abstract: Without scientific expertise, society may make catastrophically poor choices when faced with problems such as climate change. However, scientists who engage society with normative questions face tension between advocacy and the social norms of science that call for objectivity and neutrality. Policy established in 2011 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) required their communication to be objective and neutral and this research comprised a qualitative analysis of IPCC reports to consider how much of their communication is strictly factual (Objective), and value-free (Neutral), and to consider how their communication had changed from 1990 to 2013. Further research comprised a qualitative analysis of structured interviews with scientists and non-scientists who were professionally engaged in climate science communication, to consider practitioner views on advocacy. The literature and the structured interviews revealed a conflicting range of definitions for advocacy versus objectivity and neutrality. The practitioners that were interviewed struggled to separate objective and neutral science from attempts to persuade, and the IPCC reports contained a substantial amount of communication that was not strictly factual and value-free. This research found that science communication often blurred the distinction between facts and values, imbuing the subjective with the authority and credibility of science, and thereby damaging the foundation for scientific credibility. This research proposes a strict definition for factual and value-free as a means to separate science from advocacy, to better protect the credibility of science, and better prepare scientists to negotiate contentious science-based policy issues. The normative dimension of sustainability will likely entangle scientists in advocacy or the appearance of it, and this research may be generalizable to sustainability. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Sustainability 2015

Bence Nanay holds, that attention which is focused on one object, and distributed acrossits properties, gives rise to disinterestedness in phenomenal experience, and it therefore is involved in the occurence of the most paradigmatic kind of aesthetic experience.It is for this reason, that Nanay defines this sort of attention as "aesthetic attention". In this thesis, I point out, that Nanay's doctrine does justice to facts and phenomena,and that it succeeds in specifiying one of the necessary conditions, of what he takes as the "paradigmatic kind" of aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, as I go on to argue, Nanay fails to account for dissinterestedness' being insufficient for aesthetic experience, and avoids to ask the question we have been longing to ask, namely whether there is such a thing, as attention which is both necessary and sufficient for aesthetic experience. I, thereafter, provide an answer to this question, according to which aesthetic attention is, essencially, attention which is focused on non-derivative value, in an aesthetic context. In the remaining of the text, I make use of Gestalt theory, and thus explore the relationship between the kind of attention Nanay conceived of as "aesthetic attention", and the kind I define as such.

Recently, Kant's concept of aesthetic disinterestedness has been called into question (see Nehamas 2007, Riggle 2016). Both texts provide insight into the ways in which experiences of beauty are interested. That said, the precise relationship between beauty and the desires, which is at the core of aesthetic interest as a concept, remains elusive. I have therefore developed a theoretical account of how desires are integral to how people experience beauty. Central to my thesis is the rejection of the idea that people experience beauty as a mere sensation, as I argue from the position that beauty is experienced as a fully fledged emotion. I build my theory on the foundation of Jenefer Robinson’s paper “Emotion, Judgement, and Desire” which, like my thesis, is specifically concerned with the evaluative component of emotions. Her suggestion is that people’s emotional evaluations are shaped by desires that are held by them prior to their emotional experiences. I expand her thesis by suggesting that such desires initiate a second distinct type of desire that is also part of the evaluative component of emotions. I argue that the distinction I make between primary desires and response desires explains how people engage with beautiful objects in an interested manner. Primary desires are defined by me as deeply held desires that are directed, in terms of their intentionality, towards the subject’s life and self-affirming values, as explored by Riggle (2021). I argue that people are predisposed to seek out experiences of beauty because of their primary desires. The reason being that the perceptual properties of beautiful objects reflect the life and self-affirming values against which primary desires are directed. I then suggest that response desires are in experiences of beauty initiated by the subject recognising beautiful objects as “speaking to” their primary desires. As in, when someone perceives qualities that reflect their life and self-affirming values, they respond by developing response desires towards the object. I argue that such response desires, in so far as beauty is concerned, is manifested in a want to prolong one’s emotional experiences of beauty. Moreover, I suggest that by satisfying them, the subject continuously develops new response desires towards the beautiful object; making response desires an essential part of how people assert the values they recognise in beautiful objects.

