This dissertation investigates the dynamics of mass attitudes toward redistributive social policies in post-industrial democracies: How have these attitudes changed over time? What factors and mechanisms drive these changes? According to workhorse models in political economy, as inequality increases, support for redistributive social policies should also increase, especially among those most likely to benefit from them. Yet, despite a sharp growth in income inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom since the 1970's, there is no evidence that attitudinal trends match these predictions. Drawing from findings in the behavioral sciences on mental processes of attitude formation and on the role of other-oriented concerns, I argue that political economy's workhorse models perform well only under specific scope conditions. Once these conditions are accounted for, observed trends become less puzzling. First, workhorse models only capture one component of demand for redistribution, namely support for redistribution conceived as taking from the "rich" (redistribution from), and ignore a separate component, support for redistribution conceived as giving to the "poor" (redistribution to). These two facets of redistribution, I argue, prime different individual motives: self-interested income maximization on the one hand, and other-oriented social affinity with welfare beneficiaries on the other, which is shaped by social ranking and non-economic moral dispositions. Second, attitudinal change that matches these models' predictions is conditional on whether elites politicize redistributive issues. The nature and structure of the options available in one's political environment impact the kind of choices citizens make, i.e. the motives that guide attitude formation. I show how elite competition over distinct redistributive agendas increases the likelihood that individuals will translate their economic circumstances into support for, or opposition to, redistribution. Through a context-sensitive analysis of longitudinal survey data, I show how most of the action in the UK and the US has happened through other-oriented motives. The decline in the predictive power of income in these countries, has been mirrored in both countries by an increase in the predictive power of moral values. Differences in the choice sets provided by elite-level electoral competition help explain how this plays out differently on each side of the Atlantic.

Why do some individuals endorse public policies aimed at reducing income inequality while others oppose them? Why is there widespread support for such policies in certain countries, but not in others? This dissertation advances scholarship toward a general theory of support for redistribution by analyzing variation in redistributive attitudes within and across two developing democracies, Argentina and Peru. Support for redistribution is higher in the former country. It examines existing theories based on interests and group identity, explanations whose predictions have been almost exclusively evaluated in the context of advanced industrial democracies. It also introduces and assesses a belief-based explanation that focuses on inequality frames, simplified mental models of the issue of inequality comprised of individuals’ beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, about the extent to which society provides equal opportunities, and about the nature of wealth accumulation. This dissertation argues that these theories are complementary and identifies the contextual factors that condition the extent to which the considerations emphasized by these accounts inform redistributive attitudes. Interests and group identity are salient in contexts where individuals have access to material and informational resources that make them more cognizant of their position along economic and ethnic cleavages. In contrast, inequality frames inform redistributive attitudes regardless of context because of their inside-the-head nature. This study shows that the relative dominance of redistributive beliefs in Argentina and self-reliance beliefs in Peru help explain why support for redistribution is higher in the former country. Finally, this dissertation develops a politico-historical explanation for why and how these frames became relatively dominant. This account argues that individuals’ inequality frames are relatively stable during times of normal politics, but malleable during certain critical political junctures brought about by major events like mass political incorporation or economic crises. During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and messages that are transmitted not only via rhetoric but also via public policies. Redistributive beliefs become dominant wherever political actors whose discourse features elements consistent with the redistributive frame are able to implement successful comprehensive social policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in countries where this combination of rhetoric and policies does not take place during a critical juncture. / text