杜榮佳. / 手稿本, 複本據手稿本複印. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Shou gao ben, fu ben ju shou gao ben fu yin. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 368-418). / Du Rongjia. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 提要 / 自序 --- p.1-4 / 引論 --- p.5-15 / Chapter 第一章 --- 光緒初年清議的興起 --- p.16-10 / Chapter 第一節 --- 先緒年間以前的清議 --- p.16-35 / Chapter 1 --- 晚明清議的興起 / Chapter 2 --- 清初清議的衰微 / Chapter 3 --- 道咸同三朝清議的復興 / Chapter 第二節 --- 光緒初年清議整頓內政的條陳 --- p.35-48 / Chapter 1 --- 整飭地方吏治 / Chapter 2 --- 彈劾奄官大僚 / Chapter 3 --- 條陳救荒建議 / Chapter 4 --- 反對立儲繼嗣 / Chapter 第三節 --- 光緒初年清議對外交與自強的獻計 --- p.48-58 / Chapter 1 --- 推翻崇約 / Chapter 2 --- 議約禦俄 / Chapter 3 --- 善用人才 / Chapter 4 --- 軍事自強 / Chapter 第四節 --- 清廷對清議的態度 --- p.58-69 / Chapter 1 --- 清廷對清議的支持 / Chapter 2 --- 清廷對清議的駁斥 / Chapter 第二章 --- 中法越南戰爭期間的清議 --- p.101-148 / Chapter 第一節 --- 清議主戰的言論及思想 --- p.101-112 / Chapter 1 --- 清議對法人的認識 / Chapter 2 --- 清議對藩屬的看法 / Chapter 3 --- 清議主戰的意見 / Chapter 4 --- 清議評彈官員的意見 / Chapter 第二節 --- 清議對外認識的變化 --- p.112-119 / Chapter 1 --- 清議籌防的意見 / Chapter 2 --- 清議對餉械不足的認識 / Chapter 第三節 --- 清廷對清議的反應 --- p.119-130 / Chapter 1 --- 清廷觀望的態度 / Chapter 2 --- 清廷對清議主戰的支持 / Chapter 3 --- 清廷對議和的重視 / Chapter 4 --- 清廷始戰終和的局面 / Chapter 第四節 --- 小結 --- p.130-131 / Chapter 第三章 --- 甲午戰爭期間的清議 --- p.149-195 / Chapter 第一節 --- 清議主戰的言論及思想 --- p.152-160 / Chapter 1 --- 清議主戰的原因 / Chapter 2 --- 清議備戰籌防的意見 / Chapter 3 --- 清議振興中樞權力的主張 / Chapter 4 --- 清議評彈將帥的意見 / Chapter 第二節 --- 清議反對和議的見解 --- p.160-165 / Chapter 1 --- 以戰為和 / Chapter 2 --- 反對割地賠款 / Chapter 3 --- 請求罷黜和議 / Chapter 第三節 --- 清廷對清議的反應 --- p.165-174 / Chapter 1 --- 對倡言主戰的反應 / Chapter 2 --- 對評彈樞臣的反應 / Chapter 3 --- 對調兵遣將言論的反應 / Chapter 4 --- 對議和問題的看法 / Chapter 第四節 --- 小結 --- p.174-176 / Chapter 第四章 --- 光緒年間清議的性質 --- p.196-274 / Chapter 第一節 --- 前清流(清流黨)的社會綱絡 --- p.197-210 / Chapter 1 --- 前清流(清流黨)的社會關係 / Chapter 2 --- 李鴻藻與「清流黨」關係的探討 / Chapter 第二節 --- 前清流活動性質的檢討 --- p.211-233 / Chapter 1 --- 前清流人物活動情況 / Chapter 2 --- 清流名士的生活好尚 / Chapter 3 --- 清流本身無意結黨 / Chapter 第三節 --- 後清流(帝黨)的社會綱絡 --- p.23-237 / Chapter 1 --- 帝黨稱謂與介定的質疑 / Chapter 2 --- 翁同龢與帝黨的關係 / Chapter 3 --- 後清流的社會關係 / Chapter 第四節 --- 後清流活動性質的探討 --- p.237-244 / Chapter 1 --- 清流名士的生活好尚 / Chapter 2 --- 後清流論政目的與「帝黨」的關係 / Chapter 第五章 --- 清議在晚清宮廷政治上的意義 / Chapter 第一節 --- 「慈禧政爭工具說」的檢討 / Chapter 1 --- 慈禧研究的缺點 / Chapter 2 --- 清議與慈禧發動政爭的質疑 / Chapter 第二節 --- 「反對運動(Qpposition Movement)說」的質疑 --- p.288-295 / Chapter 1 --- 清議與變法及反對運動的關係 / Chapter 2 --- 清議與打擊非正途出身官員的關係 / Chapter 第三節 --- 清議與晚清中央決策的權力危機 --- p.296-320 / Chapter 1 --- 中法戰爭期間外交決策權力危機的分析 / Chapter 2 --- 中日戰爭期間外交決策權力危機的分析 / Chapter 3 --- 清議與晚清皇權危機 / 結論 --- p.351-367 / 主要參考書目

