Though the political unrest in African schools has been broadly viewed as arising from the power struggle between the state and the liberation forces, in rural areas the question of violence should also be looked into in the context of the emergence of conflicting views between Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). Political contradictions have emerged for various reasons. One of the reasons has been the desire to preserve the traditional political system, the tribal authority system. The liberation forces view the present forms of traditional political structures as parts of apartheid political organs, in that, since the introduction of the Bantu Authority system in the early 1950s and later on the formation of homeland governments in the early 1970s, they have been performing the functions assigned to them by the state. However, despite the reality that traditional political structures are functional to the state, they, at the same time, remain the authentic and legitimate political organs representing the aspirations of a significant fraction of rural communities. What needs to be taken seriously into consideration in analysing the rural political situation is the fact that the apartheid policy was ingeniously designed and predicated upon a tradition which was still held in esteem when it was subordinated by the colonising nations. This tradition was then enshrined in the apartheid programme, or, put differently, apartheid was camouflaged by it. Therefore it is a simplistic view to over emphasise the functional role of the traditional political system. The desire to preserve the present form of political system could be attributed either to the success of the policy of separate development or the fear for the annihilation of traditional structures in the new political dispensation or both. This study looks at the political dynamics and how it has precipitated violent confrontation among the oppressed people. It focuses on how schools in rural areas of KwaZulu have been affected. Principals were asked to express their views on their perceptions of violence. The conclusion drawn from respondents is that pupils are defiant because parents and teachers have been unable to fight for the rights of their children. For example they have been unable to provide them with adequate education. The author ends by recommending that parents and teachers should take up their rightful places in society. That is they should take upon themselves the responsibility of providing adequate education for the children. / Thesis (M.Ed.)-University of Natal, 1992.

The political violence and vigilante activities that characterised Natal and Zululand between 1985 and 1996 had numerous causes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 contributed to the rise of vigilantism and political violence. The formation of the Congress of the South African Trade Union (COSATU) in 1985 compounded this situation. Both these movements were known to be sympathetic to the African National Congress (ANC), which was still banned at the time of their formation; hence they had similar objectives to the ANC. During this time, Inkatha was the only strong Black political movement in the country, and particularly in Natal and Zululand. The Inkatha movement and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi regarded the formation of the UDF and COSATU in 1985 as a challenge to the hegemony of Inkatha in the region, following his fall-out with the ANC leadership in exile. Local leadership of political movements, namely, UDF and COSATU on one hand and Inkatha on the other, mobilised their support-base and took arms against each other. The lifting of the State of Emergency in 1986 intensified political violence and vigilante activities in the region. The Natal Midlands’ violence saw a high number of deaths and causalities. Local communities as well such as Vulindlela suffered a great deal. Clan faction fights were characteristic of KwaShange in the period 1940s-1970s, but from the late 1980s onwards (especially 1987) political unrest and struggle against the Nationalist apartheid regime changed into conflict between Inkatha and the UDF, which gradually worsened into civil war. In the course of my previous studies in KwaShange I discovered that the violence had impacted upon families and inter-generational relationships. According to some senior residents’ thinking, a number of youths were ill disciplined. Issues of disciplining of youths had obscured the political struggle and violence, making it hard to disentangle them. When researching memories of the violence, I found that persons spoke of different incidents within this struggle period and described their violent nature and how it had impacted on families’ survival, both psychologically and physically. The interviewees kept saying that it was hard to forget the memories engendered by their horrific experiences. The South African Government was accused of secretly provoking acts of violence in Natal and Zululand and was furthermore accused of having sent IFP troops to the Caprivi in Namibia for training in guerrilla combat. The Government later acknowledged this, explaining that the Natal Legislature needed specially trained forces for its officials. The unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 saw KwaZulu- Natal entering a new phase of random vigilante activities and violence. The security forces (the South African Police and the South African Defence Force) were accused of supporting IFP vigilantes. All this led to the “Seven Days War” in 1990 in the Midlands, particularly in KwaVulindlela. In KwaShange this violence, from 1986 until 1996, created divisions in families and the community. Many people lost their lives. All efforts to put an end to the violence and vigilantism failed. The announcement that the first democratic election in South Africa was to be held in 1994 triggered more violence in Vulindlela. Exhaustion in the area, and a national climate which promoted peace were elements which eventually brought the conflict to an end. Socially and economically, the area is still experiencing problems. Survivors and generations born during and after the turmoil talk about endless psychological and emotional suffering born during this turmoil. My contention is that trauma experienced as a result of this violence and its consequences influenced the lives of all persons affected by it, and that this was transmitted across generations, through whole families and communities. It must be realized that these people and their families were affected for a long time, and many are still traumatised. The social structure of the community has been affected by it and by implication that of successive generations will also be affected. This study describes and analyses political violence in KwaShange and investigates how it is remembered by the survivors. It also attempts to answer the question of how communities, families and individuals survived these traumatic experiences, how they coped (or failed to cope) with their experiences, both then and fifteen years after the end of violence. By focusing on KwaShange as a case study of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, I hope to determine what was in play in the province, and find a common pattern underlying the dynamics of the conflicts. Pre-civil war divisions have not, up to the present, been confronted, and these fuelled the political affiliations that were a response to the struggle against the apartheid regime. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

The main aim of this study was to investigate which factors are likely to affect the probability that events of violent collective action are reported by the press in KwaZulu-Natal. The study hypothesised that the likelihood of violent conflict events being reported by the press is affected by certain characteristics of the events themselves, such as their intensity and size, and by the environment in which events occur, such as their physicai location and the prevailing political context. The study was limited to the KwaZulu-Natal province where levels of violent collective action have been the highest in the country over the past decade. This province is also home to many violence monitoring agencies, which constituted an important alternative source of information against which the reporting trends of the newspapers in the province could be compared. The main source of information used in this study was the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project's database of collective action events, which comprises events reported by both the press and the monitoring agencies. Data on a total of 3990 violent conflict events was analysed during 1987, 1990 and 1994, in the form of comparisons between the reporting tendencies of the press and the monitors. Interviews were also conducted with reporters and editors of the daily newspapers in KwaZulu-Natal, as well as with selected monitoring agency staff members. These interviews provided valuable information about how these media operate, and the factors which constrain their violence reporting activities. The most support was found for the argument that the political context influences violence reporting by the press. Analyses suggested that in all three years studied, the press contribution to the database decreased as monthly levels of violent conflict increased. This was explained in relation to the prevailing political context. The results also showed that reporting trends changed over time. In the earlier years, the press did not appear to be more inclined to report events of larger size and intensity, or events which were close to the newspapers' base. In 1994, however, this trend was reversed. There also was no clear evidence that the States of Emergency impacted negatively on press reporting of violence in terms of the variables studied. In addition, the study concluded that both the press and the monitOring agencies had made important separate contributions to the database on violent collective action. It is, therefore, vital that systematic studies of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal make use of multiple sources of data. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1995.

The focus of this study is on the occurrence of mass violence in Durban's settlements in the 1980s. Mass violence is defined as the violent reaction of crowds against targets, which may be people and/or objects - for example the stoning of buses or administration buildings, schools, etc. The theoretical framework for the study derives from recent realist philosophy emerging from prominent British social theorists. The method of analysis is based on a framework developed for the analysis of the UK inner city 'riots' of the 1980s. The theory emphasizes the nature of the relationship between the contending groups with particular attention paid to the presence of contingent factors. The analytical method was broadened so as to incorporate rebellion rather than simply 'rioting', as it was developed for in the UK context. Data was gathered in the first instance through an analysis of news reports of 'unrest' for the period 1980-85. Due to restrictions on the press from 1985, the Indicator SA unrest chronologies were used extensively for the period 1985-87. This extensive analysis provides an overview of mass violence, organizational developments, and government response for the period under consideration. Case studies were selected for the more intensive analysis presented in Chapter 4. These are based on published and unpublished reports of 'unrest', interviews, and group discussions. The extensive/intensive dualism of method assisted in giving both an overview of mass violence for the area, and an insight into the particular form it took in specific areas. Finally, the case studies were placed in their regional context, and further reasons sought for the particular nature of 'unrest' in Durban and Natal during the period. The conclusion assesses the explanatory power of the theory and methodology employed in relation to the South African situation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1989.

