Moral actions characteristically emanate from moral perception; therefore, if we are to improve moral action, we should see to improving moral perception. Accordingly, this thesis prioritizes the importance of moral perception in moral performance. Yet, perception is usually interpreted as reception and, hence, lying outside one's direct control, in which case the notion of improving moral perception would be limited. However, many contemporary moral theorists who profess the primacy of moral perception are rather strongly committed to such a notion as evidenced in their pursuit of the possibility of open moral perception which is not rigidly prescribed by prior doxastic and dispositional conditions. I problematize this situation by arguing that in the way perception ordinarily operates, which is superimposition of the subject's beliefs and dispositions on what is perceived, moral perception as open perception is not possible in any serious sense. Unless this superimposition is first of all recognized—a difficult task, given our tendency to objectify what is perceived—and, secondly, given to deconstruction in both theory and experience, the proposal for open perception would not yield far-reaching results. I examine this tendency to objectification and attempt to repudiate our foundational subject-object dualistic epistemology and ontology that lie behind this tendency. Then I consider how the resulting thesis of nonduality can be experientially established. For this step, I explore the resources available in the Buddhist tradition of vipassana theory and practice which proposes laying bare the process of superimposition, and furthermore, deconstructing it experientially, thereby availing to us the possibility of nondual moral perception—that is, perception freed from the enthrallment of superimposition. I also explore the epistemology and phenomenology behind vipassana, and I attempt to picture human intentionality in the mode of nonduality. Furthermore, I attempt to construct a general ethical theory, which I term "nondual ethic," that centralizes empathic, compassionate, and harmony-making perception. Finally, I consider the kinds of educative practices that foster nondual ways of experience, and hence nondual moral perception. With this thesis, I lay the preliminary groundwork for further investigation.

Moral actions characteristically emanate from moral perception; therefore, if we are to improve moral action, we should see to improving moral perception. Accordingly, this thesis prioritizes the importance of moral perception in moral performance. Yet, perception is usually interpreted as reception and, hence, lying outside one's direct control, in which case the notion of improving moral perception would be limited. However, many contemporary moral theorists who profess the primacy of moral perception are rather strongly committed to such a notion as evidenced in their pursuit of the possibility of open moral perception which is not rigidly prescribed by prior doxastic and dispositional conditions. I problematize this situation by arguing that in the way perception ordinarily operates, which is superimposition of the subject's beliefs and dispositions on what is perceived, moral perception as open perception is not possible in any serious sense. Unless this superimposition is first of all recognized—a difficult task, given our tendency to objectify what is perceived—and, secondly, given to deconstruction in both theory and experience, the proposal for open perception would not yield far-reaching results. I examine this tendency to objectification and attempt to repudiate our foundational subject-object dualistic epistemology and ontology that lie behind this tendency. Then I consider how the resulting thesis of nonduality can be experientially established. For this step, I explore the resources available in the Buddhist tradition of vipassana theory and practice which proposes laying bare the process of superimposition, and furthermore, deconstructing it experientially, thereby availing to us the possibility of nondual moral perception—that is, perception freed from the enthrallment of superimposition. I also explore the epistemology and phenomenology behind vipassana, and I attempt to picture human intentionality in the mode of nonduality. Furthermore, I attempt to construct a general ethical theory, which I term "nondual ethic," that centralizes empathic, compassionate, and harmony-making perception. Finally, I consider the kinds of educative practices that foster nondual ways of experience, and hence nondual moral perception. With this thesis, I lay the preliminary groundwork for further investigation. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

Diss. (sammanfattning) Umeå : Umeå universitet, 2005. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, 2000. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 276-325).

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-138).

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2003. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 55 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2003. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 90 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.