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Corruption and democratic performanceLittvay, Levente. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed May 22, 2007). PDF text: 162 p. : ill. (some col.) ; 3.48 Mb UMI publication number: AAT 3237061. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.
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Predictors of political participation in new democracies : a comparative studyPotgieter, Elnari 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MA)-- Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Comparative studies investigating predictors of political participation in new democracies are
rare. This study addresses an identified gap in the literature on predictors of political
participation in new democracies in order to build on the rich body of literature concerned with
political participation and democratic consolidation which already exists, but also to contribute
towards understanding the role of citizens and their decisions pertaining to political participation
in new democracies.
In order to address the identified gap, this cross-national comparative study uses World Values
Survey (2006) data for Chile, Poland, South Africa, and South Korea as part of a cross-sectional
secondary analysis aimed at ascertaining what predictors of political participation can be
identified for these new democracies.
Drawing primarily from studies by Shin (1999) and Dalton (2008) which used the Civic
Voluntarism Model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) as theoretical framework, predictors
of political participation considered in this study include: personal resources (level of education
and self-reported social class), political engagement and motivation (political interest and leftright
political ideology), group membership and networks, as well as demographic attributes
(age, gender and size of town). Forms of political participation investigated include: voting as
conventional form of participation; and boycotts, petitions and demonstrations as forms of
political protest behaviour. The relationships between the possible predictors of participation and
forms of political participation were determined by multiple regression analysis.
The main findings by this study are that political interest is an important predictor of voting and
political protest behaviour; age is a strong predictor of voting; and group membership has a
greater impact on political protest behaviour than on voting. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Vergelykende studies wat ondersoek instel na voorspellende faktore van deelname aan politieke
aktiwiteite in jong demokrasieë, is skaars. Deur indikatore van politieke deelname in nuwe
demokrasieë na te vors, spreek hierdie studie dus die geïdentifiseerde gaping in die literatuur aan
en brei dit uit op die korpus tekste aangaande politieke deelname en demokratiese konsolidasie.
Verder bevorder dit ook ’n beter begrip van landsburgers en hul besluite rakende politieke
deelname in jong demokrasieë.
Ten einde die aangeduide literatuurgaping te oorbrug, steun hierdie verglykende studie op data
van die “World Values Survey” (2006) vir Chili, Pole, Suid-Afrika en Suid-Korea. Dit vorm deel
van ’n sekondêre analise om individuele eienskappe as voorspellers van deelname aan politieke
aktiwiteite in nuwe demokrasieë, te identifiseer.
Studies deur Shin (1999) en Dalton (2008), wat gebruik maak van Verba, Schlozman en Brady
(1995) se “Civic Voluntarism Model”, dien as primêre teoretiese begronding. Daaruit word
afgelei dat moontlike voorspellers van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite gelys kan word as:
persoonlike hulpbronne (vlak van opvoeding en self-geidentifiseerde sosiale klas); politieke
betrokkenheid en motivering (belangstelling in politiek en politieke ideologie); groeplidmaatskap
en –netwerke asook demografiese eienskappe (ouderdom, geslag en grootte van dorp). Die
vorme van politieke aktiwiteite waaraan daar aandag gegee word, is eerstens stemgedrag tydens
nasionale verkiesings as konvensionele vorm van politieke deelname en tweedens biokotte,
petisies en demonstrasies as vorme van politieke protesgedrag.
