The thesis defended in this paper is that theHigher-Order Thought Theory is actually inconsistent. According to the theoryit would be possible to introduce the notion of a second-order quasi-thoughtfrom S. Shoemaker’s notion of a quasi-memory. On the one hand, a secondorderquasi-thought, but not necessarily a quasi-memory, entails an use of ‘I’as subject. On the other hand, Shoemaker conceives the use of ‘I’ as subjectin terms of the notion of an immunity to error through misidentification. Now,as the notion of a quasi-memory as the notion of a second-order quasi-thoughtare liable to allow for the cases of personal and psychological fission where thecausal series between events belonging to one and the same subject is broken,and thus there is not an immunity to error through misidentification. Then, thenotion of a second-order quasi-thought would allow for cases where an use of ‘I’as subject is not immune to error through misidentification! / La tesis defendida en este artículo es que la teoría reflexiva del pensamiento consciente es realmente inconsistente. Según la teoría, sería posible introducir la noción de un cuasi-pensamiento de segundo-orden a partir de la noción, de S. Shoemaker, de un cuasi-recuerdo. Por un lado, un cuasi-pensamiento de segundo-orden, pero no necesariamente un cuasi-recuerdo, entraña un uso de yo” como sujeto. Por otro lado, Shoemaker concibe el uso de yo” como sujeto en términos de la noción de una inmunidad al error por un fallo de identificación. Ahora bien, tanto la noción de un cuasi-recuerdo como la noción de un cuasi pensamiento de segundo-orden están sujetas a dar entrada a casos de fisión personal y psicológica donde la serie causal entre sucesos pertenecientes a uno y el mismo sujeto está rota y, de este modo, no hay inmunidad al error por un fallo de identificación. Entonces, ¡la noción de un cuasi-pensamiento de segundo orden daría entrada a casos donde un uso de yo” como sujeto no es inmune al error por un fallo de identificación!

abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to present and analyze experimental evidence involving anti-substitution intuitions about co-referential names in simple sentences. In her book Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, Jennifer Saul claims that anti-substitution intuitions involving co-referential names in simple sentences are particularly resistant, so much so that they exist even when one is given an identity statement that shows that the two names refer to the same individual. She uses this claim to motivate her thesis that a psychological explanation is needed to understand why these anti-substitution intuitions exist. Her theory is that before people know that two names co-refer to an individual, they have two "nodes" or "mental files" that contain information that is associated with the name. Saul claims that the reason anti-substitution intuitions in simple sentences involving co-referential names are resistant is that when people find out that two names co-refer to an individual, they do not merge the nodes into a single node, but instead the nodes are kept separate and are linked. The linked nodes then are capable of sharing information, though they do not do so by default. Instead, good reasons are needed for the sharing of information. The experimental results show that, contrary to Saul's claims, anti-substitution intuitions of this sort are not resistant such that they persist even when one is given the identity statement. This evidence is used to call into doubt the psychological explanation given by Saul and is used to raise the possibility that a particular implicature view can better explain these anti-substitution intuitions. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2014

Abstract not available.

The aim of this thesis is to provide an answer to the problem of meaning scepticism as presented by Kripke by appealing to facets of a person's mental history. Following Wright's strategy, the sceptic's demand for a fact that determines meaning is placated by appealing to intentions. The focus of the problem becomes the need for a satisfactory account of first-person authority that also answers Kripke's argument from 'queerness'. Two approaches are presented, one from the traditional first-person perspective, and the other from Davidson's standpoint of the interdependence of self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds and knowledge of the external world. It will be shown that Davidson's approach is preferable because it answers Kripke's three problems. An interesting corollary of this research exposes similarities between Wright's judgement-dependence and Davidson's views on the theory of interpretation.

Perennially, investigations into Plato's use of myths have hinged on a distinction between muthos and logos, from which logos is privileged as philosophical discourse, while muthoi are relegated to tools of persuasion for the non-philosophical. Focussing exclusively on the Republic, this thesis argues that Plato's myths can constitute a necessary, although not a sufficient component of Plato's philosophical discourse. In his discussion of the section of dianoiu in the Divided Line, Plato writes: "the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion (510b4-6)." Elaborating on this passage, I shall demonstrate how dianoetic understandings rely on the collaboration of both images and argument. I argue that Plato presents the Myth of Er as a dianoetic image, on which Plato's arguments concerning the justice rely.

