Includes abstract. / This mini dissertation analyses the claims that Uganda is the success story of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under this debt management programme, and has a reputation for being able to address its economic and social problems simultaneously. Furthermore, the manner in which Uganda has engaged with civil society has also received praise. Thus, some scholars believe that the country offers a model example for indicating the effectiveness of debt management programmes in general, and the HIPC Initiative in particular. However, other scholars are more critical, claiming that the successes that Uganda has experienced under the HIPC Initiative have been short lived, and have also compounded the country‘s indebtedness. There is therefore a robust debate in the literature regarding this topic as some scholars take a more optimistic view of the impact of the HIPC Initiative in Uganda, and other scholars take a more pessimistic stance. This mini dissertation surveys these contrasting views in the literature, and argues that because the HIPC Initiative failed to deliver the promises that it made Uganda was unable to sustain its achievements under the programme. The dissertation concludes that Uganda is not an HIPC Initiative success story.

Emerging donors, such as India, Brazil and South Africa, have provided assistance to other developing countries for many decades. However, the creation of dedicated aid agencies in emerging donor countries is a relatively new feature. The establishment of these aid agencies is often motivated by the objective of better coordinating and managing the increasing volume and scope of their development assistance activities. Since many of these emerging donors are also recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from traditional donors, this institutionalization and professionalization of their development assistance raises some difficult questions. How do traditional donors perceive this new development in beneficiary countries and how do they respond to it in terms of aid allocations and co-operation arrangements? Do traditional donors still perceive beneficiary countries that are in a position to provide development assistance to other countries as being eligible to receive aid? These are the fundamental questions that this research study aims to answer. This research study is based on the hypothesis that the creation of dedicated aid agencies in beneficiary countries prompts traditional donors to either freeze, reduce or terminate ODA and rethink their development cooperation strategies. It argues that traditional donors perceive beneficiary countries with dedicated aid agencies as no longer in need of foreign assistance. In order to test this hypothesis and identify changes in the flow of aid, the research study compares official aid flow data for five selected traditional donors (France, Germany, the UK, the US and EU Institutions) to three emerging donor countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) before and after the establishment of dedicated aid agencies. The research further investigates whether other factors, such as beneficiary countries' socioeconomic performance and compliance with DAC norms and standards, play a role in traditional donors' aid allocation decisions. Alongside the quantitative analysis, the research uses semi-structured elite interviews with representatives of the five traditional donors as well as development cooperation experts to solicit qualitative responses. The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest that the establishment of dedicated aid agencies in emerging donor countries does not have a negative impact on traditional donors' aid allocations. Other factors, such as the economic status of beneficiary countries, domestic debates and the strategic interests of traditional donors', seem to play a much more important role in this regard. In fact, traditional donors welcome the creation of such aid agencies and actively support beneficiary countries in this endeavour. Traditional donors expect that such aid agencies will promote transparency and accountability and increase the effectiveness of aid.

This essay is concerned with exploring and analysing some of the criticisms levelled against a conception of rationality which has been variously described as, "the contemplative account of knowledge"', and, "the idealist conception of knowledge", but which we shall call the traditional theory of rationality. The essay does not make any pretence at being a complete survey of the critical appraisals which this theory of rationality has received. It has confined itself to a selection of those theoretical contributions believed to be most useful in illustrating certain fundamental ideas embodied in the traditional theory.

In this dissertation scientific theory is investigated in order to show its socio-ethical aspects. An historical approach shows that prevailing historical conditions influence the development of scientific theory. These conditions are also created by the theories that they influence. Thus there is a continual interaction between theory and practice, pointinig to the socio-ethical aspects of theory. An investigation of scientific theory including biological theory also shows this continual interaction. Efforts to derive moral precepts from biological theory, e.g., Darwinism, sociobiology and genetic theory reveal the influences and prejudices of the particular historical periods in which the theories are developed. These aspects of scientific theory show that the scientific enterprise is not characterised by objectivity and disinteredness. The community aspect of scientific practice also shows that scientists are dependent on one another and that theories are interrelated. These spects of scientific theory show the transcultural and transnational nature of theory and lays a foundation for the basis of ethics and for scientific responsibility. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1987.

