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Wilfrid Sellars has made familiar a distinction between manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. The manifest image is 'a sophistication and refinement of the image in terms of which man first came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world' ([2], p.18)/ and in its methodology 'limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events' (p.19). The scientific image, on the other hand, 'postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles.' (ib.) This thesis is centred on a consideration of two difficulties facing anyone who takes the manifest image seriously as an autonomous image of man. In chapter 1 I consider the connection between perception and its objects, and argue that there is a disharmony between the manifest and scientific accounts of this connection. But I also suggest that the manifest image, which incorporates a certain Cartesianism or internalism, cannot lightly be dispensed with in our understanding of the nature of experience. Chapter 2 is a companion piece to chapter 1: in it I argue that the manifest view of experience accords a certain metaphysical priority to secondary over primary qualities in the constitution of any world capable of being experienced; I also suggest that the scientific image is dependent on the manifest image/ and so cannot subvert it. In chapter 3 I turn to the other main area of difficulty: freedom. I argue that free will as the incompatibilist contrues it is constitutive of the time-order; but that it carries with it implicit internal contradictions. The conflict here lies within the manifest image; the scientific image discerns no such freedom/ and so incurs no such problems. But if I am right that freedom constitutes time/ it will not be an option for us to disembarrass ourselves of the contradictions. I also argue that there is a relation of mutual dependence between freedom/ incompatibilistically construed/ and internalism. The manifest image as a whole - deeply problematic as it is - is therefore grounded in and entailed by something quite ineluctable/ namely the reality of the time-series. This is the principal conclusion of the thesis. If I succeed here/ I provide support for the claim that our difficulties with the manifest image cannot be solved by abandoning it: the manifest image/ problems and all/ must just be lived with. The remainder of the thesis explores topics related to this main thrust. Chapter 4 is really an appendix to chapter 3; it shows how no parallel difficulties attend the constitution of experiential space/ because space is (unlike time) not transcendental. In chapter 5 I examine the commitments of the notion of the transcendental self/ whose existence was deduced in chapter 3 as a condition of freedom. In particular, I aim to show how that self inherits some of the difficulties of its parent concept of freedom; but also how a distinction between transcendental and empirical components in the self can help us with the problem of privacy.

This study attempts to show that an appeal to the 'perspective of the witness' is essential to better understand the way Sankara makes sense of the richly diverse Vedanta material. It goes beyond the general understanding that Sankara 'conveniently' arranges such material into the categories of the conventional and the absolute placing texts speaking of the Absolute (Brahman) with properties in the conventional/relative category. It suggests that the fundamental properties associated with a theistic conceptualisation of the Absolute, which all authoritative texts attest to, need not be seen as dogmatic tenets that Sankara has to contend with while expounding his non-dual system of thought. Instead, it argues that they should be regarded as meaningful devices that have for their sole purpose to lead the spiritual seeker to the realization of the absolute unity of being, a result that the Advaita tradition holds as the highest goal of life. Three key conceptions of Brahman are explored: Brahman as the cause of the world, as an entity who is gracious towards his devotees, and as an object of devotion. It is argued that all three can be better understood and appreciated when considered in their proper and larger pedagogical context, whose climax is 'the perspective of the witness.' The first three chapters of this thesis are mainly concerned with epistemological and didactic means that are associated with demonstrating the 'perspective of the witness.' The fourth and fifth chapters evaluate how much help such a standpoint can provide us in our appraisal of these three aspects of the Absolute in the context of Sarikara's writings.

This dissertation is an interpretive inquiry of the conception of self in the Hindu Advaita (non-dual) school. I focus on the original works of Sankara (8th-9th CE) and Abhinavagupta (10th-11th CE), both of whom played a significant role in developing the Advaita philosophy within the Hindu tradition. I offer an innovative analysis of the Advaita thought, drawing upon the fields of religious studies, philosophy, psychology, and history and philosophy of science. This multidisciplinary exploration focuses on the structure of human consciousness and its relation to the existential dimensions of human experience. On the basis of non-dualism, I examine the subject-object relationships in the contexts of cognitive activity, aesthetic experience and interpersonal relationships. I argue that certain structures of self-object or self-other relations, which I characterize as the sacred, point to experiences of depth which do not merely reduce to cultural phenomena or socio-political dynamics, though their expression often take specific cultural forms. Such structures play a crucial role in developing authentic dynamics with the other, in enhancing creativity and enriching aesthetic activities. Thus the sacred create the possibility for a vital and caring relationship with one's environment. Because my investigation focuses extensively on subjective awareness, it will add important dimensions to questions concerning the nature of cognition.