This thesis is an exploration of Edmund Husserl's early writings on internal time-consciousness (Husserliana X, 1893-1917). Developments in Husserl's method of phenomenological exploration are presented. Changes in Husserl's models of internal time consciousness are also presented. In the concluding sections of this thesis, the developments in Husserl's early writings on time are examined in the context of Husserl's overall philosophical project. This thesis supports the secondary literature that argues that Husserl underwent significant developments in his phenomenological method because of his early exploration of time and time-consciousness.

The purpose of this preliminary study is to assess levels of compassion fatigue, burnout, and compassion satisfaction in frontline shelter workers, with consideration of demographic and spiritual characteristics as possible ameliorating factors. The study participants are frontline workers in three emergency men's shelters in Ottawa. Research in related fields, particularly health care and mental health, indicates a prevalence of compassion fatigue and burnout among human service personnel, either as a result of direct exposure to acts of aggression (primary exposure) or as a result of working with persons in distress (secondary exposure). The Professional Quality Of Life Scale was used to assess the responses of frontline shelter workers on measures of compassion fatigue, burnout, and compassion satisfaction. The Spiritual Well-Being and Community Spirituality Scales were used to assess spirituality on the domains of faith, hope and love.

The main aim of this study was to gain a better understanding of the experience of praying with a sacred object during a time of stress and to examine the influence this process has on coping and spiritual growth. Using a transcendental phenomenological methodology, the essential structure of the prayer experience was uncovered. Several unexpected features of the nature and function of sacred prayer objects revealed themselves. (1) Sacred prayer objects are often introduced to the individual in childhood becoming vital components of spiritual life by adulthood. (2) As symbols of the sacred the objects become a source of comfort, guidance and strength, providing short term relief from negative emotions. (3) As symbols of a faith tradition as well as personal spiritual beliefs, ongoing prayer with the objects provides a rich framework within which rumination and reflection on the stressful event may take place. This process supports positive meaning making often resulting in positive reappraisal and spiritual growth.

La grande ville moderne est un lieu de circulation capitaliste dans lequel la rétention des souvenirs et la constitution d'une mémoire collective semblent de moins en moins probables. Les schèmes traditionnels de la mémoire s'effondrent. Sous la République de Weimar, Siegfried Kracauer (1889-1966), un essayiste à la fois philosophe et sociologue, a non seulement étudié cette situation, mais il a aussi cherché un genre littéraire dans lequel le quotidien urbain moderne pourrait être representé et ainsi davantage mémorise. Ses "miniatures urbaines", en phase avec le rythme de la vie en ville, ont pour objectif de dévoiler des fragments de mémoire collective dans la grande ville. Kracauer veut offrir aux citadins un moyen de remémoration et de distanciation critique grâce auquel ils pourraient prendre conscience des contradictions qui traversent leur ville et leur quotidien, et, ultimement, agir et transformer ceux-ci. Kracauer s'oppose à l'organisation de l'espace totalement planifié et unifié corollaire du mode de production capitaliste que défend en majeure partie l'urbanisme moderne. Amoureux de la flânerie, il préfère l'aléatoire, le provisoire et le contingent. Selon lui, la rétention du temps vécu dans la grande ville moderne, condition minimale de la constitution d'une mémoire dans celle-ci, s'effectue de manière hétérogène, poreuse et improvisée. Dans les "miniatures urbaines" de Kracauer, l'espace urbain n'est pas une simple matière inerte, malléable et calculable, mais il est, d'abord et avant tout, un espace narratif irréductible, c'est-à-dire un espace contenant des histoires, ou, autrement dit, des vestiges du passé et des constellations porteuses d'avenir.

In this thesis I examine John Dewey's discussion of the natural bases of inquiry---his attempt to show how intelligent behaviour is continuous with, and a special case of, organic behaviour more generally conceived. I argue that as "the tool of tools", he takes language to be a crucial element in intelligence as it enables an organism to exert control over the formation of its habits through inquiry (EN: 134). For behaviour to be intelligent, he thinks, not only requires an organism to exert control over its habit formation but also requires that an organism exercise control over its behaviour using the best means available. The scientific method of forming beliefs, he claims, provides the best available basis for intelligent action. It is for this reason that Dewey takes scientific inquiries, in particular, to be exemplary of inquiry and why he identifies the scientific method as method of intelligence.