This thesis explores the theme of "worldlessness" in the political thought of Hannah Arendt. / The thesis analyzes "worldlessness" by way of Arendt's reflections on the sub-themes of "contemporary crisis," the "Western tradition," the "modern age" and the modern phenomenon of "thoughtlessness." These sub-themes are examined in chapters one, two, four and five respectively. Chapter three examines Arendt's conception of politics and "the world." / The analysis proceeds on the basis of Arendt's stated conviction that political thought must take its bearings from "incidents of living experience" if it is to be adequate to its subject matter. More specifically, it investigates the basis and significance of Arendt's contention that the modern condition of "worldlessness" has produced a rupture between thought and experience which has radically altered the character of contemporary understanding. In general terms, the thesis examines the origins of modern worldlessness and the implications of this for contemporary thinking.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, August 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 122-129).

This is a thesis about our basic moral equality as human beings: its meaning, its justification and its implications for our society. It offers the fundamental principles of how we are obligated to live together in a Society of Equals. Its major conclusions are as follows. First, whilst there is more than one meaning to the claim that 'we are one another's basic moral equals', the most important meaning for political philosophy is that each individual has Equal Authority. More specifically, each individual has fundamental authority over herself, and herself alone. Secondly, the justification of this fundamental authority over ourselves lies in our common limitation: we are all fallible. Further, we are not merely all fallible in the sense that any one of our beliefs could be false, but also in the sense that we have no non-circular way of judging the reliability of any of our beliefs. This aspect of our natural epistemic position justifies our equal, fundamental, practical authority over ourselves alone. Finally, the most important implication of this justification is that each individual's most basic reason for action is to promote not merely her own, but each and every individual's compliance with her fundamental authority over herself. It follows that each individual has decisive reason to constrain her own compliance with her own fundamental authority over herself, where necessary, to allow the equal promotion of someone else's compliance with her fundamental authority over herself. This principle is called 'Equal Respect'. Upon this principle of Equal Respect arises an architectonic System of Right, and correlative duties, that is called Equal Sovereignty. Under this system, our rights and duties with respect to one another are distributed in accordance with a hypothetical auction and insurance scheme to ensure that each individual is truly sovereign over their own equal share of the world.

This dissertation addresses the problem of raising consciousness in Walter Benjamin's writings, which focuses on the problem in his major early works, and in his later writings on photography, film, and mimesis generally. It is a closely-read interpretation, following Benjamin in his attempt to present a historical-philosophical treatment of the literature he was examining. However, it moves away from Benjamin's methodology at critical moments, presenting its own reading of the raising of consciousness as a problem not only for political theorists, but for those interested in the philosophy of history as well. The chapters focus on Benjamin's key major early works, the untranslated "Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism," his dissertation, and the essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities. It contains a lengthy chapter on Benjamin's famous Trauerspiel book, and two on mimesis and the essay on the work of art in the age of its technical reproducibility. The dissertation casts these works in a different light, one under which they have not been examined previously: this light bears the shadow of Kant. Although this is not a dissertation on Benjamin and Kant, the place of the subject and its historicity is considered when contemplating the raising of consciousness at stake in each individual chapter. The question of temporality is present in each case, and marks the presence of Kant as the figure who attempted so articulately to bridge reason and history. Benjamin realized this, and so his attention to consciousness and its temporality is so keen in all of his writings. Conclusions are always difficult to enumerate, especially when a work sees itself as necessarily unfinished. It is the opinion of this author that it is evident, in each chapter, both how Benjamin wrote about raising consciousness, what that meant in each case examined, and how this author interjected to highlight, stress, and invent new ways to read what is often so terribly obscure.

This dissertation analyses export control programs in the Western state system. The main focus is Western alliance collaboration on East-West technology transfer controls through COCOM. It examines post-1945 intra-alliance and intra-national perspectives on the relationship between East-West trade and Western security. Within four historical periods (1949-1964, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1991) four questions are addressed: (a) How does the structural distribution of power and the nature of United States leadership affect collaboration on the form, the nature, and the enforcement of controls? (b) How does the nature of global economic competition affect Western alliance states' collaboration on and Western firms' compliance with export controls? (c) How does the nature and the distribution of power in intra-national politics on this issue affect United States policy and multilateral collaboration? (d) How does the nature of changing images and representations of security and threats to security affect United States policy and the nature of collaboration? The project thesis is that a multi-factor analysis is necessary for an appropriate understanding of the dynamics of discord and consensus over the terms of the Western alliance export control program. To conduct such an analysis the project draws on four theoretical frameworks: modified structural realism, a market explanation, institutionalism and discourse analysis. The study is a contribution to the literature on international relations theory, particularly the role of ideas in international policy collaboration. It draws on work in theories of language and discourse and microeconomic theories of contested exchange. The dissertation concludes that emerging opportunities regarding overall global security will result in a transformation of Western collaboration from East-West export control to a multi-directional technology transfer management system. The problems with this transformation and issues that must be addressed in a broader-based program (such as: the proliferation of missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons and environmental management) are considered.

