The first chapter explains Derrida's notion of the trace as the opening of subjectivity to alterity. Autonomy must be rethought as a heteronomic relation with nonhuman others---beings of the world, ecosystems, etc. The second chapter explains the ethical relevance of Husserl's thought for Derrida's project. The third chapter explains many of the implications of Derrida's thought in Of Grammatology. Some of the distinctions between humans and other animals are rethought. In the fourth chapter, Derrida opens Rousseau's conceptions of pity and justice to include nonhuman animals. Next, the deconstruction of Being-towards-death has many implications, such as opening Dasein's responsibility to nonhuman animals. Chapter six claims that we must move beyond the duty of Kant. We must do so in order to be more responsible to the uniqueness of the other, including other cats and horses. Finally, the essential condition of the opening of the ethical and the political is the affirmation of nature and animality, contrary to the thought of Hegel.

The first chapter is an examination of four projects of clarification which are all studies in one way or another of the deep disagreement between Derrida and Ricoeur. The objective is to show how these studies as clarifying projects simplify and even over-simplify the nature of this disagreement or, more broadly, Derrida's and Ricoeur's both convergent and divergent discourses on metaphor. The following four chapters are the analysis proper of the dynamics of the deep disagreement. These dynamics, being both ethical and epistemological, are as much about the indirect as the direct encounters between Derrida and Ricoeur. The second chapter analyses Derrida's essay, "La mythologie blanche," as challenge to the tradition which Ricoeur, its undeclared champion, must take up. Accordingly, the third and fourth chapters are devoted to analysing how Ricoeur meets this challenge in La metaphore vive. While the third chapter is devoted to analysing Ricoeur's indirect encounter with Derrida's project, the fourth is devoted to analysing his direct encounter. The latter is essentially his critical analysis of "La mythologie blanche" in the last study of La metaphore vive. In turn, Derrida responds to Ricoeur's critique with a polemic and an expose of sorts in "Le retrait de la metaphore." Analysing how Derrida takes aim at Ricoeur through Heidegger is the task of the fifth and final chapter.

This thesis attempts to show a relevant correlation between Heidegger's conception of language, as rooted in the logos, and the possibility for ethical action. That language is the primary mode of disclosure for Dasein suggests that the character of language will inflect the disclosure, and so the constitution of the world, according to the shape and way we use language. In short, the character of the world disclosed will be coloured by the language of disclosure. Thus, possibilities for ethical acting, insofar as we live in a world primordially constituted by language, arise in language and remain there with its users. As is well known, Heidegger does not address the issue of ethical possibilities directly. Therefore, this is an interpretive, though as I contend an entirely plausible, reading of Heidegger's works mainly before and around Sein und Zeit. The interpretation suggests that there are language-based ethical possibilities implicit in his philosophy.

Readily acknowledged as two of the intellectual giants of twentieth century French thought, Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault are typically depicted as philosophical opposites. Sartre and Foucault are certainly distinct philosophers, but such a portrayal all too often obscures important similarities in their thought. This thesis, by arguing that Sartre and Foucault are not worlds apart on the question of freedom, attempts to bridge the distance that is commonly regarded to exist between these two. This task is accomplished by bringing to light specific affinities between Sartre and Foucault on the issue of freedom that occur at different junctures in their oeuvres. By proceeding with a critical intention in mind, this thesis provides an interpretative analysis that elucidates three important similarities between Sartre and Foucault: first, it will be shown that when Foucault, in his later thought, unequivocally raises the issue of freedom, he proposes an ethical orientation that is not markedly different from the one suggested by Sartre in his early existentialism. Both Sartre and Foucault put forth an ethical motive that relates to the creativity of the subject. It will be argued that this idea of creative freedom, implicit in Sartre's notion of authentic freedom and explicit in Foucault's proposal for an aesthetics of existence, can be related to an historical idea of artistic freedom, specifically, the autonomy that modern art promises. By showing that the concept of freedom which modern art presumes is a contentious issue, this thesis also argues that the idea of creative freedom in Sartre and Foucault is nothing less than an empty ethical suggestion. By tracing the theme of the gaze in Sartre and Foucault, the next motive will to be show that their thought is motivated by a similar recognition: the notion that humans gaze upon themselves and their world through an objective lens that limits freedom. It will be argued that this insight can be associated with another insight that Sartre and Foucault share: the idea that universal morality is impossible. Although morality, in the eyes of Sartre and Foucault, is impossible, it will be argued that their political activity, while not revealing a universal moral project, nevertheless discloses an ethical impetus. The final convergence that will be presented is that Sartre and Foucault, via different avenues, illustrate that freedom takes place in a socio-historical field that governs and determines its possibilities. Although this conclusion is a result of each thinker's engagement with history, it will be argued that neither Sartre or Foucault presents a convincing way out of this historical nightmare. In fact, by considering the implications of their refusal to introduce an idea of the good into the social field, it will be shown that both reduce the status of freedom to a negative concept.

