Non-combatants, even though they not participate directly in a conflict, are often targeted by armed groups. This study seeks to answer to the question why some areas are more affected by violence against civilians than others. Considering their importance in the contemporary world, electoral processes are used to explain the patterns of civilians’ victimization. This study focuses on irregular civil wars as the effects of elections on the distribution of violence against civilians in those wars is particularly understudied. Elections provide crucial information to armed groups about the preferences of the local population and therefore also the presence of potential collaborators or enemies. In addition, local political elites have incentives to favour or curb the violence against civilians, according to their electoral strength in a specific area. The thesis tests the implication with a quantitative study in the case of Colombia by analysing the long- and short-term effects of electoral results on the distribution of violence. Contrary to conventional civil wars, the findings suggest that civilians living in political strongholds in irregular civil wars, areas where a political party has strong support, are more likely to be targeted.