abstract: There is ample evidence from psychology and cognitive science that a person's beliefs, memories, expectations, concepts, and desires can influence how that person perceives the world. In other words, the way an object looks (the color, size, shape, etc.) to a person can vary according to his or her beliefs, memories, desires, and so on. But a person is principally justified in his or her beliefs about the world by how things look to that person. So, if how things look to a person justifies that person's beliefs about the world, and that person's prior beliefs, memories, and desires influence how things look, then his or her prior beliefs, memories, and desires influence the justification for his or her beliefs about the world. This influence creates several significant philosophical problems. In this dissertation, I introduce and attempt to solve these problems by constructing a theory of justification in which a person's beliefs about the world are justified if and only if his or her prior beliefs, memories, and desires constitute a coherent worldview. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2011

<p> It is necessary to increase emergency preparedness in the United States, to ensure safety for all Americans before, during, and after critical incidents. Historical research on emergency preparedness indicated that the need to increase disaster preparedness in the United States is known, but how to accomplish gaining the necessitated increase of emergency preparedness is not known. Due to the shortage of information on how to increase emergency preparedness, this study was designed to reveal an understanding of how to increase disaster preparedness in the United States. Results from this study will offer the public service leadership industry valuable information to utilize in further study of how to effectively accomplish increasing disaster preparedness in the United States. The study was a qualitative phenomenological research study with a phenomenological method of data collection. When the information acquired from descriptive answers provided by qualified participants was compared to historical research using content data analysis, three themes were revealed. The first theme presented information supporting the necessity to increase emergency preparedness in the United States. The second theme revealed the concerns among emergency management preparedness researchers and practitioners that disaster preparedness may be too complex to accomplish increasing. The third theme offers suggestions of how to improve present methods of disaster preparedness encouragement in the United States.</p><p>

The recognition of the other and how the other affects our individual, free self-consciousness, is explained by Hegel in the dialectic of the master-slave relationship. In Hegel's view, self-consciousness is a self-consciousness only by existing for another self-consciousness. Hegel makes it clear that the relation between individual, independent, and free, self-consciousnesses is needed for the freedom of all self-consciousness. This process first exhibits the side of the inequality of the two, one self-consciousness only recognizing, the other self-consciousness being only recognized, the master and the slave. When the slave submits to the master, the master does not directly relate to the slave. What really confronts the master is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one, although it is in his labor that the slave transforms servitude into mastery. Since the master's desires are fulfilled by the slave in the things the slave produces, the master becomes dependent on the slave and is no longer an independent self-consciousness. The slave then recognizes he no longer needs the master to fulfill his development as a free self-consciousness. The master must thus come to acknowledge this in the slave and learn to map his own point of view on that of the slave who is emerging as independent. We come to understand both why the situation of mastery and slavery emerges, why it is inadequate as a stance of free self-consciousness and why mutual recognition alone will lead us to free self-consciousnesses discovered in a social community consisting of independent, free individuals.

<p> This dissertation addresses a set of problems in understanding the Stoic physics of time. It begins by investigating the ontology of time as an incorporeal in Stoic physics. I show that time is constructed as a deliberate parallel to two of the other incorporeals &ndash; place and void. Time is defined as the &ldquo;<i>diast&emacr;ma</i>&rdquo; of motion, and much of the debate over the Stoic theory of time has centered on the definition of this term &ldquo;<i>diast&emacr;ma</i>,&rdquo; which may mean interval, extension, or dimension. I argue that only the reading of &ldquo;dimension&rdquo; makes sense in the context of Stoic physics. Place turns out to have three dimensions, measuring the height, depth, and breadth of bodies, while time adds a fourth dimension of motion that measures fast and slow of bodies in motion. </p><p> The second half of the dissertation addresses the vexed problem of the present in Stoicism. Multiple sources tell us that the present has a different status from the past and future&mdash;the past and future merely &ldquo;subsist&rdquo; while the present &ldquo;is real.&rdquo; However, this account is complicated by strong evidence that the Stoic present is <i>composed</i> of past and future. Furthermore, Stoic accounts of divisibility leave the length of the present apparently indefinite. If the present is ontologically privileged, it seems that it cannot be of indefinite length. If the present is real but the past and future are not, it seems that the present cannot be composed of past and future. </p><p> I resolve these problems by arguing that the Stoics had two interrelated definitions of the present, and that the apparently conflicting pieces of evidence refer to different kinds of present. The first present is called &ldquo;precise&rdquo; or &ldquo;narrow&rdquo; and corresponds to a point of zero duration. As it has no duration, it is not a continuum, and as it is not a continuum it is not, technically, a time. A secondary &ldquo;broad&rdquo; present, composed of past and future times, is present in virtue of containing this present. It derives a special ontology from its relationship to the strict present, despite being composed of past and future.</p><p>

This thesis examines the notion of experience in the philosophy of Walter Benjamin. It focuses on the relationship between its constructive and disruptive features in four facets of Benjamin’s work, starting with the early writings dedicated to history and tradition and then moving towards different analyses of the reception of the work of art in modernity. Chapter I examines Benjamin’s early characterisation of experience on the basis of the transmissibility of tradition and suggests that the constructive character of experience manifests in the historical development of knowledge and truth in language. Chapter II is dedicated to The Origin of the German Mourning-Play and the shift towards an examination of the development of language from the perspective of the moments of rupture, forgetting and those deviations inherent in the transmissibility of tradition. I argue that experience appears immanently in the momentary suspension or interruption of the transmissibility of tradition: origin and allegory serve to characterise the double movement of concentrating the totality of tradition and suspending its objectivity. The ‘shattering of tradition’ that Benjamin regards to be the hallmark of modernity in his later writings is located within this dynamics. This shattering undermines the conditions for understanding the conflict out of which the present emerges, thereby producing a historiographic crisis which unsettles experience. Chapter III examines modern epic narration and the resources it develops to contests the forgetting which informs late capitalism. I specifically discuss the method of montage and the fragmentary memory associated with it to suggest that Benjamin looks at history from the standpoint of memory rather than from the perspective of tradition. Chapter IV discuses the radicalisation of the forgetting informing modernity and the possibility of developing, though momentarily, an equilibrium or interplay between technology and sensibility by means of long-term practice formed according to technical reproducibility and the principle of montage. It is finally argued that despite Benjamin’s constant emphasis on its destructive character, experience necessarily entails a cumulative or constructive dimension which Benjamin reformulates throughout his authorship in terms of tradition, memory and practice.

On Tradition”. Tradition plays a vital role as an ontological and explanatory concept quite apart from its frequent use as a moral and political one. Human scientists often explain features of actions, practices or works by locating them in a tradition, and even scholars who explicitly reject the concept of tradition often adopt related concepts to describe the impact of context upon human activity. It appears, then, that a concept such as tradition, structure, heritage, or paradigm has an important role to play in our understanding of the human condition. This paper analyses this ontological and explanatory concept of tradition. It asks, why do we need such a concept? What content we should give to it? What role does it play in our accounts of human affairs? The analysis takes us away from essentialist accounts of traditions as defined by fixed features toward one that sees them as composed of conceptual and historical connections. It thus seeks to allow for the contingent and fluid nature of social life. / La tradición juega un papel vital como concepto ontológico y explicativo, además de su frecuente uso como concepto moral o político. Los humanistas suelen explicar las características de las acciones, las prácticas o las labores ubicándolas en una tradición. Incluso los académicos que rechazan explícitamente el concepto de tradición, adoptan con frecuencia conceptos afines para describir el impacto del contexto sobre la actividad humana. Al parecer, pues, un concepto como el de la tradición, la estructura, la herencia o el paradigma, cumple un importante papel en nuestra comprensión de la condición humana. Este artículo analiza ese concepto ontológico y explicativo de la tradición. Se pregunta, ¿por qué necesitamos de tal concepto? ¿Qué contenido deberíamos darle? ¿Qué papel cumple en nuestras consideraciones de los asuntos humanos? El análisis nos conduce, lejos de las posturas esencialistas en torno a las tradiciones que las definen como rasgos dados, hacia una postura que las considera compuestas de conexiones conceptuales e históricas. Busca, de este modo, tener en cuenta la naturaleza contingente y fluida de la vida social.

In this note we discuss a general form of the Deduction Theorem (DT) for first order modal systems, which permits to derive severa! other formulations of DT found in the literature, and their relationship with the Barcan's Formula / En esta nota discutimos una forma generaldel Teorema de Deducción (TD) para sistemas modales de primer orden, la cual permite derivar varias otras formulaciones del mismoque aparecen en la literatura, así como su relación con la Fórmula de Barcan

