Spelling suggestions: "subject:"philosophy off emotionation"" "subject:"philosophy oof emotionation""
1 |
Making White Guilt FittingCantu, Luis 10 May 2024 (has links)
This paper draws on the non-fiction writings of James Baldwin to introduce a novel conception of white guilt that is consistent with standard philosophical views that guilt is fitting only in cases of direct moral culpability while addressing practical criticism that white guilt is at variance with the aims of social justice movements. Taking on Baldwin's perspective on whiteness as a subjective choice, I develop an Identity-Based Account of white guilt describing the emotion as tracking culpability for a pernicious form of self-identification. My central claim is that white guilt is fitting because in experiencing the emotion, one is simultaneously recognizing the role their own identity plays in providing a source of justification for actions that sustain a system of injustice. Conceived in this way, responses to white guilt demand taking part in corrective political action as a means of moral self-creation. / Master of Arts / In the wake of the deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and others due to police and vigilante actions, there has been a noticeable shift in racial sentiments among white individuals in the US and globally, leading to increased reports of white guilt. This paper explores the concept of white guilt as a negative, self-conscious emotion experienced by white people in response to their behaviors, attitudes, or perceived racist injustices. It addresses two main concerns: the appropriateness of white guilt when many white individuals lack direct culpability, and the effectiveness of outcomes driven by this guilt in combating racial injustice. Drawing on James Baldwin's writings, the paper proposes a novel understanding of white guilt, focusing on white individuals' self-perception rather than their actions.
|
2 |
Proper Emotions and Aesthetic Interest: : Examining the role of Desires in Experiences of BeautyÖhnström, Anthony January 2022 (has links)
Recently, Kant's concept of aesthetic disinterestedness has been called into question (see Nehamas 2007, Riggle 2016). Both texts provide insight into the ways in which experiences of beauty are interested. That said, the precise relationship between beauty and the desires, which is at the core of aesthetic interest as a concept, remains elusive. I have therefore developed a theoretical account of how desires are integral to how people experience beauty. Central to my thesis is the rejection of the idea that people experience beauty as a mere sensation, as I argue from the position that beauty is experienced as a fully fledged emotion. I build my theory on the foundation of Jenefer Robinson’s paper “Emotion, Judgement, and Desire” which, like my thesis, is specifically concerned with the evaluative component of emotions. Her suggestion is that people’s emotional evaluations are shaped by desires that are held by them prior to their emotional experiences. I expand her thesis by suggesting that such desires initiate a second distinct type of desire that is also part of the evaluative component of emotions. I argue that the distinction I make between primary desires and response desires explains how people engage with beautiful objects in an interested manner. Primary desires are defined by me as deeply held desires that are directed, in terms of their intentionality, towards the subject’s life and self-affirming values, as explored by Riggle (2021). I argue that people are predisposed to seek out experiences of beauty because of their primary desires. The reason being that the perceptual properties of beautiful objects reflect the life and self-affirming values against which primary desires are directed. I then suggest that response desires are in experiences of beauty initiated by the subject recognising beautiful objects as “speaking to” their primary desires. As in, when someone perceives qualities that reflect their life and self-affirming values, they respond by developing response desires towards the object. I argue that such response desires, in so far as beauty is concerned, is manifested in a want to prolong one’s emotional experiences of beauty. Moreover, I suggest that by satisfying them, the subject continuously develops new response desires towards the beautiful object; making response desires an essential part of how people assert the values they recognise in beautiful objects.
|
Page generated in 0.0749 seconds