This thesis provides a theoretical framework that brings the unity of Kierkegaard’s ‘middle period’ into relief. I will analyse Kierkegaard’s writings between 1846 and 1852 when, I argue, the socially constructive dimension of his thought comes to prominence, involving two dialectical aspects of religiousness identified by Kierkegaard: the edifying and the polemical. How these two aspects come together and get worked out in the lives of individuals form the basis of what can be called a Kierkegaardian ‘social praxis’. I conclude that the tension between the edifying and the polemical can be coherently maintained in a communicative life that is also characteristic of a militant faith. This militant faith and life is presented as a critical guard against absolutisms, fundamentalisms, and intellectual aloofness; but the ‘militant’ individual is also utterly dependent, in need of edification and critique, and therefore chooses the risk of encountering others, seeking relationships out of a commitment to the development of persons and communities in co-operation. Therefore, not only does this dialectic provide readers with an important theoretical framework for understanding Kierkegaard’s ‘middle period’, but it is also a valuable resource for a constructive analysis of active social living suitable for theology in the twenty-first century.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-147). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

In the history of sartorial reflection, the usual offerings for human motivations to dress are: protection (i.e. from the elements), modesty, decoration, and socio-political self-expression. The literature on clothing rarely attends, however, to the question of garments' impact on wearers' self-experience. There is some social science research, for example, suggesting that when we wear clothing we associate with individuals who have a high degree of mental focus and attention to detail, it causes us - probably, in most cases, pre-reflectively - to experience ourselves as such and therefore to perform better on tests that measure these qualities. Apart from this research, exploration into the matter, regardless of field, is scant, but it is especially thin in philosophy and theology. This thesis seeks to address the shortfall in these fields by providing at least one model of the human relationship to clothes that, unlike what is currently on offer, accounts for findings like the above. To do so, it draws on the sartorial reflection of the British artist and essayist Eric Gill, who understands clothes as architectural spaces of sorts, as encasements that house our being, and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose philosophy of being and 'thinking about building' can do similar work less explicitly but more robustly. After outlining this new way of looking at humanity's relationship to clothes, the thesis will conclude by discussing some theological implications. In particular, it discusses how the overlap between Gill's sacramental perspective and Heidegger's similar understanding of an inherently meaning-infused 'world' can yield an account of clothes as facilitators (or hinderers) of the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God through their potential to bear theological resonances.

In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant's ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant's claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant's conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant's method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

Combatants in war inflict untold devastation. They lay waste the environment, destroy cultural heritage, wound, maim, and kill. Most importantly, they kill. These deeds would be, in any other context, paradigmatically unjust. This thesis asks whether they can be justi-fied. There are two possible approaches: first, deny that killing in war is in fact unjust; sec-ond, argue that the injustice is overridden by weightier moral reasons. In Part I, I reject the view that principles of self-defence can render killing in war just. I argue that the most plausible theories of self-defence are hardest to apply in the cha-otic context of war, while the most practicable theories are least philosophically defensible. Moreover, none of them encompasses the inevitable noncombatant deaths that all wars bring. If killing in war is almost always unjust, perhaps we should advocate pacifism. In Part II, I propose an alternative, arguing that these injustices might be all things con-sidered justified. Combatants have morally important relationships: they have deep personal relationships with friends and family, and comrades-in-arms; if they are citizens of just communities, then that relationship is valuable too. I argue that they have associative duties to protect these relationships against the threat posed by war, and that these duties may override the injustices they must commit to avert that threat. After defending a conception of associative duties, I support this conclusion with the following argument. As well as our general duties not to harm, we have general duties to protect. Our general duties to protect sometimes override our general duties not to harm, in particular, in cases of justified humanitarian intervention. Our associative duties to protect, however, are stronger than our general duties to protect. If our associative duties to protect are stronger than our general duties to protect, and our general duties to protect can override our general duties not to harm, then our associative duties to protect should also be able to override our general duties not to harm.