Background: Since 1998 Sweden has individual accounts as a part of both public and occupational schemes (Sundén 2006). Yearly, 2,5% of the pensionable income is set aside to the premium pension (The Swedish Pension Agency 2021) Individuals are able to choose how the premiums should be paid in the system and in what way the money should be invested, either by choosing from the fund market or by refraining from making an active choice and instead let the Swedish pension agency management their money in the passive alternative called AP7 Såfa. The passive alternative AP7 Såfa is a portfolio which adapts to the age of the investor and is built to fit a long-term pension investment.  Purpose: This study will focus on evaluating if the passive alternative AP7 Såfa has an excess risk-adjusted return compared to given portfolios in the premium pension selection system, or if the investor would benefit from managing the portfolio more actively. The study will also search for benefits using the Treynor-Black model to check the optimal allocation between this actively managed portfolio versus the passive alternative AP7 Såfa.  Conclusion: This thesis has shown that there might be superior strategies rather than the index fund to find risk-adjusted excess return in the premium pension system. However, those strategies require professional analysts in order to forecast securities. For households choosing between active management themselves or the passive index fund AP7 Såfa, the most beneficial investment is to be passive and to not actively manage the portfolio. The optimum strategy is found to be the Treynor-Black model with a combined portfolio of the index fund and the active portfolio.

We investigate the activity and performance of 64 Swedish registered mutual equity funds available in the Swedish Premium Pension System from October 2002 to December 2011. Fund activity is measured by applying the holdings based analysis Active Share combined with Tracking Error Volatility (TEV). Active Share is a relatively new measure that compares a fund’s holdings with its benchmark index constituents (Cremers & Petajisto, 2009; Petajisto, 2013). This is used as a proxy for the fund’s stock selection strategy. As a complement, TEV is used as a proxy for the factor timing strategy. Performance are measured by using Jensen’s (1968) model, Fama and French’s (1993) model and Carhart’s (1997) model. We document that Swedish funds in the Premium Pension System are relatively passive in term of Active Share compared to US funds. We attribute this finding to the relative number of stocks held by a fund compared to the market. Swedish equity funds hold a relatively larger share of the number of stocks in the Swedish market while US funds hold a relatively smaller share of the stocks in the US market. We run a panel regression analysis to test the relation between Active Share and various variables. We find that funds with higher TER fees and fewer stocks on average have higher Active Share. There are also indications that TEV is positively related to Active Share. However, the overall explanatory power of the variables is low. We attribute this as evidence that Active Share is an independent measure of fund activity. Overall, we find neutral performance for an equally weighted portfolio of all funds in the PPS. To examine the performance differences between different levels of activity, we sort funds into five portfolios based on Active Share and TEV. The results show that, given a medium-to-low TEV, funds with high Active Share significantly outperform funds with low Active Share. Furthermore, it appears that the fee rebate in the Premium Pension System is important especially for the passive funds. Without the rebate, the passive funds underperform significantly. We run a panel regression analysis on the future fund performance to test the predictive abilities of Active Share and TEV. The results indicate that Active Share does not explain future performance differences. Conversely, TEV is negatively related to future performance which can be explained by fund managers being overconfident