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Political parties and their competitors : party development in Russia's regionsGibson, James, 1982- January 2006 (has links)
The variation in expansion of national political parties into regional politics in Russia poses a fundamental challenge to theories of party development by presenting an empirical puzzle: why have national politics dominated in some regions yet failed to elect or even present candidates in others? Conventional explanations for party weakness in Russia invoke cultural constraints or poor institutional incentives but neither provide sufficient variation to explain these outcomes at the regional level. These failures correspond to a larger lacunae in the party literature on the process by parties become nationalized and eliminate their regional competitors. / This study addresses these empirical questions by re-examining regional elites and their ability to create informal alternatives to parties. I argue that the failure of national political party development in Russian regional politics is not simply the product of poor institutional incentives but rather due to the active opposition of regional elites. Where regional elites successfully mobilized the resources made available during transition, they prevented the entry of national parties by furnishing their own candidates with powerful financial resources and lending them reputation that resonated with the electorate. These outcomes were not predetermined by legacies of the Soviet era, however, but were rather contingent on the ability of regional executives to rapidly construct winning coalitions, particularly through the mobilization of administrative resources and the construction of patronage networks. Hence, the successful development national parties in regional politics was as much a story of weak regional regimes as it was a story of successful regional party branches.
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Political parties and their competitors : party development in Russia's regionsGibson, James, 1982- January 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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Electoral and party systems in post-communist Russia /Townsend, David James. January 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M. A.)--Acadia University, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.
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Electoral and party systems in post-communist RussiaTownsend, David James. January 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M. A.)--Acadia University, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.
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A quoi servent les partis parlementaires d'opposition en Russie ?étude de cas des antennes régionales du Parti libéral-démocrate de Russie, du Parti communiste de la Fédération de Russie et de Russie juste à Tomsk, en 2005-2010 / What is the role of the parliamentary opposition parties in Russia ?case study of regional branches of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Communist Party of Russia and Just Russia in Tomsk, 2005-2010Brenez, Lou 29 February 2012 (has links)
La thèse de doctorat en science politique s’attache à comprendre le rôle des partis politiques parlementaires d’opposition en Russie entre 2005 et 2010. Elle se fonde sur l’étude des branches régionales du Parti communiste de la Fédération de Russie (KPRF), du Parti libéral-démocrate de Russie (LDPR) et de Russie juste à Tomsk, en Sibérie occidentale. Toute la problématique de ces trois partis d’opposition est liée à ce paradoxe :dans les années 2000, il existe en Russie des partis qui se positionnent comme étant d’opposition - dans un système partisan dominé par Russie unie - tout en se montrant loyaux envers le régime politique et ses principaux dirigeants.<p>Les données, recueillies au cours de huit mois et demi de recherche de terrain en Russie, sont essentiellement qualitatives. Une approche organisationnelle et fonctionnelle de l’étude des partis est utilisée afin de comprendre le rôle de ces trois formations dans le système politique russe. <p>La thèse s’attache à tester trois hypothèses :les partis parlementaires d’opposition remplissent certaines fonctions dans le système politique qui leur assurent le soutien d’électeurs et d’adhérents ;les organisations partisanes du LDPR, du KPRF et de Russie juste sont centralisées de manière à limiter la marge de manœuvre des branches locales et permettre un contrôle étroit de l’appareil central ;ces trois partis transforment au sein des institutions parlementaires le soutien des électeurs en soutien pour le régime.<p>Tout d’abord, il apparaît que le KPRF, le LDPR et Russie juste remplissent d’autres fonctions dans le système politique que celle de légitimation/stabilisation (Lavau, 1969). Ces fonctions sont multiples. Les activités électorales indiquent que ces trois partis servent, d’une part, de plateforme d’accès aux organes du pouvoir pour les entrepreneurs, d’autre part, la fonction d’expression est assurée en ce que les partis expriment des problèmes, proposent une alternative, et disqualifient certaines pratiques. Pendant les élections, et au sein du parlement régional, les partis assurent dans une certaine mesure la fonction d’organisation de l’opposition. Enfin, le KPRF, le LDPR et Russie juste remplissent, de différentes façons, la fonction d’assistance à la société.<p>Ensuite, la thèse a vérifié que les trois partis ont une structure interne centralisée à Moscou, tout en mettant en évidence l’interdépendance qui existe entre le siège fédéral et les branches régionales dans chaque parti. Une marge de manœuvre, différente selon les trois formations, existe donc au niveau des branches locales.<p>Enfin, l’exemple de Tomsk montre qu’une loyauté formelle envers le régime et une opposition réelle sont possibles. Cela implique des ambiguïtés, notamment concernant l’activité des députés de ces partis au sein des parlements locaux./The PhD thesis starts with this paradox: in the 2000s, the Russian party system is dominated by United Russia called the party of power. Nevertheless, this system also allows the existence of parties that claim to be the opposition, while being loyal to the political regime and its leaders. How do these parties resolve this paradox? <p>The doctoral dissertation in political science seeks to understand the role of parliamentary opposition parties in Russia between 2005 and 2010. It is based on the study of regional branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Just Russia (SR) in Tomsk, Western Siberia. The qualitative data were collected during eight and a half months of field research in Russia. An organizational and functional approach to the study of political parties is used to understand their role in the Russian political system.<p>The thesis tests three hypotheses: first, the opposition parliamentary parties perform certain functions in the political system that gives them the support of voters and members. Second, the party organizations of the LDPR, the KPRF and Just Russia are centralized to limit the flexibility of local branches and allow tight control of the central apparatus. Third, we examine if these parties transform the support of voters into support for the regime in the parliamentary institutions at the local level.<p>The results show three elements. First, it shows that the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia perform several functions in the political system. On the one hand, they are platforms for businessmen to access to the organs of power; on the other hand, they express problems, offer an alternative, and disqualify some practices. During elections, and within the regional parliament, parliamentary opposition parties perform to a certain extent the function of organizing opposition. Moreover, the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia support citizens in various ways. <p>Then, the dissertation verifies that the three parties have a centralized internal structure. But it also highlights the interdependence between federal headquarters and regional branches within each party. <p>Finally, the case of Tomsk shows that formal loyalty to the regime, and a real opposition at the same time, is possible as far as the KPRF, the LDPR and Just Russia are concerned. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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