Kant' s jurídical and polítical meditations fit inside the critical system as a proyect that faces the challenge of building a bridge between liberty and nature. In this sense, law, conceived by Kant as categorical imperative, must accomplish the task of conciliating the need to reform the State in order to achieve justice with the preservation of an irresistible civil authority. The polítical problem is, then, to resolve the conflict between liberty and order. The polítical antinomy (empiricism vs. fanaticism) is resolved with the definition of a practical rationality based on the publicity of polítical rules. Without abolishing the difficulties of Kant's jurídical philosophy, this solution allows to define an intersubjective space of polítical rationality, both free of jurídical positivism and decisionism as well as of historicism or of the dictatorship of a fanatical reason. / La reflexión jurídica y política de Kant se inscribe al interior del sistema crítico como proyecto de asumir el reto de edificar un puente entre la libertad y la naturaleza. En este sentido, el derecho, concebido por Kant como imperativo categórico, debe cumplir con la tarea de conciliar la exigencia de la reforma del Estado para la realización de la justicia con la conservación de una autoridad estatal irresistible. El problema político es, pues, de resolver el conflicto entre la libertad y el orden. La antinomia política (empirismo vs fanatismo) se resuelve con la definición de una racionalidad práctica basada en la publicidad de las máximas políticas. Sin abolir las dificultades de la filosofía jurídica kantiana, esa solución permite definir un espacio intersubjetiva de racionalidad política liberado tanto del positivismo jurídico y del decisionismo que del historicismo o de la dictadura de una razón fanática.

This paper mainly proposes to point out some aspects that render hermeneutics pertinent within the context of political discussion, defending it from attacks mostly stemming from a philosophy of  critical consciousness such as Habermas’s, Adorno’s, and some of their followers. It will be shown, from Gadamer’s perspective, how hermeneutics responds to those critiques within its conception of understanding as a fundamental task and a primordial political space. Contrary to a philosophy that appeals to the need of taking its distance” as a starting point of critique, only place of a true political philosophy and political action, Gadamer’s hermeneutics proposes an alternative that deserves to be considered: it is in dialogue, in the shared space of understanding, rather than in critique, that humans un-veil the possibilities of what is, where the openness of their freedom is given and, consequently, where the space of politics develops –thus in action rather that in reflection. / El presente artículo tiene como tarea principal señalar algunos aspectos que hacen pertinente a la hermenéutica dentro del marco de la discusión política, defendiéndola de los ataques que se le han propugnado sobre todo desde una fi losofía de la conciencia crítica como la de Habermas, Adorno y algunos de sus seguidores. Se mostrará, a partir de Gadamer, cómo la hermenéutica responde a dichas críticas en el marco de su propuesta de la comprensión como tarea fundamental y como espacio político primordial. Frente a una fi losofía que apela a la necesidad de una toma de distancia” como punto de partida de la crítica, único lugar de una verdadera fi losofía y acción políticas, la hermenéutica de Gadamer presenta una alternativa que vale la pena ser rescatada: es en el diá-logo, en el espacio compartido de la comprensión, más que en la crítica, donde el hombre des-encubre las posibilidades de lo que es, donde se da la apertura de su libertad, y, por consiguiente, donde se desenvuelve, en la acción, antes que en la refl exión, el espacio de lo político.

Husserl’s overcoming of the Modern representationalist and immanentist notions of consciousness and knowledge is tied to the early development of his sui generis concept of intentionality. This development is the result of logical and psychological studies, the latter laying open different modalities of intuition: the founded modes –eidetic and categorial– and the sensible founding modes, all of which presuppose the most basic and founding mode –that of perception. Although the Husserlian concept of intentionality is determined by Husserl’s discovery of ideality” in his logicsemantic investigations, no less relevant are Husserl psychological studies and the early development of a non-representationalist notion of perception. This paper will attempt to highlight some salient features of Husserl’s early phenomenology of perception and its overcoming of representationalism. / La superación husserliana de las nociones representacionalistas e inmanentistas modernas de conciencia y conocimiento está atada al desarrollo temprano de su concepto sui generis de intencionalidad. Este desarrollo es fruto, a su vez, tanto de investigaciones lógicas como psicológicas, estas últimas dando paso a distintas formas de intuición: las formas fundadas –eidética y categorial– y las fundantes sensibles, todas las cuales presuponen el tipo básico y fundante –la percepción misma. Si bien el concepto de intencionalidad husserliano está determinado por el descubrimiento de la idealidad” en investigaciones lógico-semánticas, no menos relevante es el papel de las investigaciones psicológicas de Husserl y el desarrollo temprano de su noción no representacionalista de percepción. Este texto intentará echar luces sobre ciertos rasgos de la temprana fenomenología de la percepción de Husserl y su superación del representacionalismo.