Why do revolutions happen? What role do structures, institutions, and actors play in precipitating (or preventing) them? Finally, What might compel social mobilization against a regime in the face of potentially insurmountable odds? These questions are all fundamentally about state-society (strategic) interactions, and elite and societal preference formation over time. The self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, served as a focal point upon which over twenty years of corrupt, coercive authoritarian rule were focused into a single, unified challenge to the Ben Ali regime. The regime's brutality was publicized via social media activism and satellite television, precipitating mass mobilization across Tunisia and, eventually, throughout the region and beyond. In light of the rapid and unforeseen nature of these events, scholars writing about the causes of the Arab Spring have focused their critiques on scholarship that they felt overemphasized the role of institutions and elite-level actors over 'under the radar' changes within society. This paper essentially agrees with this point of view, but is not content to simply 'throw out' institutionalism. As Timur Kuran (1991) argued in the wake of the unforeseen collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, one cannot understand revolution without understanding the 'true' preferences of social actors. In this way, the inevitability of revolutionary surprises seems a given so long as analysts continue to look from the top-down. Yet, this paper contends that institutions do still matter. They matter because different institutional arrangements incentivize and constrain regime strategies, which, in turn, inform the strategic calculations and preference orderings within society. These two societal variables are determined - in part - by the degree of regime flexibility, and they affect whether, how, and where social actors choose to vent their dissent. This paper proposes a model for the development of contentious social mobilization under authoritarianism. In order to do so, two models - one game-theoretic, and the other rooted in the contentious politics subfield of political sociology - are synthesized toward elucidating how altered societal preferences affect strategic interactions between the regime and society over time and during acute contentious episodes. The synthesized model is then illustrated through narrative case studies of two North African states that experienced divergent outcomes in the wake of the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco. The limited spaces and institutions for the expression of dissent in Tunisia gradually changed societal preferences over time. In 2010, Tunisians' preferences shifted from various socioeconomic demands and other issue-specific grievances toward a galvanized demand for the fall of the regime. In Morocco, on the other hand, social actors, by and large, continued to prefer limited reforms to a complete upheaval of the political system. This paper contends that this divergence in preferences and therefore outcomes was in part determined by the variation in the two regimes' respective strategic mixes of concessions and/or coercion. To the extent that such strategies and institutions were more flexible - i.e. were more permissive of (limited) political contention and contestation - social movements were less likely to become emboldened against the regime.

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Studies have suggested that the Christian Right, composed largely of Protestant fundamentalists, is a political movement characterized by an extreme right-wing (conservative) ideological bias. The general assumption by students of religion and politics has been that the Christian Right reflects a consistently conservative position with regard to both economic and social policy issues. However, minimal quantitative research has been employed to lend substance to such theories. The goal of this study was to employ quantitative research data to determine the political biases and ideology of Protestant fundamentalists on bothChristian Right is indeed conservative on issues policy, but much less so (even somewhat liberal) on economic or social welfare policy.This study was conducted using survey data collected by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys (NORC). The Protestant respondents were separated from the non-Protestant respondents, and indexes were computed to reflect the composite scores of the Protestant respondents on issues of social policy and social welfare policy. Although the results were somewhat inconclusive with regard to social welfare issues, the findings generally supported the hypothesis: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between social policy conservatism and degree of Protestant fundamentalism, strong enough to be of theoretical importance. Conversely, there is, in some instances, a statistically significant positive relationship between support for social welfare and degree of Protestant fundamentalism. The prevailing theory that Protestant fundamentalists are economic conservatives was shown to be a questionable if not a false theory.The conclusion of the present study was that the Christian Right is acutely aware of and politically motivated by social policy issues, concerned that the fundamentalist's perception of the proper morality is carried out in public policy. The Protestant fundamentalist position on issues of social policy reflects a conservative ideological bias. The economic issues, however, are of much less importance to members of the Christian Right, and perhaps may be unrelated to any type of religious position or religious intensity. Where relationships were found to exist, the Christian Right was shown to be moderate or even liberal, reflecting some degree of support for government-provided social welfare programs, a position at variance with the general conservative political movement. Some speculations as to the dichotomy of the Christian Right as a conservative political movement are offered, and several reasons for this dichotomy between social and economic policy issues are offered in light of the religious beliefs held by Protestant fundamentalists. / Department of Political Science

This dissertation examines three different subjects underpinned by one common approach— the survey experiment—and, broadly, one common aim: to better understand heterogeneity in public opinion in the United States and Canada. Specifically, it focuses heterogeneity as it relates to minorities and the cultural dynamics that emerge in multiracial and multiethnic countries. Contexts with diverse racial and ethnic compositions, diverse immigration and equity policies, and complex sociohistorical lineages are bound to be underpinned by deeply fragmented attitudinal dynamics. Yet only recently has research taken a deep dive into what the contours of this fragmentation might look like. As diversity increases in the West and cultural complexities deepen, understanding heterogeneity in public opinion toward and among different cultural, racial, and ethnic groups will become increasingly pressing. Luckily for the research community, the ability to study such heterogeneity is increasing as well. Fielding large-scale surveys has been facilitated by both the vast penetration of the Internet in the 21st century and the explosion of online marketplaces that allow researchers to buy survey respondents relatively cheaply and quickly. This dissertation exploits these contextual developments to field three online survey experiments among a total of 40,000 respondents in Canada and the United States.