published_or_final_version / Psychology / Master / Master of Philosophy

Separate essays on entrepreneurship, joint venturing, and trade comprise this thesis. The emergence of entrepreneurship is common in the real world but relatively less so in classical economic models. If industry incumbents are attributed with full rationality and perfect foresight, then there are few, if any, profitable opportunities left for new entrants (entrepreneurs) to exploit. This essay explains how entrepreneurs can emerge in a dynamic world when firms must choose between a technology strategy that is either statically or dynamically efficient. A model is developed which shows how such opportunities for new entry can occur when incumbents are caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game involving technology strategy. A relevance measure and policy implications are then explored. Joint ventures, especially of the R&D type, are becoming increasingly important as a way to gain needed technological and market competencies. Unfortunately, many joint ventures have the characteristics of a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Firms may cooperate or defect in the venture. If contracts, side-payments, and third-party verification of the venture outcome are unavailable, then the dominant solution to the Prisoners’ Dilemma (mutual defection) results. This paper proposes the use of an ex-ante auction to obtain a Pareto-improvement for these ventures. A Pareto-improvement is assured when non-transferable costs and benefits of firms are not conditional on joint venture strategies. When this condition is not met restrictions are required to obtain the Pareto-improvement. The problem of trade between countries that share an international open access resource is becoming significant as the world reaches the limits of critical shared resource stocks. It is modelled as a world with one primary factor, two intermediate goods, one final good (harvested from the open access resource), and two nations where it is assumed that either the trading takes place over one stage (nations are price-takers), or two stages (nations have market power). Imperfect competition and open access generated externalities affect the trading efficiency. To maximize world welfare this essay recommends subsidizing R&D where comparative advantage exists, and creating international agreements to ensure the one-stage game structure is used when trading.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-68). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-99).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009. / Committee Chair: Fredda Blanchard-Fields; Committee Member: Ann Bostrom; Committee Member: Christopher Hertzog; Committee Member: Jack Feldman; Committee Member: Paul Corballis

Separate essays on entrepreneurship, joint venturing, and trade comprise this thesis. The emergence of entrepreneurship is common in the real world but relatively less so in classical economic models. If industry incumbents are attributed with full rationality and perfect foresight, then there are few, if any, profitable opportunities left for new entrants (entrepreneurs) to exploit. This essay explains how entrepreneurs can emerge in a dynamic world when firms must choose between a technology strategy that is either statically or dynamically efficient. A model is developed which shows how such opportunities for new entry can occur when incumbents are caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game involving technology strategy. A relevance measure and policy implications are then explored. Joint ventures, especially of the R&D type, are becoming increasingly important as a way to gain needed technological and market competencies. Unfortunately, many joint ventures have the characteristics of a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Firms may cooperate or defect in the venture. If contracts, side-payments, and third-party verification of the venture outcome are unavailable, then the dominant solution to the Prisoners’ Dilemma (mutual defection) results. This paper proposes the use of an ex-ante auction to obtain a Pareto-improvement for these ventures. A Pareto-improvement is assured when non-transferable costs and benefits of firms are not conditional on joint venture strategies. When this condition is not met restrictions are required to obtain the Pareto-improvement. The problem of trade between countries that share an international open access resource is becoming significant as the world reaches the limits of critical shared resource stocks. It is modelled as a world with one primary factor, two intermediate goods, one final good (harvested from the open access resource), and two nations where it is assumed that either the trading takes place over one stage (nations are price-takers), or two stages (nations have market power). Imperfect competition and open access generated externalities affect the trading efficiency. To maximize world welfare this essay recommends subsidizing R&D where comparative advantage exists, and creating international agreements to ensure the one-stage game structure is used when trading. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

In evolutionary theory the existence of self-sacrificing cooperative traits poses a problem that has engendered decades of debate. The principal theories of the evolution of altruism are inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, and multilevel selection. To provide a framework for the unification o f these apparently disparate theories, this dissertation identifies two fundamental conditions required for the evolution of altruism: 1) non-zero-sum fitness benefits for cooperation and 2) positive assortment among altruistic behaviors. I demonstrate the underlying similarities in these three theories in the following two ways. First, I show that the game-theoretic model of the prisoner’s dilemm a (PD) is inherent to all three theories. While the PD has been used extensively to model reciprocal altruism, I demonstrate that the n-player PD captures fundamental aspects o f multilevel selection and inclusive fitness in that NPD model parameters relate simply to Simpson’s paradox, the Price covariance equation, and Hamilton’s rule. The tension between hierarchical levels that defines a PD reflects the tension between Abstract levels o f selection that is explicit in multilevel selection theory, and im plicit in the other two theories. Second, Ham ilton’s rule from inclusive fitness theory applies to the other theories. As mentioned, I demonstrate that this rule relates to multilevel selection via the NPD. I also show that Queller’s generalization of Hamilton’s rule applies to the conditional strategies of reciprocal altmism. This challenges the selfish-gene viewpoint by highlighting the fact that it is the phenotypes o f others, not their genotypes, that is critical to the evolution o f altruism. I integrate the PD and H am ilton’s rule as follows: the evolution o f altruism in general involves PD situations in which Hamilton’s rule specifies the necessary relationship between 1) the degree of non-zero-sumness within the PD and 2) the degree of positive assortment among altruistic behaviors. Additional contributions of this research include a demonstration that randomly formed associations can provide the necessary positive assortment for strong altruism to evolve, the development of a new selection decomposition that is symmetrical to the Price equation, and a game-theoretic analysis showing the essential similarity of weak and strong altruism under selection.

Thesis (MSc)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: There are many examples of cooperation in action in society and in nature. In some cases cooperation leads to the increase of the overall welfare of those involved, and in other cases cooperation may be to the detriment of the larger society. The presence of cooperation seems natural if there is a direct bene t to individuals who choose to cooperate. However, in examples of cooperation this bene t is not always immediately obvious. The so called prisoner's dilemma is often used as an analogy to study cooperation and tease out the factors that lead to cooperation. In classical game theory, each player is assumed to be rational and hence typically seeks to select his strategy in such a way as to maximise his own expected pay-o . In the case of the classical prisoner's dilemma, this causes both players to defect. In evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, it is assumed that players have limited knowledge of the game and only bounded rationality. Games in evolutionary game theory are repeated in rounds and players are a orded the opportunity to adapt and learn as this repetition occurs. Past studies have revealed that cooperation may be a viable strategy if the prisoner's dilemma is placed in an evolutionary context, where the evolutionary tness of a strategy is directly related to the pay-o achieved by the player adopting the strategy. One of the mechanisms that promote the persistence of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma is structured interaction between players. A mathematical framework for representing the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (ESPD) is developed in this thesis. The mathematical framework is used to undertake an analytical approach (i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) towards investigating the dynamics of the ESPD with a path, cycle, plane grid or toroidal grid as underlying graph. The objective of this investigation is to determine the likelihood of the emergence of persistent cooperation between players. The ESPD on a path or a cycle admits two fundamentally di erent parameter regions; large values of the temptation-to-defect parameter are not capable of inducing persistent cooperation, while small values of this parameter allow for the possibility of persistent cooperation. It is found that the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph increases if the underlying graph is a path or cycle. The state space of the ESPD with a plane or toroidal grid graph as underlying graph grows very quickly as a function of the graph order. The automorphism classes of game states are enumerated to determine exactly how fast the size of the state space of the game grows as a function of the order of the underlying graph. Finally, the dynamics of the ESPD is investigated for a grid graph as underlying graph (in cases where the state space is small enough) by means of constructing the corresponding state graphs of the ESPD. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Daar is baie voorbeelde van samewerking in the gemeenskap en in die natuur. In sommige gevalle lei samewerking tot 'n toename in die algehele welvaart van die betrokkenes, terwyl samewerking in ander gevalle tot nadeel van die bre er gemeenskap mag wees. Die voorkoms van samewerking blyk natuurlik te wees indien daar 'n direkte voordeel vir die individue is wat kies om saam te werk. In voorbeelde van samewerking is s o 'n voordeel egter nie altyd voor-diehand- liggend nie. Die sogenaamde prisoniersdilemma word dikwels as voorbeeld in die studie van samewerking gebruik om die faktore wat na samewerking lei, te ontbloot. In klassieke speleteorie word daar aangeneem dat elke speler rasioneel is en dus poog om sy spelstrategie op s o 'n manier te kies dat sy eie verwagte uitbetaling gemaksimeer word. In die geval van die klassieke prisoniersdilemma veroorsaak dit dat beide spelers mekaar verraai. In evolusion^ere speleteorie, daarenteen, word daar slegs aangeneem dat elke speler oor beperkte kennis van die spel en begrensde rasionaliteit beskik. Spele in evolusion^ere speleteorie word in rondtes herhaal en spelers word die geleentheid gebied om gedurende hierdie herhalingsproses aan te pas en te leer. Vorige studies het getoon dat samewerking 'n lewensvatbare strategie is indien die prisoniersdilemma in 'n evolusion^ere konteks gespeel word, waar die evolusion^ere ksheid van 'n strategie direk afhang van die uitbetaling van 'n speler wat die strategie volg. Een van die meganismes wat volhoubare samewerking in die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma voortbring, is gestruktureerde interaksie tussen spelers. 'n Wiskundige raamwerk word vir die voorstelling van die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma in hierdie tesis ontwikkel. Hierdie wiskundige raamwerk word gebruik om 'n analitiese studie (met ander woorde sonder die gebruik van simulasie) van die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad, siklus, rooster in die vlak, of rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek van stapel te stuur. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die waarskynlikheid vir die ontstaan van volhoubare samewerking tussen spelers te bepaal. Die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad of siklus as onderliggende gra ek het twee fundamenteel verskillende parametergebiede tot gevolg; groot waardes van die versoeking-om-te-verraai parameter lei nie tot volhoubare samewerking nie, terwyl volhoubare samewerking wel vir klein waardes van hierdie parameter moontlik is. Daar word gevind dat die kans vir volhoubare samewerking toeneem tot sekerheid namate die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die toestandsruimte van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek groei baie vinnig as 'n funksie van die orde van die gra ek. Die outomor smeklasse van die speltoestande word getel met die doel om te bepaal presies hoe vinnig die toestandsruimte van die spel as 'n funksie van die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek word laastens deur middel van konstruksies van die ooreenstemmende toestandsgra eke ondersoek (in gevalle waar die toestandsruimte klein genoeg is).

Studies of life span development in everyday problem solving suggest two trajectories of change in adulthood: individuals become less effective at solving well-defined instrumental problems but more effective at managing ill-defined interpersonal problems. Two experiments were conducted to examine the ability of young and older adults to effectively manage an interpersonal problem that has a well-defined measure of instrumental success. Participants played an iterated Prisoner s Dilemma game with same-age, computer-simulated strangers (Experiment 1) and friends (Experiment 2). Success was dependent upon one s ability to put aside self-interest and cooperate with a partner. Computer-simulated partners reciprocated the participants decisions 100% of the time or behaved in a more self-interested manner. Young and older adults tendencies to create conflict with the reciprocating partner and their defensive reactions to the selfish partner were examined. Although young adults outperformed older adults when playing the game on their own, they did not carry this performance advantage into the interactive rounds. In fact, despite their success when playing alone, young adults were no more successful than older adults when interacting with others. Young and older adults both cooperated more with friends than with strangers and more with the reciprocating partner than the selfish partner. However, when the participants first interaction was with a selfish stranger, older adults were more cooperative than young adults and consequently accrued more reward. This is consistent with previous research demonstrating that older adults use more passive interpersonal problem solving strategies than young adults, and it also partially supports the prediction that advancing age leads to more effective strategy implementation when solving interpersonal problems.

The Internet has made a considerable impact on how business is conducted. Empowered by technology consumers are using the Internet as a tool to communicate and transact online. E-commerce (electronic commerce) presents opportunities for business to gain a competitive advantage, however it also posses certain challenges. Small and Medium Hospitality Enterprises (SMHEs) sector within the tourism industry, is one of the sectors which stands to benefit from using the Internet for business. Researchers agree that the contribution made by the tourism sector in developing economies is substantial. However, SMHEs are noted for their failure to derive optimal benefits from using the Internet for business to improve their competitiveness. This study which seeks to develop a model for use by SMHEs as a guide when making the decision to adopt technology was necessitated by the importance of SMHE’s contribution in the economy of developing countries. This model is based on the examination of existing theories and models such as; the Delone and McLean IS success model (2004), and the ITGI’s (2007) IT governance focus areas model. To elicit the desired outcomes, additional data was collected using questionnaires, interviews, and observations. The collected data was analysed and resulted in the development of a model that can be used by SMHEs in order to derive value from IT and to gain a competitive advantage.