It can hardly be gainsaid that the splendour of African history has but received disproportionate attention in international scholarship on peoples and societies of Africa. A plethora of various scholarships on the African continent spilled so much ink on unfounded and academically feeble claims that the history of the Africa is shrouded in darkness. This misleadingly erroneous view about the African continent, though increasingly losing currency, has unfortunately influenced scholarship on the origin and philosophy of human rights. This explains therefore, the failure of eurocentric writers’ to consult or examine the rich tapestry of cultural values of African societies in their assertions about the origin and philosophy of the modern phenomenon of human rights. However, like its predecessor, this fallacious academic position has attracted scholarly responses from afro-centric scholars. Zeleza has noted that the: western appropriation of human rights does grave intellectual and political disservice to the global human right discourse and movement. Intellectually it homogenises and oversimplifies the human rights traditions of both the west and the rest of the world and undermines theoretical advances that can come from serious and sustained intra and inter-cultural comparisons and conversations. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2010. / A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Babcar Kante of the Faculty of Law, University of Gaston Berger, Saint Louis, Senegal. 2010. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Despite its prominence as a pejorative term in moral and political philosophy, the phenomenon of ethnocentrism has escaped the focused attention of moral and political philosophers. Little sustained effort has been devoted to its in-depth analysis. This thesis attempts to fill in that gap in the philosophical literature, with a particular focus on the analysis of ethnocentrism as a problem, or rather a set of problems, facing the theory and practice of human rights. The thesis begins by drawing a core distinction between ethnocentrism as a moral phenomenon (i.e., a form of moral partiality), on the one hand, and as an epistemological phenomenon (i.e., a mode of judgment), on the other. After singling out the epistemological aspect of ethnocentrism as its main focus, the thesis argues for four interlocking claims. The first claim is that ethnocentrism represents an unwarranted mode of judgment, and thus an epistemic hazard that ought to be avoided if at all possible (Chapter One, §3). This claim is defended at length against the version of political constructivism advanced by John Rawls, which, by grounding political argument exclusively in ideas and values embedded in a common public culture, implicitly justifies a form of ethnocentrism (Chapter Two). The second claim is that moral argument cannot avoid ethnocentrism by grounding itself, as some have thought, in judgments upon which there is broad moral consensus, or rather by avoiding any appeal to judgments that are the subject of marked dissensus (Chapter Three and Chapter Four). Thirdly, the thesis argues that ethnocentrism is, if avoidable, only so to a limited extent (Chapter Six, §2). And fourthly, it offers an outline of how this limited form of avoidance might work (Chapter Five and Chapter Six, §3).