We are used to regarding aesthetic experience from the point of view of a spectator, rather than something we actively provide and give. It is not common in the aesthetic debate to analyse what it is like to offer an aesthetic experience, but it is rather the opposite. Philosophers and aestheticians tend to study and focus on how the experience is perceived by someone, not on how it unfolds for the one who provides it. I believe that the experience of giving - especially when we give ourselves to others - is an aesthetic experience in itself. By "giving ouselves to others" I mean opening ourselves to others through acts of generous and disinterested service. In fact, it seems that we are truly and fully happy when we are willing to give ourselves to others in this way. Accordingly, the questions I am going to answer in this research are: why can we be happy by giving ourselves to another person? Can we be "gifts" for others without expecting something back? Is this experience aesthetic? I argue that love and disinterestedness are two key-concepts which help us understand how it is possible to selflessly give ourselves. In addition to that, I claim that such an act is aesthetic because we judge it as "beautiful" and not only as "good". The experience of self-giving is aeshetic because we invoke aesthetic concepts when we describe it.

Den här uppsatsen undersöker förhållandet mellan Kants estetiska omdöme, såsom det formuleras i Kritik av omdömeskraften, och Jacques Rancières estetiska projekt, framförallt i förhållande till begreppet dissensus. Dels försöker uppsatsen spåra arvet från Kant hos Rancière och visa hur detta tar sig uttryck, dels ställer den frågan om hur Kants omdöme politiseras med Rancières dissensus. Detta sker i två kapitel, varav det första är en läsning av Kants kritik av den estetiska omdömeskraften, mot bakgrund av idén om dissensus, och det andra en genomgång av Rancières formulering av dissensus, samt relaterade begrepp såsom konstens identifikationsregimer och ”fras-bilden”. Vidare jämför det andra kapitlet Rancières dissensus med Kants idé om det ”intresselösa” i det estetiska omdömet, samt visar vilka politiska eller metapolitiska implikationer Rancière tillskriver det senare. Uppsatsen visar hur Kants estetiska omdöme är oumbärligt för Rancières estetisk-politiska filosofiska projekt och att flera av hans viktigaste begrepp vilar tungt mot Kant. Den visar också, med hjälp av Rancière, på ett möjligt sätt att ge Kants estetiska omdöme politisk betydelse, delvis i motsättning till de politiska läsningar av den tredje Kritiken som främst tar fasta på sensus communis som ett vittne om en konsensuell gemenskap. Rancière visar med sina omformuleringar av Kants intresselösa omdöme att en sådan gemenskap alltid föregås av ett visst dissensus – ett brott med de dominerande formerna för den gemensamma sinnligheten. / This paper explores the relationship between Kant's aesthetic judgment, as formulated in the Critique of Judgment, and Jacques Rancière's aesthetic project, specifically the way in which the concept of dissensus is developed in the work of Rancière. The purpose of the paper is two-fold: first, to trace the legacy of Kant in Rancière and second, to pose the question of how Kant's judgment is politicized in Rancière's reading. This is discussed in two chapters, the first of which is a reading of Kant's critique of aesthetic judgment in light of the notion of dis-sensus; the second chapter examines the concept of dissensus in Rancière, as well as other related concepts, such as the regimes of art, and the 'image-phrase'. The second chapter also offers a comparison between Rancière‟s dissensus and the notion of 'disinterestedness' in Kant's aesthetic judgment, showing how Rancière draws out from the latter a set of political or meta-political implications. Ultimately, the paper serves to underline the essential role that Kant's aesthetic judgment plays in the development of Rancière's aesthetic project, examining how several of Rancière's most important concepts lean heavily on Kant for philosophical support. With the help of Rancière, the paper also provides an alternative way to give political significance to Kant's aesthetic judgment, partly in opposition to those political readings of the third Critique that primarily focus on sensus communis as a testimony of a consensual community. By way of rearticulating Kant's disinterested judgment, Rancière shows that this community is always preceded by a certain dissensus – a break with the dominant forms of a shared sensible community.