This work is an effort to develop an interpretative framework for Kant's political philosophy that will illuminate not merely the political philosophy itself, but will have the additional advantage of showing the integral rather than the peripheral connexion of that philosophy with Kant's wider philosophical concerns. In this sense the essay is not an extended explication or critical commentary on Kant's political theory so much as an attempt to establish a context within which such commentary might proceed. The context which is suggested is Kant's anthropology, that is to say, his concept of persons, a notion which is foundational to both his political philosophy and the entire Critical philosophy. The difficulty with such an approach is that Kant no where develops in an explicit and extended fashion his concept of persons, and thus the essay is in one way an effort of recovery, first from the historical accounts of human origins and progress, next from the teleological theories of the third Critique and the Anthropology, then from the doctrine of man as end, and finally from Religion, of a systematic account of what Kant believes persons to be. In all of these diverse efforts to make sense of man, it is argued that Kant's central concept for discussing persons is the idea of freedom, though depending on the context this notion is often linked to another, for instance, in the historical works with Nature, in the Groundwork with reason and morality, and in Religion with evil. Thus all of these other ideas become either extensions of or elucidations of freedom. The idea of Freedom as the foundation of personhood is, however, given its most crucial role in Kant's characterization of persons as ends in themselves. It is this doctrine which is foundational for much of subsequent Western political theory, and which is essential for Kant's political and moral theory. Chapters Three, Four, and Five are thus the core of the essay in that they suggest first that Kant's very strong claims about persons as ends will not work in terms of his own arguments and are rendered even more conceptually suspect in light of his subsequent account of radical evil, and second an alternative reading, proposed by Kant if not finally entirely accepted by him which might provide a more plausible foundation for his basic insights about persons.

[From the introduction:] This thesis will analyse and advocate a 'contextualist' reading of human nature. By reference to the work of Charles Taylor it will be argued that Modern conceptions of human nature are (to echo Nietzsche) 'dead'. This is to attack the suggestion that a conception of human nature may be understood in an ahistorical, universalist, abstract or 'unencumbered' sense. A conception of human nature must, of necessity, it will be argued, be understood in a more dynamic and 'local' sense. It is the suggestion of this thesis that human nature must be understood in a sense akin to the existential notion of 'facticity', or as possessing a degree of 'determinacy'. While human nature is 'encumbered' by its 'situation' in time and geographical location it is not however wholly determined. An individual's existence is co-determined by individual choice, the individual's history, and by Nature. Human nature must be recognised to have a facticity, to exist at a certain point in history, in a certain country, to be encumbered by countless other emotional ties, friendships, and loyalties. This 'embedded' conception of human nature is delineated and explored through Taylor's conception of human nature as an 'interspatial epiphany', and is to be preferred to the unencumbered sense of interspatial epiphany that might be seen to be offered by some forms of existentialism. Such existentialist thought is not as astutely located or embedded as Taylor's thought, and suffers from what Taylor terms 'existential heroism', a focus on choice making rather than on the background of encumberment. While the notion of a universal conception of human nature must be abandoned, as the individual is now seen as 'located' temporally, and spatially, it is still possible to draw some (very) modest generalisations about the nature of individuals. This exploration proceeds by generating a 'thick description' of the selfs particular, but ultimately contingent, connections and affiliations. (Such a located description is seen as superior by Taylor, to thin, mechanistic, scientific and neurological descriptions of human agency.)

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No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

The prevalence of intra-state conflicts and state failures in Africa since the end of the Cold War has made Africa the epicentre of threats to human, national and international security. The inability of African states to combat the insecurities in their respective countries reinforces the discourse on the role of the African Union (AU) in enhancing peace and security across the continent. Since its establishment in 2002, the AU has responded to some security challenges in Africa. In situations of armed conflicts, especially where diplomatic and mediatory efforts fail, the AU has adopted military interventionist mechanisms to protect civilians and to restore peace and security in accord with Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. Drawing from the cases of Somalia, Sudan and Libya, this research evaluates the capacity of the AU to operationalize the idea of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ and enforce peace and security especially through its military interventionist mechanisms. Limitations in terms of resources, expertise and funds as well as the poor commitment of member states constitute setbacks to the AU’s effort at conflict management. For the AU to perform effectively in conflict situations, it is imperative for the regional body to develop the required supranational capacity to compel obedience from member states as well as warring parties. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2014.