahlale tsa bokgobapuku le tshedimoso le dirutegi, le ge e le gore di tletse kudu ka go teori le tiriso ya dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso. Dinyakisiso tse di nepisitse go kamano magareng ga dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso, filosofi le maikutlo a go nagana ka filosofi ao a utollotswego ka dipelaelo mabapi le teori le tiriso. Se se akaretsa moloko wo o dirisago teori e lego seo se bakilwego ke tiriso ya filosofi go utolla mosomo wa filosofi le wa tiriso ya filosofi. Di hlokometse kudu mathata ao a bonwago ka go lekodisisa, go amogela le go gana mosomo wa mekgwa ya filosofi le seabe sa go tseba mokgwa le dilo tsa teori le tsa tiriso ya dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso. Bothata bjo bo laeditswego bja go se lemoge mekgwa ya filosofi, ke gore mehola ya kgopolo ya filosofi e ka se diriswe gore re kwesise ka fao tsebo, tshedimoso le poledisano ka ga yona di ka phethagatswago ka polelo le tlhagiso ya polelo. Ditsela tse tharo di a diriswa ka nepo ya go utolla filosofi le tiriso ya filosofi ka go dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso, kamano magareng ga go hwetsa tshedimoso le polelo, le mekgwa ya go nagana ka filosofi maemong a teori le a tiriso. Boleng bja dinyakisiso tse ke go ba le seabe go tsebo le go temoso ka ga seabe sa diteori tsa filosofi go mathata ao a bonwego bjalo ka dinyakisiso tse bohlokwa ka go dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso le go makala a tsona. Tsela ye ya go dirisa mekgwa e rata kudu mokgwa wa papetso le wa go tseba dilo ka tsela ye e fapafapanego mo leetong. Dinyakisiso tse di lekodisisa mokgwa wa kwesiso le kamano ya go hwetsa tshedimoso tsa Peter Ingwersen, kwesiso ya David Blair ya go hwetsa tshedimoso le polelo ya tlhago bjalo ka selo seo se tlisago tlhobaelo ya mathomo, le seabe sa Fanie de Beer ka ga tiro ya boitlhamelo ya go bala le go beakanya tsebo, bjalo ka dilo tseo di tlisago kemelo. Go bolelwa gore dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso di ka se kgone go efoga filosofi ka tirisong ya tsona ye e fapafapanego. Ka go kwesisa ka fao filosofi e diriswago ka gona ka go dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso, go swana le ge mosomo wa filosofi o utollotswe ka polelo le ka go utolla tshedimoso, sebaka se a fiwa go lebeledisisa leswa seemo sa thuto ye sa kamano le dithuto tse dingwe ka seemong sa bjale sa dirutegi le ka setshabeng, le seabe sa tlhabollo ya yona mo nakong ye e fetilego go ditshisinyo le go difilosofi tseo di thekgago thuto ye. Dinyakisiso tse dingwe tseo di theilwego go boitemogelo ka ga ka fao filosofi le tiriso ya filosofi di tsentswego ka go dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso di a sisinywa. Di ka nyakisisa khuetso ya filosofi go diphetho tseo di dirilwego ke diyunibesithi tsa Afrika Borwa go hlama leswa dinyakisiso tsa dithutamahlale tsa tshedimoso le go mananeo a dithuto. / Information Science / Ph. D. (Information Science)