The thesis examines what counts as a moral act for John Duns Scotus when he considers the two innate affections (or propensities) of the will, the affection for the advantageous (affectio commode) and the affection for justice (affectio iustitiae). The affection for the advantageous inclines us to love an object as suitable to us. This affection tends naturally to produce excessive desires. The affection for justice inclines us to love its object for its own sake. In Scotus' various treatments of natural law, he does not indicate that the only moral motives are selfless motives. Selfless motives seem necessary only in certain circumstances. Friendship is one such circumstance. Scotus claims otherwise, however, in his various treatments of the will's two affections. We never act morally from self-interest alone---that is, on motives provided by the affection for the advantageous alone. But since we cannot long choose apart from the affection for the advantageous, living a moral life depends upon using the affection for justice to moderate (or order) the excesses of the propensity for the advantageous. The most sustained application of the will's two affections is found in Ordinatio II, distinction 6, question 2. The first half of the thesis provides a commentary on this crucial text. We discover that moral disorder has three basic moments. The first moment is the decision to love ourselves inordinately; the second, the decision to love a particular good inordinately; the third, the decision to hate God or neighbor as threats to our unjust desires. We also discover that Scotus has two ways of explaining each of the three moments of moral disorder. He can explain them in terms of the will's two affections, but he can also explain them in terms of the will's two positive acts, the love of desire (velle-concupiscentiae ) and the love of friendship (velle-amicitiae). By an act of the love of desire, we want or wish or choose an object for the sake of something else. By an act of the love of friendship, we want or wish or choose the good of an object for its own sake. This explanation better accounts for the first moment of moral disorder, in fact, than does the former. In Chapter Three, we examine the alterations that Scotus would need to make to his conception of natural law morality in order to accommodate it to the two affections. In Chapter Four, we flesh out Scotus' stipulation in Ordinatio II, distinction 6, question 2, that no sin proceeds from the affection for justice. The work done in this thesis is a necessary first step to further critical analysis of Scotus' treatment of the will's two affections.

The study investigates disposability as a uniquely modern ontological mode of existence. A disposable is something a priori wasted, a phenomenon whose presence in the world presupposes its absence. Consequently, from a phenomenological perspective, the essence of a disposable includes its non-existence, or more strongly, its essence excludes its more than instantaneous existence. Trash is taken as an ontological category that extends over all disposable beings. An historical interpretation is ventured that traces the current predominance of this category to the original metaphysical denigration of the sensuous human body. Only through the sensitive body do we experience the materiality, impenetrability and integrity of physical things. As technology and metaphysics continue to disengage our sensual capacities for perception, our understanding of physical things becomes increasingly tenuous and abstract. In the absence of tactile commerce with resilient and resistant things, we fail to encounter their physical, independent existence. Their being thus seems ever more thoroughly to depend on how we rationally conceive, determine and design them. However, the undeniable evidence of trash, and the threat it poses to our own continued existence demonstrate a fatal flaw in our exclusively rationalized relation with the physical world. If we desire to avoid the "throw-away society's" dangerous excesses, we must secure metaphysics and technology to a sensitive, physical participation with the world that takes care to preserve the being of things, by the generosity of which our own being is preserved.

The aim of this thesis is to consider what reasonably follows from the hypothesis that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be interpreted from a mystical point of view. That is, if the final passages on the mystical are considered as the conclusion of the book, how does this end follow from Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that the Tractatus deals with the problems of philosophy? First, I will attempt to show that Russell's method based on analysis is an inadequate means of understanding what cannot be put into words. Second, in contrast to analysis, I will consider the method Wittgenstein uses in light of the topics in the Tractatus that cannot be expressed in words. This second point is the focus of this project because, as I will show, while reality cannot be expressed in words, neither can it be considered nonsense. Next, the thesis will examine the question of showing in three parts. First, it will demonstrate that Wittgenstein's notion of showing forms the basis for his separation from Russell's theory of types; second, it will illustrate that there is no distinction between what is shown and what shows itself, and third, it will connect Wittgenstein's notion of showing to the mystical. Following this, the thesis is concerned with what sense we can grasp of what cannot be put into words. In dealing with the eternal and the mystical, this section will offer a view from outside language to satisfy both concerns (i.e. both reality and what cannot be expressed in words). Viewing the world in this way is the mystical. Finally, we will discuss sense and nonsense, and the mystical from the view of other philosophers in order to show that Wittgenstein's thoughts on nonsense and the mystical cannot be interpreted from either a metaphysical point of view or an anti-metaphysical perspective.

