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This thesis is concerned with the project which J.N. Findlay has called absolute-theory (see his book <i>Ascent to the Absolute</i> London: George Allen and Unwin 1970, and his article 'Bradley's contribution to Absolute-theory' in <i>The Philosophy of F.H.Bradley</i> edited by Guy Stock and Anthony Manser, Oxford: Clarendon 1984). In absolute-theory one is concerned with (1) determining the abstract or formal characteristics, the form as it were, of the fundamental existent or existents on which all things depend, and (ii) evaluating the candidates that might be said to fit the abstract form. If there are a plurality of fundamental existents then the form is a universal with many instances. If there is only one fundamental existent, one primordial object, then the form itself is particular in the sense that it is not instantiable by more than one thing. The background issue is monism versus pluralism. In chapter 1 first some of the characteristics that go to make up the form are delineated. Then some candidates are briefly evaluated and rejected. Finally the kind of candidate absolute idealists offer in general is elucidated to some degree giving the authors preferred formulation. The self-differentiated Substance-Person. The rest of the thesis is concerned with elucidating this conception as a candidate and arguing for it. Through this the formal characteristics of the Absolute are also considered. The author has tried to formulate an independent and original position within the general tradition of absolute idealism. In chapter 2 the concept of substance and of ultimate substance is elucidated and argued for. In chapter 3 the substance-attribute distinction is utilized to construct an original dilemma and it is argued that the solution lies in the conception of the ultimate substance. The dilemma is this: All attributes are either essential or accidental to their substances. If interaction between substances is at the level of essential attributes loss of identity occurs. If it is at the level of accidental attributes knowledge of the real nature of other substances remains ever elusive. In chapter 4 it is argued that the ultimate substance is the source of all meaning and truth. In chapter 5 it is argued that the ultimate substance is also a self-differentiated Person. This is basically the idea that there is One Person embodied in all brain-bodies.

This study aims to develop the logic of relativism, then to apply that logic to the question of self-refutation in relativism. / After first defining generic relativism as radical indexed pluralism, the study identifies three substantive theses following as a consequence of this definition that any instance of relativism must meet: (1) the formal requirements for relativity, (2) objective equity, and (3) incommensurability. Each of the three theses is developed in detail to determine precisely what must be demonstrated by a claim of relativism. / Next, the study develops five separate logical systems to represent the logic of relativism, each adding progressively more complex relativistic features. The first system is modelled on basic modal logic. The second models multiple kinds of relativity. The third models relativised accessibility relations. The fourth combines features of the second and third systems. And the fifth is modelled on a non-normal modal logic. Finally, the charge of self-refutation is evaluated with regard to each system in turn. / I argue that while all five systems initially seem to support models that support fully relativistic perspectives, when an operator is added to the language to express whether a sentence is true for a perspective, four of the systems can no longer support fully relativistic perspectives, since some sentences including that operator must be evaluated to be absolute within all perspectives. The fifth system, however, formulated analogously to a non-normal modal logic, does support fully relativistic perspectives even with the additional operator. I argue further that the nature of relativism provides some motivation for considering this last system to be the logic of global relativism. / While these formal, structural arguments do not fully address all the varieties of self-refutation arguments levelled against relativism, in particular, those based upon pragmatics, incoherence, and the nature of language, I argue that there are reasons to think that these latter kinds of argument may not be completely successful, and I suggest various ways that these arguments might be strengthened against relativism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Vita. Thesis note on label mounted on t.p. Title also in Chinese. Includes bibliographical references.

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In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.

Thesis (M.A. 1978) from the Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1979.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2006. / Advisor: Alfred Mele, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Philosophy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 20, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 166 pages. Includes bibliographical references.