No description available.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsible with regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising from certain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claims we are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying of thousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitely responsible for the other. It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishes between an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other. The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we are summoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the 'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific other and disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginning of impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocity between the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general other with whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who commands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in a symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoy legitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to the other less so. To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debate about transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from a Levinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poor global other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him, are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the subject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a political response to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitan and communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds us of our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete. Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor, the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for it overlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the interpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitancommunitarian debate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to the globally poor than is presently the case is possible. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vra waarom ons onsself nie skuldiger en meer verantwoordelik beskou teenoor die duisende mense wat elke dag, sonder enige toedoen van hul eie, as gevolg van voorkombare, armoed-verwante oorsake, sterf nie. Vanuit sekere perspektiewe is sulke nalatigheid te wagte. Wanneer ons egter die kwessie vanuit die perspektief van Emmanuel Levinas se etiese filosofie benader, kom ons voor 'n teenstrydigheid te staan, aangesien Levinas aandring dat ons oneindiglik en onvermydelik verantwoordelik is vir die ander, terwyl die daaglikse voorkombare sterftes van duisende arm mense aandui dat ons nie optree asof ons onsself as oneindiglik verantwoordelik teenoor die ander beskou nie. Dit wil voorkom asof Levinas eenvoudig verkeerd is. Levinas tref egter 'n onderskeid tussen 'n interpersoonlike etiese verhouding en 'n onpersoonlike politiese verhouding met die ander. Eersgenoemde is 'n verhouding van asimmetriese en oneindige verantwoordelikheid waartoe ons beveel word deur die uniekheid van die ander se 'gesig.' Laasgenoemde is 'n verhouding waarby ook 'n 'derde' betrokke is, en daarom moet die self sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die spesifieke ander beperk om so ook sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor 'n veelheid van andere na te kom. Die teenwoordigheid van die derde dui die beginpunt van onpersoonlike geregtigheid, institusies, politiek, kennis, asook gelykheid en wederkerigheid tussen die self en die ander, aan. Elke person wat ek teëkom is 'n algemene ander met wie ek in 'n politiese verhouding staan, asook, tegelykertyd, 'n spesifieke ander teenoor wie ek oneindiglik verantwoordelik is. Teenoor elke ander staan ek terselfdetyd in 'n simmetriese politiese verhouding en 'n asimmetriese etiese verhouding. Die dubbelsinnigheid van die samelewing lê daarin dat ek moet besluit of ek polities of eties teenoor die ander gaan optree. Beide opsies geniet 'n mate van legitimiteit, alhoewel, 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander minder legitiem is vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse oogpunt. In 'n poging om ons apatie teenoor die wêreld se armes te verstaan, word die sentrale debat rondom die kwessie van transnasionale verantwoordelikheid, die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat, vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Drie wyses waarop die etiese verhouding met die ander onderdruk word, en sodoende bydra tot ons etiese apatie teenoor die ander, word geïdentifiseer. Eerstens poog skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat om die subjek so 'n groot mate van outonomie en vryheid as moontlik te handhaaf en te bewaar, en 'legitimiseer' in die proses 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander. Tweedens, wanneer die kwessie van globale geregtigheid deur skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat aangeraak word, word die andersheid van die ander, wat ons aan ons etiese verantwoordelikheid teenoor die ander, asook aan die onvoltooide aard van geregtigheid, herinner, onderdruk. Derdens, in soverre kosmopolitaanse skrywers hulself beywer om 'n groter mate van besorgdheid teenoor arm persone regoor die wêreld te ontlok, blyk die strategie wat deur hulle gevolg word (hulle beklemtoon menslike gelykheid) teenproduktief te wees, aangesien hierdie strategie die uniekheid van die subjek en die ander in die etiese verhouding misken en onderdruk. Die kritiek teenoor hierdie drie aspekte van die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat word dan uitgebrei na aansprake dat 'n meer etiese houding teenoor die wêreld se armes moontlik is.

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Public goods are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. One person enjoying the benefits of a public good will not reduce the value of the good for others. And nobody within a particular population can be excluded from enjoying those benefits. While we often think of the relevant population being co-citizens of a state - national defence is taken to be the archetypal public good - in recent years the importance of public goods that benefit individuals across different countries has increasingly been recognised. We can refer to these as "global public goods". When global public goods are supplied, various costs and benefits are generated, and these costs and benefits can be shared among countries in different ways. This thesis explores how justice requires us to share them; I develop a theory of distributive justice for global public goods. I begin by developing two principles for assigning the costs and benefits of supplying public goods within a state, and then argue that these should, for the most part, also govern the distribution of costs and benefits arising from global public good production. Finally, I assess how certain private goods that the supply of public goods make possible should be shared among states. The fact that these goods rely for their production on the supply of global public goods, I argue, will affect the principles of distributive justice that should govern these.