Notre thèse de doctorat propose une étude systématique de la relation entre l'expérience esthétique et la visée éthique. Cette relation est celle de l'interaction, de la continuité et de la complémentarité entre ces dimensions de l'expérience humaine. Plus encore, notre enquête philosophique veut répondre à la question centrale: En quoi l'expérience esthétique est-elle une condition de possibilité de la visée éthique? Pour traiter cette problématique, nous avons cherché à rendre explicites les liens souterrains qui existent entre ces deux sphères d'activités humaines, ainsi qu'à dégager ses applications pour une conception du soi, chez trois philosophes importants, soit Paul Ricoeur, John Dewey et Ralph Waldo Emerson. Nous étudions, dans un premier temps, les notions de texte comme paradigme de l'action, d'identité narrative, de visée éthique et de raison (sagesse) pratique telles que décrites par Ricoeur. Dans un deuxième temps, nous comparons la pensée de Ricoeur avec les analyses de l'expérience esthétique et éthique développées par Dewey. C'est à partir de Ricoeur et de Dewey que nous exposons, dans un troisième temps, cette relation chez Emerson. Il ne s'agit aucunement de réduire la morale à l'art, ni de soumettre l'art à la morale, mais de montrer en quoi l'expérience esthétique, en ce qu'elle est l'expérience d'une certaine unité ou complétude---de même que l'art (e.g. la littérature), en ce qu'il nous permet d'explorer (sur le plan de l'imaginaire) des possibilités d'existence---, est une condition de l'éthique comprise comme la visée de la vie bonne. Aussi, nous croyons que notre investigation implique une conception de l'être humain en tant qu'être en relation, agissant, pensant. Nous maintenons que l'esthétique et l'éthique convergent également sur le plan d'une sagesse pratique et débouchent sur un ensemble de réflexions ontologiques et métaphysiques.

Friendship is a significant aspect of our lives. We make friends, engage in activities with them, and share an emotional bond with them. However, despite its familiarity and prevalence, there is no common agreement regarding what constitutes friendship and what its proper role in our lives is. Some people consider it an intrinsically good relationship and prioritize it in their lives and conduct, and others view it as a valuable relationship, alongside other relationships, having no primacy or priority of its own. My purpose in this dissertation is to critically examine friendship and to determine its proper nature, content and value in our lives. I discuss the above issues with specific reference to three major moral-political traditions. These are virtue ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism. I focus on a leading representative of each tradition, namely, Aristotle, Kant and Mill. Both deontology and utilitarianism, Kant and Mill, construe friendship in terms of certain abstract universal moral principles. They contend that, as a moral person, one must accord equal considerations to both friends as well as non-friends. That is, one must act impartially in friendship. Against Kant and Mill, Aristotle holds that a friendship is a personal relationship, and that it is inherently incompatible with impartiality. He argues that friendship either is virtue or necessitates virtue, and as such, it is an essential constituent of a good life and flourishing existence. Aristotle's view that a good friendship and a good life require effective moral co-operation with others in society has generated interest in the present times. On the one hand, it is argued that Aristotle provides us with a fulfilling account of friendship and a good life. On the other hand, it is claimed that Aristotle's view is in disagreement with an individual's freedom of choice, and inconsistent with the central tenets of present-day liberalism. In this thesis, I argue that Aristotle provides us with an enriching account of friendship, and that his view of friendship and the good life is fully compatible with an individual's free choice and moral autonomy. I further argue that Aristotle's view complements liberalism; hence, it is a mistake to see these views as adversaries.

This thesis argues for a new understanding of liberal morality and its relationship to liberal justice. Traditionally, theorists of liberal democracy have relegated the liberal virtues---traits such as tolerance, reasonableness, and fairness---to a secondary role within the theory and practice of liberal justice. Their reasoning for this is clear: the virtues prescribe a vision of the good life, while the aim of the liberal approach to statecraft is to limit government authority over citizens' conceptions of the good. Thus, to give the liberal virtues primacy of place within the theory of justice---and, specifically, within the justification for this theory---would stand in contravention of this basic liberal tenet. The argument of this thesis is that liberal theorists have misrepresented the virtues and that this has caused the neglect of the foundational role which the ideal of civic virtue plays within both the theory and practice of liberal democracy. This argument is advanced through an explication of the theories put forward by contemporary liberal theorists who focus on the import of liberal virtue. Their approaches to virtue are shown to consistently rest on a justification of liberal virtue as an instrumental good for the liberal polity. The claim of this thesis, however, is that the virtues are rightly justified as intrinsic liberal goods. This claim is supported through appeal to insights produced in another branch of philosophy, virtue theory. Similar to their predicament within the political theory of the modern era, the virtues have been downplayed in the field of ethics as well, and only within the past few decades have philosophers begun to reinvestigate the virtues for their distinctive strengths and weaknesses. This thesis argues that the fruits of these investigations prove relevant to liberal theory in that they not only help make a case for the appropriateness of the declaration that the liberal virtues are, in fact, intrinsic goods but also they point to a new approach to liberal morality and, hence, to a new dialogue on the issues of liberal citizenship and liberal civic education.