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Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemmaLee, Cheuk-wah., 李焯華. January 2001 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Asian Studies / Master / Master of Arts
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The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation /Hanley, James E. January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemma /Lee, Cheuk-wah. January 2001 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-134).
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Co-operation as a function of perceived group size in a game situation.Shum, Kit-hing, January 1977 (has links)
Thesis--M. Phil., University of Hong Kong, 1978.
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Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemmaLee, Cheuk-wah. January 2001 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-134). Also available in print.
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Influence of communication on reactions to "unconditionally cooperative" behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game.Sejwacz, Dorothy 01 January 1974 (has links) (PDF)
No description available.
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Topics in the emergence of cooperation in competing games. / 論競爭環境中出現的協作現 / Topics in the emergence of cooperation in competing games. / Lun jing zheng huan jing zhong chu xian de xie zuo xianJanuary 2008 (has links)
Chan, Chun Him = 論競爭環境中出現的協作現象 / 陳俊謙. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-141). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chan, Chun Him = Lun jing zheng huan jing zhong chu xian de xie zuo xian xiang / Chen Junqian. / Title / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.v / Table of Contents --- p.vii / Chapter 1 --- Prologue --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Prisoners' Dilemma and Snowdrift Game --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Formulation --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Prisoners,Dilemma (PD) --- p.8 / Chapter 2.4 --- The Snowdrift Game (SG) --- p.9 / Chapter 2.5 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in PD --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- The Temptation Reward Punishment Sucker System (TRPS system) --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- "Our Expanded 2-parameter System (r, s system)" --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- The Benefit and Cost System (BC system) --- p.11 / Chapter 2.6 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in SG --- p.12 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- A Common 1-parameter System (rh system) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Tragedy of One-shot PD Game --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- The First Cooperation --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Repeated PD Game --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Axelrod´ةs Tournament and Strategy “Tit-for-Tat´ح (TFT) --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Second Cooperation --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Nowak and Sigmund Evolutionary Experiment --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Stochastic Reactive Strategies (SRSs) and Evolutionary Infinite IPD --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Experimental Setup --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Experimental Results --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Conclusion: TFT as a Pivot for Cooperation --- p.22 / Chapter 4 --- Evolutionary IPD with Strategy Lattices --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Numerical Accuracy in IPD --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Simulation Results --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Strategy Frequencies Xi(t) versus Time --- p.27 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- "Mean Final State in the Whole r, s Space" --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Time Evolution of (p) and (q) --- p.38 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Mean Final State of a Strategy Lattice with Inclined Frequencies --- p.42 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Conclusion --- p.50 / Chapter 5 --- Egoistic Exploiters Induced Global Generosity in Evolutionary IPD --- p.52 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.52 / Chapter 5.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.52 / Chapter 5.3 --- "The Three Initial Conditions: Cases TO, T1 and T2" --- p.53 / Chapter 5.4 --- Simulation Results --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Distribution of the Final Dominant Strategies --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Case TO (100 Random Strategies) --- p.56 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Case T1 (99 Random Strategies and a TFT-like Strategy) --- p.58 / Chapter 5.4.4 --- Case T2 (98 Random Strategies and both a TFT-like and an AllD-like Strategies) --- p.58 / Chapter 5.4.5 --- Comparing the Three Cases --- p.61 / Chapter 5.4.6 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter 5.5 --- Analytic Manipulations for Small r Region --- p.65 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Values of (pmps) and (qmps) for Case T2 --- p.65 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Values of {pmps) and {qmps) for Case TO and T1 --- p.68 / Chapter 5.6 --- Conclusion --- p.71 / Chapter 6 --- The Basics of Networks --- p.72 / Chapter 6.1 --- Fully-connected Networks and Well-mixed Networks --- p.72 / Chapter 6.2 --- Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.73 / Chapter 6.3 --- Barabasi-Albert (BA) Scale-free Growing Networks --- p.74 / Chapter 7 --- Proposing the N-person Snowdrift Game (NSG) --- p.76 / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations of 2-person Games on Networks --- p.76 / Chapter 7.3 --- The Existing N-person Games --- p.77 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Public Good Game (PGG) --- p.78 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- The N-person Battle of Sexes Games (NBOS) --- p.78 / Chapter 7.4 --- The NSG Scenario and Payoffs --- p.79 / Chapter 7.5 --- Everyday Examples of NSG --- p.80 / Chapter 7.6 --- Preview of Studies in Evolutionary NSG --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Evolutionary NSG in Well-mixed Populations --- p.84 / Chapter 8.1 --- The Method of Replicator Dynamics --- p.84 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Simulation Algorithm --- p.90 / Chapter 8.3 --- The Simulated Equilibrium Contributor Fraction x*(r) --- p.91 / Chapter 8.4 --- Analytic Manipulations on the Algorithm --- p.92 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Conversion Probabilities and Equilibrium Conditions --- p.92 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Discussions --- p.94 / Chapter 8.5 --- Analytic Treatments on the Time Evolution of the Contribution Level x(t) --- p.96 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Discrete Time Equation --- p.97 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Continuous Approximations --- p.97 / Chapter 8.5.3 --- Analytical Solutions of N=2 and N=S --- p.98 / Chapter 8.6 --- Conclusion --- p.100 / Chapter 9 --- Evolutionary NSG in Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.101 / Chapter 9.1 --- Comparison between Well-mixed and Lattice Populations --- p.101 / Chapter 9.2 --- Simulation Parameters --- p.103 / Chapter 9.3 --- Simulation Results for ID Lattices --- p.103 / Chapter 9.4 --- Analytic Theory for ID Lattices by Analyzing on the Local Configurations --- p.105 / Chapter 9.4.1 --- The Absence of Connected Contributors --- p.105 / Chapter 9.4.2 --- Theory for ID k=2 Chain Lattice --- p.106 / Chapter 9.4.3 --- Theory for ID k=4 Chain Lattice --- p.109 / Chapter 9.5 --- Simulation Results for 2D Lattices --- p.112 / Chapter 9.6 --- Analytic Theory for 2D k=4 Square Lattice --- p.115 / Chapter 9.7 --- Simulation Results for 3D Cubic Lattice --- p.120 / Chapter 9.8 --- Conjectures for Approximate Solutions in High-Dimensional Hy- percubic Lattices --- p.120 / Chapter 9.9 --- Extracting the Relation Neff=2k+1 --- p.122 / Chapter 9.10 --- Conclusion --- p.123 / Chapter A --- Evolutionary NSG in Barabasi-Albert Networks --- p.125 / Chapter A.l --- The New Elements in BA Networks --- p.126 / Chapter A.2 --- The Two Implementations - Model A and Model B --- p.126 / Chapter A.3 --- Results in Model A (Varying-N) --- p.127 / Chapter A.4 --- Results in Model B (Fixed-N) --- p.133 / Chapter A.5 --- Conclusion --- p.135 / Chapter B --- Supplementary Equations for Chapter 9 --- p.136 / Chapter B.l --- Equations for ID k=4 Lattice --- p.136 / Chapter B.2 --- Equations for 2D k=4 Lattice --- p.137 / Bibliography --- p.139
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Some effects of the liquidity and commitment of assets on the use of power in a Prisoner's Dilemma gameCassady, Robert Idleman, 1932- January 1972 (has links)
No description available.