Résumé : « Wege, nitch Werke ». L’exergue de la Gesamtausgabe donne une indication précieuse pour quiconque souhaite lire et comprendre la pensée de Heidegger. Son œuvre se distingue des classiques de la tradition philosophique par le fait qu’elle ne cherche pas à établir une doctrine. Elle vise plutôt à reprendre à bras-le-corps une seule et même question : la Seinsfrage. Heidegger l’a retournée de maintes façons, parfois en puisant dans les préjugés au sujet de l’Être, parfois en empruntant des chemins de pensée plutôt inexplorés, mais à chaque fois il étonne. Le lecteur habitué à la rigidité conceptuelle, aux évidences cartésiennes et aux règles logiques de l'esprit, trouve peut-être en Heidegger son plus grand défi parce qu’il adhérait à une pensée-en-chemin (Zu Denken Wege) qui accueille l'errance et la pause, le silence et le tournant. Il invite le lecteur à prendre le pas, à risquer les chemins qui ne mènent nulle part ― Holzwege ―, à ne pas hésiter à faire un pas en arrière (Schritt zurück). La Gesamtausgabe oblige un certain inconfort pour la pensée. Ce mémoire de maîtrise est consacré à l’examen de la fonction phénoménologique des humeurs (Stimmungen) et à l’importance que leur accorde Heidegger, à partir d’une lecture de Sein und Zeit, tout particulièrement. La recherche a pour hypothèse de travail qu’on y retrouve une théorie des humeurs appréciable, bien que ne lui soit pas réservée une analyse systématique dans l’œuvre. Malgré cela, ce mémoire fait la démonstration, en quelques chapitres, que Sein und Zeit contient des éléments théoriques qui permettent de fonder cette théorie. Au final, le mémoire explore brièvement les humeurs analysées par Heidegger. C’est l’occasion de voir comment la théorie des humeurs s’inscrit véritablement dans la pensée du philosophe. La thèse défendue dans ce mémoire pourrait être reprise et approfondie par une étude doctorale, ce qui donnerait peut-être une clef supplémentaire pour contribuer à l'élaboration d'une lecture intégrale de la Gesamtausgabe. / Abstract : The highlight of the Gesamtausgabe gives a valuable indication for anyone who wants to read and understand Heidegger's thought. His work part from the philosophical tradition in that does not seek to establish a doctrine. Rather, it is intended to tackle the question of Being (Seinsfrage). Heidegger has posed it in many ways, sometimes by challenging our common sense about the “Being”, sometimes by exploring new paths of thinking, each time surprising us. Someone familiar with rational assertion, methodological pattern and logical rule, may find Heidegger really hard to understand because he assumes what he calls a « thought-in-way » (Wege Zu Denken), which welcomes silence and wandering. Heidegger invites the reader to try pathways that lead nowhere at first sight — Holzwege —, and sometimes to take a step back (Schritt zurück) from what he thinks. The Gesamtausgabe is definitively a challenge for the thought. The main goal of this master’s thesis is to examine the phenomenological function of moods (Stimmungen) and the importance we should give to them, from a reading of Sein und Zeit, especially. The aim is to find in it a theory of moods, even if Heidegger did not analyze them systematically. Nevertheless, this essay outlines, in just a few chapters, the reasons why we can pretend there is a such theory and why the moods have a significant phenomenological function. Finally, we explore the moods analyzed by Heidegger so we can see how his theory is truly embodied. This research could be taken further in a doctoral study, which would perhaps contribute to a more comprehensive interpretation of the Gesamtausgabe.

Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique. / At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness.