Central to the philosophy of Aristotle is the belief that the aim of serious enquiry is knowledge of the constitutive essences of a given field. Modern scientific essentialism claims that this still holds good, and this thesis aims to support that approach by elucidating and applying the original concept of essence. Chapter one argues that Aristotle formulated his theory of essences entirely in the context of the theory of explanation expounded in Posterior Analytics. The components of that theory are explained, and the implications of Aristotle’s view for current debate are considered. Chapter two examines the reasons for the decline of Aristotelian essentialism during the scientific revolution, the metaphysical problems which resulted, and Leibniz’s reasons for defending the older view. Chapter three considers the nature of explanation in a modern context, starting with the preconditions for any grasp of reality that are needed to make explanations possible; it is then argued that only essentialist explanation can occupy the role which these preconditions entail. Chapter four surveys the components of that picture of reality that seem explicable, to see how essentialist explanations would actually be formulated. The theoretical discussion concludes with an account of what form essences should take, in order to occupy the explanatory role that has been assigned to them. The final chapter examines the cases of counting physical objects, explaining abstract axiomatic systems, and the discovery of the periodic table of elements, showing how attempts at explanation in these cases all converge on the sorts of essence which have been delineated in the thesis.

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The goal of this thesis is to create a distinctively Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical schema. I shall do this in four stages. First, in chapter one, I am going to present a summary of Aristotelian metaphysics. I will present a slightly Thomistic take on Aristotelian metaphysics specifically when it comes to the distinction between accidental and substantial form. However, I will present a more classically Aristotelian account when it comes to the source of teleology. Along the way I will explore whether science can disprove any aspects of Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, I will examine whether science can show that there are no final causes, and whether evolution poses problems for the Aristotelian concept of form and essence in biology. Second, in chapter two, I shall explain the nature of goodness within this metaphysical schema. I will also engage with competing accounts of the nature of goodness and will argue that my Aristotelian account is superior. Third, in chapter three, I will list and defend my account of the basic goods. I will also explain why certain things, such as pleasure and freedom, are not included in my list of the basic goods. I will then explain how and why they do fit into my schema. Finally, in chapter four, I will move onto duties. I will show how we can derive a list of pro tanto duties from the Aristotelian ethical schema. Along the way I will also briefly sketch out an account of human rights. My ethical theory will differ from many contemporary neo-Aristotelians in that it will place emphasis on, and smoothly follow from, Aristotelian metaphysics. At the same time, my ethical theory will differ from more traditional neo-Aristotelians and the medieval neo-Aristotelians in the way that it reconciles an Aristotelian ethical schema with a non-natural account of goodness and a reasons-based account of obligation.

The study deals generally with Aristotle's ethical and political philosophy; the primary theme, however, is Aristotle’s theory of the nature of society as expounded in the First Book of the Politics. The study, therefore refrains from going into the details of the so-called primitive elements in Greek culture, and of questions like exogamy, endogamy, totemism etc. which bulk so largely in works like G. Thomson's "Studies in Ancient Greek Society". The introduction deals with earlier conceptions of man and society as reflected in the conception of dúois gives some close attention to Protagoras' doctrine of the development of society as expressed in Plato's 'Protagoras'. Chapter 2 examines Plato's conception of dúois and relates this to his theory of man and society. Chapter 3 critically examines the various conceptions of dúois ascribed to Aristotle, especially in so far as those views imply judgements on Aristotle's doctrines in the Politics. Chapter k examines Aristotle's conception of human nature, and of the relation of Ethics to Politics. Chapter 5 examines the Greek Household and Aristotle's conception of the nature of the Household. Chapter 6 deals with Aristotle's theory of slavery. Chapter 7 gives an account of the Greek village or clan-community the development of the village-community is reviewed with reference to the emergence of the state and Aristotle’s conception of the role of the village in the developed state. Attention is here drawn to the 'tribal' , elements in Aristotle's political thought. Chapter 8 examines Aristotle's conception of the nature of the city-state. Attention is drawn to both the merits and the inadequacies of Aristotle's conception of the state through a close examination of his conception of (a) political justice and (b) friendship or social sympathy. Finally, though no special attempt has been made in the study to gig into the primitive past of Greek culture, it is argued that the society which Aristotle analysed has sufficient similarities to some West African societies to make his categories applicable to those societies. These similarities are more obvious in family and religious customs, but even, in more political terms, what Aristotle says of the clan-village contains lessons relevant to the study of any 'tribally' based society.

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