The study of development in the 1960s and early 1970s was characterised by major struggles between competing ideological positions . Writings were dominated by attempts at getting the ideologies right , hence the proliferation ofNeo-Marxist and Neo-Classical discourses. The vociferous debates between development theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (1966), Paul Baran (1962), W.W. Rostow (1963) and their followers) were indicative of this period. A fundamental shift occurred in the late 1970s, however, when the focus of development studies shifted to the more technical issue of how to get prices right. World Bank and International Monetary Fund intervention in state affairs were a characteristic of this fundamental shift, with the now notorious Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s being a direct result of this movement. The whole terrain of development studies has once again, however, undergone reconstruction, with the emergence of an entirely new strain of development-oriented thought in the 1990s. The key development problem being identified by social scientists at present is the institutional context in which development takes place. It has finally emerged that this issue surpasses those debates concerning ideology and monetary issues. Development protagonists now acknowledge that they can no longer look at development without considering the institutional environment in which it is to take place. Irrespective of ideology and price factors, then, it has finally been realised that development is highly contingent upon the establishment of a sound development-oriented institutional environment. Although the international development arena has experienced this fundamental shift, very little research has been done , thus far, on the dynamics of KwaZulu Natal 's institutional environment. As such very little is known about its efficacy in supporting or initiating development programmes in the province. If one considers the enormity of the development task in KwaZulu Natal this is an extremely unsatisfactory situation. KwaZulu Natal undoubtedly needs a sound institutional environment that supports development, thus making a study of how the province's institutional environment impacts on development imperatives an extremely important endeavour. It is hoped that this dissertation helps in some small way to fill the research void that is clearly apparent in KwaZulu Natal. It needs to be iterated right at the outset, however, that this dissertation is not meant to be an extensive, all encompassing critique of KwaZulu Natal's institutional environment. It is rather an exploration of those important issues pertaining to its institutional environment that impact so dramatically on development imperatives in the province. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1995.

The field of political violence is introduced with an overview of anti-State political violence in South Africa between 1 January 1977 and 21 July 1985. Incidents of political violence in that period were classified into one of three categories, each of which reflects different sources of political violence. Subsequently, the research analysed what is referred to 'spontaneous' collective violence in two of Durban's townships Lamont and KwaMashu. The theoretical framework for the analysis of this type of behaviour is provided by T.R. Gurr using the formula: MPV = RD + (RD x JUST x BALANCE) where MPV is the magnitude of political violence; RD is discontent; JUST is the justifications for engaging in violence; and BALANCE is the ratio of support for, and coercive capacity of, dissidents vis-a-vis the State. The weight of each variable (RD, JUST and BALANCE) was assessed in Lamont and KwaMashu through interviews with 25 group leaders from both townships and by various inferential techniques. While discontent was found to be universal in both townships, the justifications for engaging in violence as a strategy to alleviate that discontent and alter existing power relations were found to be a function of ideology. For the purposes of this research two ideological classifications were employed: 'reactionaries' (those organisations operating within government created institutions, including bantustans, e.g. Inkatha); and 'progressives' (those organisations operating outside government created institutions and which are popularly labelled the Left e.g. the United Democratic Front). In Durban there is a specific spatial distribution of ideology which has resulted in support for, and the coercive capacity of, reactionaries' being greatest in bantustan townships ' (e.g. KwaMashu), while among 'progressives' support and coercive capacity are highest in townships in 'white' South Africa (e.g. Lamont). The distribution of ideology has its origins in historical forces which are discussed in detail. The question to be answered thus remains at what point does political violence reach a crescendo? This question was answered by identifying the issues precipitating political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu and then analysing specific incidents. Frequently, the most intense collective violence erupted when resistance to State hegemony was interpreted by the State, or its proxies, as challenging the existing status quo. In Lamont the State has directly intervened to crush resistance through the use of its security forces while in KwaMashu Inkatha vigilantes have acted as proxies for the State. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1987.