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This thesis explores how Foucault and Marx can be reconciled through examining power analyzes and resistant strategies proposed by the two thinkers. This thesis concludes that Foucault and Marx, despite their more visible differences, are not inherently in conflict with each other.

Scotland has long been a nation within a wider state, but only within the last four decades has a political party dedicated to the establishment of a Scottish state emerged as an electoral force. Yet, since that time the political landscape within the United Kingdom has changed rapidly. While some see devolution as a step towards the separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, others argue it is a strengthening of that relationship. This thesis argues that only by acknowledging the ethnic and mass influences on the nature of Scottish national identity will an understanding of Scottish nationalism be possible. After considering the theoretical arguments surrounding nationalism, and specifically Scottish nationalism, the work shifts to an empirical analysis of Scotland. To examine the nature of Scottish nationalism and national identity, this research considers the manifestos of the political parties over the past thirty-five years, examining how they have employed a sense of Scotland the nation, and Scottishness. This consideration is then linked to an analysis of mass perceptions of national belonging and identity, which are themselves contrasted with elite perceptions, gleaned through interviews conducted amongst MPs and MSPs. The results indicate the need to recognise that ethnic aspects of Scottish national identity are more significant than the foremost theoretical considerations of nationalism and national identity allow. Furthermore, this case study illustrates that the impact that mass perceptions have on national identity also requires greater recognition within the field.

The aim of the thesis is to rebut the dominant autonomy-based defence of hate speech within a liberal framework. The thesis argues that liberal egalitarianism is compatible with certain restrictions on free speech. I defend the view that liberal ideals such as equality and autonomy are, contrary to the arguments of many liberals, better achieved by imposing certain restrictions on what citizens are allowed to express. I examine the problem of freedom of expression in the context. of the public/private distinction. In particular, I explore the Rawlsian conception of this distinction, which is based on the idea that principles of justice apply only to the 'basic structure of society'. Citizens are required by justice to treat all others as free and equal citizens, but this seems to hold only when citizens deliberate about 'constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice'. In their private lives and other social contexts citizens are free to treat other people without equal respect and concern, provided that basic rights are not violated. This position is criticised by calling attention to recent developments in Social and Cognitive Psychology. Evidence suggests that much of our behaviour is triggered by features of�· the environment that bypass individuals' rational control: this includes social stereotypes, non-instrumental behaviour, and goal-oriented activity among others. I develop these ideas into a discussion of free speech and autonomy. I argue that autonomy defences of free speech need to assess how the environment directly affects rational processes. Moreover, I argue, given the structure of human cognition, there is no guarantee that attitudes and actions cultivated in the private sphere will not 'spillover' into the public sphere. For this reason, I suggest, political morality must also extend to the justice of our private practices. To the extent that autonomy and justice matter, I argue that we have reasons to limit the expression of certain views, in particular those which trigger processes that bypass rational control. Finally, despite the importance I attribute to the concept of autonomy, I reject the claim that my position endorses a form of liberal perfectionism. I do so by defending a conception of full publicity and demonstrating that the view I articulate is compatible with rejecting perfectionism.

This thesis examines the relationship between rebel organisation and violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that rebels use such one-sided violence to enforce popular support when they are unable to secure support otherwise. An important determinant of this strategic use of violence is the rebels' organisational configuration. Organisational factors such as the ideology of a rebel group, the occurrence of leadership divisions, the level of fractionalisation within a rebel group's population base, the existence of external support and the number of competing rebel factions determine whether non-violent strategies to secure support are available or whether rebels can only rely on violent means to enforce support. I test this theoretical model using both quantitative and qualitative methods. First, I conduct a statistical cross-sectional study analysing the relationship between rebel organisation and rebel one-sided violence in sub-Sahara Africa between 1989 and 2007. The analysis reveals that the occurrence of leadership divisions increases the probability of an onset of rebel violence against civilians. I also find that ethno-nationalist rebel groups kill fewer civilians while rebel groups who draw support from highly fractionalised population bases kill more civilians. Second, I use qualitative within-case analyses of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) to test whether these correlations are actually driven by the causal pathways outlined in my theoretical model. While both case studies provide supporting evidence for this, they also uncover that the causal pathways linking leadership divisions to rebel violence can substantially differ from each other. Moreover, the qualitative analysis reveals that the theoretical model only partly captures the causal pathways between rebel ideology and the rebel groups' population base and the level of one-sided violence.

This thesis outlines a species of political liberalism and an understanding of human rights developed from contemporary interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s moral, legal and political theory. Working from a reading of Aquinas’s ethics that stresses both its eudaimonism and the capacity of practical reason to immediately apprehend certain human goods, the work builds on this ethical understanding by propounding a substantive approach to justice and natural right in the legal-political domain. It is argued that a Thomistic conception of justice and natural right is consistent with the notion of subjective human rights, including both fundamental human rights and certain ‘liberty’ or ‘choice’ rights. The thesis demonstrates that Aquinas’s innovative approach to justice and the political common good is useful in addressing key points in debates in political theory on human rights practice, ideal theory and forms of social criticism. Such an approach to natural right is developed into a particular species of political liberalism, based on the genus type put forward by John Rawls and Jacques Maritain before him. The work justifies a form of political liberalism in which public reason is focused on building an overlapping consensus on the political common good between citizens through practical reasoning, but one in which there is a permissive approach to the use of metaphysical or religious arguments in the public domain. The work concludes by offering a defence of a form of political rather than legal constitutionalism; one that takes normative orientations on the nature of political freedom and the consequent role of government from neo republican theorists, whose positions are held in some respects to be complementary with those of political liberals.

