Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-208). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (doctoral) - Universität, Basel, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (pp. [315]-340) and indexes.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Qual a Filosofia da Natureza que podemos inferir da Física Contemporânea? Para Werner Karl Heisenberg, prêmio Nobel de Física de 1932, a ontologia da Ciência Moderna, estruturada no materialismo, no mecanicismo e no determinismo já não pode servir de fundamento para a nova Física. Esta requer uma nova base ontológica, onde o antirrealismo, seguido de um formalismo puro, aparece como o princípio basilar de uma nova Filosofia Natural. Este trabalho visa investigar o pensamento filosófico, a ontologia antirrealista, formalista, a abordagem da tradição filosófica e da história da ciência de Werner Heisenberg e sua contribuição para a interpretação da mecânica quântica. / What is the Philosophy of Nature that we can infer from the Contemporary Physics? For Werner Karl Heisenberg, Nobel Prize in Physics in 1932, the ontology of modern science, based on materialism, mechanism and determinism may no longer be the basis for the new physics. This requires a new ontology_based, where anti-realism, followed by a pure formalism, appears as the basic principle of a new Philosophy of Nature. This study aims to investigate the philosophical thought, the anti-realist ontology, formalistic approach to the philosophical tradition and the history of science of Werner Heisenberg and his contribution to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Qual a Filosofia da Natureza que podemos inferir da Física Contemporânea? Para Werner Karl Heisenberg, prêmio Nobel de Física de 1932, a ontologia da Ciência Moderna, estruturada no materialismo, no mecanicismo e no determinismo já não pode servir de fundamento para a nova Física. Esta requer uma nova base ontológica, onde o antirrealismo, seguido de um formalismo puro, aparece como o princípio basilar de uma nova Filosofia Natural. Este trabalho visa investigar o pensamento filosófico, a ontologia antirrealista, formalista, a abordagem da tradição filosófica e da história da ciência de Werner Heisenberg e sua contribuição para a interpretação da mecânica quântica. / What is the Philosophy of Nature that we can infer from the Contemporary Physics? For Werner Karl Heisenberg, Nobel Prize in Physics in 1932, the ontology of modern science, based on materialism, mechanism and determinism may no longer be the basis for the new physics. This requires a new ontology_based, where anti-realism, followed by a pure formalism, appears as the basic principle of a new Philosophy of Nature. This study aims to investigate the philosophical thought, the anti-realist ontology, formalistic approach to the philosophical tradition and the history of science of Werner Heisenberg and his contribution to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Orientador: Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T03:35:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Malbouisson_IaraVelascoeCruz_M.pdf: 1013402 bytes, checksum: d9fab04e3710fe9e8d5bbf376e49bfdc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: Essa dissertação tem por objetivo geral investigar as noções de ciência e conhecimento científico de Nicole Oresme (1323?-1382). Mais precisamente, procura-se situar o projeto filosófico de Oresme no contexto do século XIV e de seu progressivo afastamento da concepção aristotélica de ciência enquanto um saber demonstrativo, necessário e evidente. Desse modo, procura-se investigar de que maneira e por quais razões Oresme fala em causas prováveis, bem como qual o papel que a matemática ocupa em sua epistemologia probabilista. Para tanto, empreende-se a análise de algumas passagens do comentário de Oresme ao De anima de Aristóteles, e procura-se sobretudo apresentar e explicar a ciência de figurar qualidades e movimentos que Oresme formula, em seu Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum, com o intuito de assinalar as causas prováveis de diversos fenômenos naturais / Abstract: The objective of this thesis is to investigate Nicole Oresme's notions of science and scientific knowledge. More specifically, we attempt to place Oresme's philosophical project in the context of fourteenth-century natural philosophy, with its progressive departure from an Aristotelic conception of science as an evident, necessary and demonstrative knowledge. Hence, we investigate how and for which reasons Oresme speaks of \probable causes" and \probable explanations", and try to determine the role that mathematics plays in his probabilistic epistemology. For this effect, we analyse some passages of Oresme's commentary on Aristotle's De anima and seek, above all, to present and explain the science of figuring qualities and movements formulated by Oresme in his Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum for the pourpose of assigning probable causes to various natural phenomena / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

This study sets out to reclaim the ontological epistemology of Saint Thomas Aquinas which serves as a unifier of knowledge in being, within the philosophical milieu of being’s forgottenness. Post-Humean and Kantian thought made appearance rather than being solely accessible to the thinking subject. The consequence has been the marginalisation of being as reflected in truth – influenced by scientistic and postmodern paradigms – which has contributed to both the paucity of meaningless metaphysics, and the conceptualisation of science and faith as necessarily opposing categories. To the end of establishing that science and faith have points of intersection, it is argued that the reclamation of Thomist natural philosophy leads to the defence of a clarified form of realism. Establishing the “real” implies that the metaphysical dimensions of the problem of existence can be explored. Within this realist model, the “pre-Modern” Thomistic theory of “scientia” is employed to bring physical and natural science and metaphysics into relationship as components of true knowledge of being. Consequently, the author puts forth that “scientia” is exemplified in, amongst others, the particular science of cosmology since the rudimentary point of engagement between physical and metaphysical science occurs in the act of creation, that is, when being comes into existence. Whilst metaphysics is often disregarded, it is consistently proposed that the causal nature of being demands – by its presence – a more robust account than physical and natural science can offer. The contribution made by this work rests in its ontologically-formed epistemic typology whereby “hard” science and faith are related in boundary areas of knowledge, that is, when metaphysical problems emerge from within physical and natural science. By reimaging “hard” science and reasonable faith within “scientia”, both approaches are conceived as adequating to truth when their content is reflective of being. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / lk2014 / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

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This thesis is an investigation into the simplest material entities recognised by Aristotle's theory of nature. In general, the position I defend is that the four 'so-called elements' fire, air, water, and earth are, for Aristotle, genuine elements, i.e., the simplest material constituents, of bodies. In particular, I deal with two problems, the first concerning the relationship between the four 'so-called elements' and the primary contraries, hot-cold, dry-wet; and the second concerning the nature of the matter from which the latter come to be. Responses to these problems in the secondary literature tend to conclude that the contraries (usually together with 'prime matter'), are constitutive of the so-called elements. I reject this conclusion. In the first part of this thesis I consider, and dismiss, the alleged evidence that Aristotle denies to fire, air, water, and earth the status of genuine elements, and I argue that the status of the contraries as the differentiae of the elements effectively rules out the possibility that they could be the constituents of the latter. In the second part of this thesis I attempt to unpack Aristotle's assertion at De Gen. et Cor. II. 1 that the matter of the perceptible bodies is that from which the so-called elements come to be. I argue that the matter of the perceptible bodies, although it is that from which the elements come to be, is not the 'matter of the elements', in the sense of a matter that composes the elements. On the contrary, the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', i.e., the constitutive matter of composite bodies, is itself composed of the elements: it is a mixture of the four elements. Thus the latter can be said to come to be 'from' the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', but this must be understood in a non-constitutive sense of 'from'.