<p> Philosophers, cognitive scientists and developmental psychologists largely agree that we understand mental states and use them to explain and predict the behaviors of ourselves and of others (i.e. we &lsquo;mindread&rsquo;) by using a cognitive capacity known as the theory of mind (henceforth, &lsquo;ToM&rsquo;). However, a question remains as to what, exactly, underpins the ToM ability thereby allowing us such great accuracy in our first-person and third-person reports. My dissertation is an adjudication of the ongoing debate between two competing theories, each of which claims to have the best explanation of ToM. These two theories of ToM are known as the theory-theory (henceforth, the &lsquo;TT&rsquo;) and the simulation theory (henceforth, the &lsquo;ST&rsquo;). Because it is thought by cognitive developmental psychologists that autism spectrum disorders (henceforth, &lsquo;ASD&rsquo;) result from a ToM impairment or deficit, I pay especial attention to the case of ASD, using the features of the disorder, to adjudicate the debate. I suggest that the particular deficits and talents associated with ASD provide reasons to favor the ST over the TT in general and to favor an account of the ST that includes introspection over an account of the ST that excludes it.</p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2008. / Title from home page (viewed on Jul 21, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-10, Section: A, page: 3983. Adviser: Timothy O'Connor.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2006. / "Title from dissertation home page (viewed July 3, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3007. Advisers: Colin Allen; Mark Kaplan.

In this dissertation, I reconcile our knowledge of our own minds with philosophical naturalism. Philosophers traditionally hold that our knowledge of our own minds is especially direct and authoritative in comparison with other domains of knowledge. I introduce the subject in the first chapter. In the second and third chapters, I address the idea that we know our own minds directly. If self-knowledge is direct, it must not be grounded on anything more epistemically basic. This creates a puzzle for all epistemologists. For the naturalist, the puzzle is especially tricky. To say that self-knowledge has no epistemic ground threatens the naturalist’s ability to understand it as psychologically real. I argue that the idea that self-knowledge is direct is not well motivated and that models of direct self-knowledge have fundamental problems. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I examine first-person authority. I distinguish between epistemic authority, or being in a better position than others to know, and nonepistemic authority, or being immune to challenge according to some conventional norm. I argue that we have only limited epistemic authority over our own minds. I then consider whether there may be an interesting non-epistemic authority attached to the first-person perspective. This would locate first-person authority in connection with our responsibility for our own minds. I argue that this sort of authority may exist, but is unlikely to threaten naturalism without further anti-naturalist commitments in the philosophy of mind. In the final two chapters, I explore the possibility that the underlying disagreements between naturalists and anti-naturalists are about the nature of belief. I consider what failures of self-knowledge might demonstrate about the nature of belief. I show how, with the proper understanding of belief, a theory of self-knowledge can assuage some of these worries. Having adopted a conception of belief that makes sense for philosophy and empirical psychology, I outline a positive theory of self-knowledge and suggest directions for future research.

In this dissertation, I examine the nature and structure of consciousness. Conscious experience is often said to be phenomenally unified, and subjects of consciousness are often self-conscious. I ask whether these features necessarily accompanyconscious experience. Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that all of a conscious subject's experiences at a time are phenomenally unified? And is it necessarily the case that subjects of consciousness are self-conscious whenever they are conscious? I argue that the answer to the former is affirmative and the latter negative. In the first chapter, I set the stage by distinguishing phenomenal unity from other species of conscious unity. A pair of conscious states is phenomenally unified if they are experienced together as part of a single experience that encompasses them both. The Unity Thesis is formulated using the notion of a maximal state of consciousness. In the second chapter, I attempt to precisify this notion in a way that does not pre-emptively decide the debate over the Unity Thesis. In informal terms, a maximal state of consciousness is a sum of conscious states that are i) simultaneous, ii) have the same subject, and iii) all have a conjoint phenomenology. I call this the Consensus View. In chapter three, I consider a recent attempt by Bayne to account for the split-brain data in a way that does not attribute two streams of consciousness to them. I close the chapter by presenting the rough outline of an interpretation of the split-brain data that is consistent with both the Unity Thesis and the split-brain data. In chapter four, I turn from defending the Unity Thesis to examining an attempt to account for conscious unity. Rosenthal has offered a theory of conscious unity as an extension of his higher-order theory of consciousness. I consider his account of conscious unity in light of a well-known objection to his theory: the (Representational) Mismatch Objection. In chapter five, the discussion turns from the unity of consciousness to self-consciousness. The question that is considered in this and the last chapter is the question whether conscious experience is necessarily accompanied by self-consciousness. The affirmative answer to this question I call the Ubiquity Thesis. I spend some time distinguishing robust conceptions of self-consciousness from minimal conceptions of self-consciousness. In the sixth and final chapter, I take up a contemporary defence of the Ubiquity Thesis. Kriegel, a higher-order theorist like Rosenthal, has argued that every conscious state is conscious in virtue of the fact that it represents itself. This self-representation is understood as a kind of self-consciousness and, thus, his theory can be seen as affirming the Ubiquity Thesis. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The U.S. Army conducts extensive training on its core values beginning with initial entry training (IET), commonly referred to as basic training, in order to shape soldiers' behavior and decision making in combat and noncombat situations. This mixed methods study addressed the problem of limited empirical research on the effects of U.S. Army IET on soldiers' moral and character development. The purpose was to explore the effects of Military Police (MP) IET on soldiers in training through a mixed methods quantitative and qualitative model. The theoretical framework for this study was based on Rest's four component model (FCM) of moral development, Hart's model of moral identity, the schemas of the Defining Issues Test (DIT), and the U.S. Army's moral code consisting of the Army values, the Soldiers Creed, and the Warrior Ethos. The DIT was administered at the beginning and conclusion of MP IET to determine change in soldiers' moral judgment. Focus groups of MP IET soldiers identified perceptions of change in moral development. Data analysis using ANOVA and matched pair t tests of DIT scores revealed no significant changes in overall scores, no differences among age groups, and limited differences among genders and educational levels. Results showed significant decline in personal interest scores among females. Focus group results using qualitative content analysis revealed the relationship with drill sergeants as having a significant impact on moral development. This study provides feedback to trainers and leaders on designing effective moral and character education. Soldiers influence societies at home and abroad. This research shows that positive social change is more likely as soldiers receive moral and character education which focuses on developing moral expertise, not just memorization of rules, and which results in moral and trustworthy behavior.