This thesis explores the role of democracy, i.e. electoral and deliberative democracy, in pluralist societies. I begin by hypothesising that democracy may function as a ‘political theory’ (‘political’ in the sense used by Rawls in Political Liberalism) and ask whether adherents of different comprehensive worldviews could endorse democracy on that basis. I consider the discomfort that liberals, adherents of one particular worldview, have with democracy. I note that Berlin’s account of value pluralism may offer an understanding that allows liberals to value democracy. I consider justifications for electoral democracy (procedural and instrumental) and for deliberative democracy. I claim that procedural justifications for electoral democracy fail arguing that, in valuing democracy because of the alleged freedom given to individuals to influence political decision-making, procedural justifications misrepresent democracy. Rather electoral democracy is about different collective endeavours (i.e. the attempts to elect different candidates). Individual involvement is in the form of the opportunity to contribute to those collective endeavours but such opportunities are not of equal value and, thus, are not morally significant. I argue that deliberative democracy cannot function as a political theory. However, there are weighty arguments for electoral democracy on account of its instrumental value. The relationship, though, between an instrumentalist electoral democracy and comprehensive worldviews is necessarily problematic. Given the contingent nature of democratic outcomes, these will clash with the imperatives of comprehensive doctrines. For that reason and others, liberals and holders of other comprehensive doctrines do not relate to democracy as a political theory. I turn to an account of political settlements as modi vivendi. I argue that democracy is best understood as a component of modi vivendi. Liberals will still have difficulties with democracy but liberals have problems with any non-liberal outcome unless they accept a broadly Berlinian approach.

Over the course of (roughly) the past three decades, much of contemporary liberal political theory has followed John Rawls and taken a ‘political’ turn. Liberalism, it is now generally supposed, is a ‘political’ doctrine, not a philosophy of life. The most influential account of such a liberalism is public reason liberalism. According to public reason liberals, political rules and decisions have to be justified by appeal to ideas or arguments that those subject to them (at some level of idealisation) endorse or accept. Public reason is the standard by which moral or political rules can be assessed. In this thesis I do two things. First, I offer a critique of public reason liberalism. I argue that it fails to live up to the ideal of liberal reason, that it fails to take diversity seriously, and that it is based on a problematic account of political institutions. Second, I articulate a genuinely ‘political’ alternative, which I call a liberalism without liberals. I develop this alternative on the basis of a re-interpretation of David Hume’s critique of the social contract and of his account of pluralism, the moral order and social criticism. I argue that Hume understands political society as the product of shared interests and not (as social contract theorists suppose) as an embodiment of a common will. I also argue that Hume offers a compelling, nonsectarian account of the standards for moral and political evaluation and that he is capable of accommodating foundational pluralism. In sum, a Hume-inspired liberalism without liberals is a combination of (a) a specific idea concerning the nature of political society, (b) an attempt to take pluralism more seriously than has so far been countenanced by liberals, (c) a specific view concerning the distribution of authority in moral deliberation and the nature of social criticism, and (d) scepticism about political institutions.

This dissertation offers a qualitative study of female participation in leftist political violence in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1970. It focuses on four militant leftist groups: the ‘Red Army Faction’ (RAF), the ‘Movement of June 2’ (MJ2), the ‘Revolutionary Cells’ (RC), and the ‘Red Zora’ (RZ). Unlike the RAF, the MJ2 has attracted little attention by scholars and journalists; and there is virtually no literature on the RC and the RZ. To offer a nuanced analysis of the history, ideologies and activities of the four groups, this thesis draws on semi-structured interviews with former group members and contemporary witnesses, autobiographical accounts, scholarly literature, newspaper articles, and a range of archival sources. The guiding questions for the analysis are: what roles have women played in the four organisations and in concrete manifestations of political violence? And, to what extent could female participation in political violence be understood as a form of feminist militancy? To answer these questions, this study combines theories and methods from new feminist materialisms, philosophies of sexual difference, gender theory and Cultural Studies. It finds that whilst opposing the existing gender regime, women in the RAF and MJ2 effectively used femininity as camouflage to carry out violent attacks. Neither groups had a feminist agenda. The RZ and some of the women in the RC, by contrast, took up central themes in the women’s movement. This thesis argues that their activities evolved into a form of feminist militancy. Beyond the specific context of research on political violence in Germany, this study makes a more general contribution to scholarship on female participation in armed conflicts, as it works towards a methodological and conceptual approach that accounts for the material-discursive nature of political violence, and for situational dynamics and gendered performances during concrete attacks.