Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-09-19T19:23:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 pabloviniciusmartinspacheco.pdf: 730912 bytes, checksum: 3bc23bdd4ca281ea1911e225fbbe56dc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-09-22T15:07:37Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 pabloviniciusmartinspacheco.pdf: 730912 bytes, checksum: 3bc23bdd4ca281ea1911e225fbbe56dc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-22T15:07:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 pabloviniciusmartinspacheco.pdf: 730912 bytes, checksum: 3bc23bdd4ca281ea1911e225fbbe56dc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-20 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A concepção de psicologia de William James (1842-1910) ainda não foi tratada adequadamente tanto no contexto da historiografia da psicologia de uma maneira geral quanto na literatura especializada no autor. Tendo isso em mente, nosso objetivo no presente trabalho é esclarecer esse assunto, em particular no que diz respeito a uma aparente incongruência entre duas atitudes do autor, a primeira delas positivista, baseada no cerebralismo e que considerou temas psicológicos clássicos; e a segunda mais inclusiva, que defendia a adição de novos fenômenos na alçada da psicologia e aceitando implicações metafísicas dos fenômenos excepcionais. Argumentamos que essas duas atitudes fazem parte do desenvolvimento da psicologia jamesiana e refletem seus esforços tanto para consolidar essa nova ciência quanto para expandir seu escopo. / William James's conception of psychology (1842-1910) has not yet been adequately addressed both in the context of the historiography of psychology in general and in the author's authoritative literature. Our objective in this paper is to clarify this subject, particularly about an apparent inconsistency between two attitudes of the author, the first of them positivist, based on cerebralism and which considered classical psychological themes; And the second more inclusive, which advocated the addition of new phenomena in the domain of psychology and accepting metaphysical implications of exceptional phenomena. We argue that these two attitudes are part of the development of James' psychology and reflect their efforts both to consolidate this new science and to expand its scope.

My study concerns the works of William James (1842--1910) and the Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu (circa fifth c.). In both cases there is a detailed examination of consciousness which looks at its physiological concomitants. Where James is concerned, this physiological study is found mainly within his Principles of Psychology (1890). In Vasubandhu's case the physiological preconditions of conscious life is inherited from traditional Buddhist psychology (skandhas), but are expanded into the Yogacara concept of the alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). This novel form of consciousness has been interpreted as both a soul theory in Buddhism, and a form of metaphysical idealism. It is these elements that I juxtapose with similar notions found in Jamesian studies (self and idealism). Thus, Chapter One examines consciousness from the isolated perspective of each thinker, Chapter Two moves to an examination of self, and Chapter Three looks at the possibility of Idealism which is explicitly rejected by James, and is rejected also by many interpreters of the alaya-vijnana.

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Yes / The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James’ “The Psychologist’s Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James’ spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James’ central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.