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Solving the iterated prisoner's dilemma using learning automation /Wu, Yaojun, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.Sc.) - Carleton University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 90-92). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.
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Topics in the emergence of cooperation in competing populations and optical properties of patterned metallic films. / 競爭群體中合作的產生及具規則結構之金屬薄膜的光學性質 / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection / Topics in the emergence of cooperation in competing populations and optical properties of patterned metallic films. / Jing zheng qun ti zhong he zuo de chan sheng ji ju gui ze jie gou zhi jin shu bo mo de guang xue xing zhiJanuary 2010 (has links)
Part I focuses on studying the extent of cooperation in networked entities, within the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and the Snowdrift Game (SG). The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is studied in the full payoff space spanned by two parameters beta and gamma. A theoretical study on two-strategy IPD is presented. We then numerically study the IPD in the full payoff space, with four different initial configurations. It is found that including the Tit-for-tat-like (ETFT) and Always-defecting-like (EAllD) strategies as initial strategies can maximize the dominating area of generous strategies in the payoff space at equilibrium. The roles played by ETFT and EAllD are further studied on the diagonal and anti-diagonal lines of the payoff space. / Part II focuses mainly on studying the optical properties of grating within the Rigorous Coupled-Wave Analysis (RCWA) method. The surface plasmon (SP) dispersion relation in a system consisting of a thin metallic film sandwiched between a linear dielectric and nonlinear dielectric of arbitrary non- linearity is derived, based on a generalized "first integral" approach. The SP dispersion relation in a system consisting of a thin metallic film sandwiched in a symmetric nonlinear dielectric environment is then derived. The changes in SP dispersion relations on film thicknesses are discussed for both cases. / The optical properties of two samples of one-dimensional metallic reflection gratings are studied. The numerical results of the zeroth order reflectance are in good agreement with experimental data. The Wood's anomaly occurs when a particular diffraction order emerges or disappears, thus inducing a change in the efficiency of other diffraction orders. This phenomenon is studied by calculating and measuring the efficiencies of all allowed diffraction orders. Numerical results of the near field patterns show a coupling between the waveguide and SP modes. We also study the controllable enhanced trans- mission in a semiconductor grating. The dielectric constant of a semiconductor becomes a tensor in the presence of a static magnetic field parallel to the slit. Numerical results based on RCWA reveal that the zeroth order transmission peaks at normal incidence can be shifted to longer wavelengths and the peak values of transmission can largely be enhanced when a moderate magnetic field is applied. A single-mode theory incorporating anisotropy is developed. The analytic results are in quantitative agreement with RCWA, indicating that the tunability in the transmission stems from the waveguide mode. / The Snowdrift Game is regarded as an important alternative to PD in studying the emergence of cooperation in competing populations. The phase transitions in spatial snowdrift games are introduced. By studying the relative alignments of the payoffs of C and D nodes, the phase transitions are analytically explained. As an extension to the standard two-person SG, an N-person Snowdrift Game (NPSG) is proposed to include generic multi-person interactions. NPSG in a well-mixed population is studied analytically by using the replicator dynamics. A simulation algorithm is developed. We also study NPSG on lattices and find a suppressed cooperation frequency, when compared with the well-mixed case. For NPSG played on 1D chain, the problem can be solved analytically. We further extend our work to study co-evolving dynamics. We propose and study a model in which the connections are driven to evolve by the dynamics of SG. Compared with played on static network, the cooperation frequency is promoted. A semi-analytic theory is proposed, with the results qualitatively agree with simulation results. / The thesis consists of two independent parts. Part I focuses on evolutionary games in networked entities and Part II focuses on calculations on optical properties of metallic gratings. / Yin, Haiping = 競爭群體中合作的產生及具規則結構之金屬薄膜的光學性質 / 尹海平. / Adviser: Hui Pak Ming. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 185-200). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Yin, Haiping = Jing zheng qun ti zhong he zuo de chan sheng ji ju gui ze jie gou zhi jin shu bo mo de guang xue xing zhi / Yin Haiping.
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