Myth and Argument in Plato's Phaedrus, Republic, and Phaedo investigates the role played by eschatological myth in the arguments of Plato's Phaedrus, Republic and Phaedo. It argues that a reconsideration of the agenda followed by Socrates in each of these dialogues brings into view the contribution made by the mythological narrative to their argumentative line. Each of the three chapters of my thesis analyses the nature of this contribution. The first chapter argues that the myth occupying the central pages of the Phaedrus contributes to developing one of the themes addressed in the dialogue, namely a link between the divine realm and the activities thought by Phaedrus to be unrelated to the religious sphere. By showing that Eros fosters imitation of the gods, the palinode makes an important contribution to this topic. The second chapter proposes that the myth of Er and passage 608c2-621d3 in which it is included are an essential part of the line of argument of the Republic. I analyse the aims Socrates sets in Book 2 for his investigation into justice, and show that they include the description of the positive consequences of justice along with the benefits it causes in and by itself. By listing the rewards just people will receive from other people and the gods, passage 608c2-621d3 gives a description of the positive consequences of justice. The third chapter argues that the argumentative line followed in the Phaedo finds its culmination in the eschatological myth. Socrates expresses a hope for post-mortem justice in his defence of the philosophical life. To render it plausible to his interlocutors he needs to show that the soul is both immortal and intrinsically intelligent. After vindicating these notions, Socrates presents in the concluding myth the image of an afterlife governed by ethical principles.

The thesis consists of five chapters: the first functions as an overture; the second, third and fourth deal with Plato, Cicero and Montaigne respectively; and the fifth raises some questions. The overture explores the ways in which Odysseus, Lucretius and Seneca approached death, and in the process introduces some obvious distinctions - between death viewed as the act of dying and death viewed as the state of being dead, between the death which comes to everyone and the death which comes to me, between our own death and the death of others - and anticipates certain recurring themes. The second chapter, on Plato, is concerned chiefly with the Phaedo and the question of what is involved in "the practice of death". This entails an examination of related concepts and terminology in the Gorgias and the Republic, and of the whole subject of Platonic myth. The third chapter discusses Cicero's views on death and immortality - both the considered reflections of the philosopher and the spontaneous reactions of the bereaved father - principally as these emerge from the Tusculan Disputations and the letters to Atticus. The fourth chapter approaches Montaigne - his own experiences of death, the relationship between his earlier and later approaches, the tension between his professed Catholicism and his pagan inclinations, the difficulty and perhaps undesirability of extracting a 'message' from the Essais on this or any other subject. The conclusion asks to what extent these various approaches succeed in what they set out to do, and whether any generalised, objective approach to death can ever successfully address the individual predicament, either in relation to one's own death or in facing bereavement.

L’objet de ce travail consiste à étudier systématiquement le rôle de l’image platonicienne en mettant surtout en relief les modalités des actions des hommes qui reçoivent et créent les apparences. Platon intègre la fonction de l’image dans son propre système de pensée qui porte sur la relation du sensible et de l’intelligible. Ce philosophe est très sensible à la modalité par laquelle les phénomènes apparaissent dans le champ de notre perception et oppose deux types d’apparence :l’image et le simulacre. L’image est une apparence qui invite le spectateur à saisir le modèle et à mesurer la proportion de l’apparence par rapport au modèle, tandis que le simulacre est une apparence qui trompe le spectateur en lui faisant prendre une illusion pour une réalité. L’opposition entre ces deux types d’apparence constitue l’ensemble de la motivation philosophique de Platon qui s’engage dans la lutte contre l’illusionnisme. C’est dans le Phédon que l’on peut découvrir la scène où émerge la conviction platonicienne à l’égard de cette stratégie fondée sur la mise en rivalité du simulacre et de l’image par la promotion de celle-ci. L’émergence de sa théorie innovatrice des images n’est pas indépendante de la formulation de l’idée selon laquelle les choses sensibles participent aux réalités intelligibles. C’est sans doute dans la République qu’il se préoccupe le plus de la mise en œuvre de cette idée en développant les questions qui concernent la réception et la création des images. Dans ce dialogue, ces deux actions sont étroitement reliées et synthétisées, pour former le système original de Platon, dans lequel le fondement de la théorie des Idées relève d’un certain dynamisme de l’action humaine qui crée et qui reçoit les images. Ce dynamisme se fonde notamment sur la fonction conductrice du tupos qui, comme principe, réglemente la perception et la création des images. On peut ainsi soutenir que la réflexion esthétique de Platon sur la fonctionnalité des images va de pair avec le mouvement intellectuel pour établir et développer la théorie des Idées. / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished