Postwar Guatemala continues to contend with ongoing criminal and state violence, insecurity, racial exclusion and disparity, exacerbated by neoliberal and neocolonial economic policies. These patterns are rooted in centuries of colonial exploitation that intensified in genocide against the Mayan and other indigenous peoples in the early eighties. This thesis explores Maya Achi youth interpretations of the historical and contemporary roots of violence through their interaction with the mandates and practice of the New Hope Foundation Intercultural Bilingual Institute in Rabinal. The institute combines historical memory, a participatory methodology, and cultural revitalization within an intercultural framework. By embracing institute themes of interculturalism, citizenship, leadership and cooperative learning, participants provide insight into the potential to transform structural violence through the promotion of alternative visions of grassroots development and reweaving community in this rural municipality, still impacted by the traumas of armed conflict.

The transition from war to peace is seldom smooth, and violence persists in many postwar societies. Existing research found that peacekeepers have a good record in addressing postwar violence along the fault lines of the preceding conflict. Yet, most postwar violence stems from actors that were not formally part of the conflict. The shift of actors is a challenge for peacekeepers focused on keeping the peace between the belligerents. Nonetheless, recent studies show that only UN police positively impact postwar violence, likely due to their broader effect on public security. Further scrutinising this finding, the research question is How do peacekeeping mandates impact the level of postwar violence in the aftermath of intra-state conflicts? I argue that variation in peacekeepers’ activities sheds light on how peacekeeping missions address postwar violence: Missions with public security-oriented mandates can reduce postwar violence better than other missions because they fill the public security gap. I test this hypothesis utilising a quantitative research strategy of 310 post-conflict episodes – years of60 conflicts between 1991 and 2016. The results imply that public security-oriented missions might not prevent collective strategic postwar violence but positively impact spontaneous unorganised postwar violence.