Die hoof bevindinge van hierdie studie is dat politieke belangstelling ‘n belangrike voorspeller is
vir stemgedrag en politieke protesgedrag; ouderdom is ‘n sterk voorspeller vir deelname aan
verkiesings en groeplidmaatskap het ‘n groter invloed op politieke protesgedrag as op die keuse om te stem. / Mandela Rhodes Foundation
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Assessing key political risk indicators for authoritarian states : the case of Libya and the petroleum industryBjelland, Roger A. 03 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MA) -- Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: For multinational oil corporations (MNOCs), increasing worldwide demand for energy combined
with greater competition in the international petroleum market necessitate continuous search for new
areas rich in hydrocarbons – and the greatest oil reserves have in many instances been located in
authoritarian states with challenging investment environments that often imply great uncertainty
with regard to return of investment (ROI). In such cases, proper political risk analysis is an
invaluable decision-making tool in determining whether the risk of a negative ROI is too large to
make an investment. The Libyan market appeared highly promising for MNOCs from the mid-
2000s, and oil companies decided to return to Libya despite a large degree of uncertainty around
regulatory, contractual and political stability issues. Once the Arab uprising surfaced in 2011,
eventually turning into a brutal civil war between the Quadhafi regime and the opposition to his rule,
the levels of political risk in the Libyan market increased dramatically. A model of political risk analysis can only be as good its components, and the start of 2011 once
again manifested the importance of proper political risk analyses in order to minimise potential
losses resulting from unexpected events. Thus, in the context of the Arab Spring revolution, the
main purpose of this research is to assess the forecasting ability of key political risk factors and
indicators. The central question asked is whether political risk analysis as a discipline can be
successfully applied as a tool to forecast a political situation within authoritarian states. Specifically,
and by analysing the case of Libya, the aim of this study is to determine whether the political events
of 2011 and the concurrent extremely high levels of political risk could have been anticipated by
competent political risk analysis. This study builds on the 1999 work of Professor Albert Venter and
his vindication of key political risk indicators for authoritarian states. Additionally, the study seeks
to contribute to existing research by adapting the indicators to an industry-specific political risk
context, namely the petroleum sector. The research study concludes that a forecast for Libya,
conducted with information available in 2009, would have given the market a medium high level of
political risk, with several points of great concern for MNOCs. The research study argues that
competent political risk analysis, as far as it is possible to predict such an event as the Libyan
uprising, identified several signs of an imminent revolution. The analysis could not forecast when, or
even if it would happen, but the fact that several indicators pointed in the direction of increasing
levels of political risk signifies that it could have been too early for MNOCs to return to the country
in the mid-2000s. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die toenemende wêreldwye energiebehoeftes gepaardgaande met groter mededinging in
brandstofmarkte, dwing die Multi-nasionale Olie Korporasies (MNOKs) om deurlopend te soek na nuwe
gebiede ryk aan vloeibare koolstowwe (hydrocarbons) en die grootste olie reserwes word in baie gevalle
aangetref in state met outoritêre regerings vorme waar die beleggings omgewing van so ’n aard is dat ’n
kapitaal-opbrengs (KO) baie keer erg onseker is. In sulke gevalle is dit noodsaaklik dat daar ’n
behoorlike analiese van politieke risiko moet wees sodat bepaal kan word of die kans van ’n negatiewe
KO te groot is om so ’n belegging te maak. In die beginjare van die 2000s het die Libiese market veel
belofte vir die MNOKs ingehou en het hulle besluit om na Libië terug te keer ten spyte van die feit dat
daar groot onsekerhede bestaan het ten opsigte van reguleering, kontrakte en politieke stabiliteit. Die
vlakke van politieke risiko het in 2011 dramaties verhoog met die Arabiese opstande, wat uiteindelik in
’n burgeroorlog tussen die Quadhafi regime en sy teenstanders, ontaard het. ’n Model van politieke risiko analise is natuurlik net so goed soos sy verskillende dele en aan die
begin van 2011 het dit weereens aan die lig gekom dat behoorlike politieke risiko analise baie belangrik
is om te verseker dat onverwagte gebeure die kleins moontlike invloed op winste sal hê. Dus, met die
‘Arabiese Lente revolusie’ as agtergrond, is die hoofdoel van hierdie navorsing om te bepaal tot watter
mate belangrike politieke risiko faktore en indikators gebruik kan word om voorspellings te waag. Die
vraag word gevra of politieke risiko analise, as disipline, suksesvol toegepas kan word om die politieke
toestande in outoritêre state, te voorspel. Deur spesifiek die geval Libië te analiseer, is die doel van
hierdie studie om te bepaal of die politieke gebeure van 2011 en die ernstige verhoogde vlakke van
politieke risiko redelikerwys voorspel sou kan wees as daar bevoegde politieke risiko analise vooraf was.
Hierdie studie gebruik as basis die 1999 werk van Prof. Albert Venter waarin hy regverdiging toon van
die politieke risiko indikators vir outoritêre state. Daarby beoog die studie om by te dra tot bestaande
navorsing deur die indikators aan te pas vir toepassing in ’n ondernemings-spesifieke politieke risiko
konteks, naamlik die brandstof sektor. Die navorsing maak die gevolgtrekking wat Libië betref, met die
inligting wat in 2009 beskikbaar was, dat ’n voorspelling van ñ medium hoog vlak van politieke risiko
vir die market gemaak kon wees met sekere punte van groot kommer vir die MNOKs. Die
navorsingstudie maak die punt dat bevoegde politieke risiko analise, sover dit moontlik is om ’n
onverwagte gebeurtenis soos die Libiese opstande te voorspel, verskeie tekens van ’n dreigende
revolusie geïdentifiseer het. Die analise kon nie voorspel wanneer of selfs indien dit sou gebeur nie,
maar die feit dat verskeie indikators getoon het dat daar verhoogde vlakke van politieke risiko was, het
dit aangedui het dat die middle 2000s te vroeg was vir die MNOKs om na die land terug te keer.
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