• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 1
  • 1
  • Tagged with
  • 2
  • 2
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

A Study on the Formation of Taiwan¡¦s Monopoly System--Based on a Assembly Councilor¡¦s Analysis of Parliamentary Politics on the Monopoly System

YU, Lin-ya 19 July 2006 (has links)
Taiwan¡¦s monopoly system, originating from the Military Governor Ming-chuan Liu of Qing Dynasty and applied by the Japanese, was a major financial source in Japan-colonized Taiwan. Chen Yi, the first ROC Chief Executive and Garrison Commander of Taiwan, renamed the Monopoly Bureau of Government-General as the Monopoly Bureau of Taiwan and then continued its monopolistic business. He stipulated five items -- tobacco, alcohol, camphor, matches, and measurement gadgets-- be monopolized by government whereas private manufacturing and sales be barred under the supervision of the Monopoly Bureau. Also banned from private transactions are certain necessities, such as salt, lime, cane sugar, gasoline, and electricity, which were distributed by some authorities other than the Monopoly Bureau. It was thought that such measures could restrict individual capital, and reinforce national capital in the hopes of realizing the idea of the nation founding, based on the doctrines of the Three People¡¦s Principles. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, though asserting capital restrictions in some degree, was not opposed to private capital, but, rather, was keen to encourage private enterprises. He had the national industries developed by a dual action via both private enterprises and national organizations. His philosophy argued that those productions not so proper to be commissioned to a state-run organization as to a private one should, along with incentives from the state and protection by the law, be rendered to the latter for operations. Based on this, it appeared obvious that people¡¦s livelihood didn¡¦t connote nationalization. And by no means did livelihood denote that the government could confiscate the industries already operated by civilians. After a further study, a distinction could be found in the argument between the economic centralization implemented by the authorities of Taiwan¡¦s administrative officers and the capital restriction elaborated in the Principles of People¡¦s Livelihood. The colossal assets taken over from Japanese-owned industries didn¡¦t mean any opportunities to reinforce national capital. Instead, monopolistic business was designed to operate by the government and afterwards turned up being outstanding samples of state-owned businesses among the industries in post-war Taiwan. The key factor consisted in the fact that state-owned industries were run under the supervision of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, which boosted the managerial performance. The revenues from monopolistic sales of tobacco and spirits were crucial to the finances of our country and were helpful to the development of its economic constructions. The monopoly featured two functions. One function was to revive the production of the state-owned industries, which laid a foundation to carry out a six-term Four-year Economic Program, beginning in 1953; to make a substitute for imports; to spur export expansion; and to help kick-start our country¡¦s economic boom. The other function was to improve village constructions with land reforms of Three-seven-five Rent Deduction (a program limiting the rent of a land to a maximum of 37.5 percent of its total product), Release of State Lands, and Land-to-the-tillers Movements. The monopoly system was an indispensable support of finances, and it also ensured that the capital from the agricultural sector could be transferred to the industrial sector, which proved that provincial constructions were closely related to national economic development.
2

Representation of ethnic groups in subnational political institutions: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Samuel, Matemane Iraguha January 2017 (has links)
Magister Legum - LLM (Public Law and Jurisprudence) / With approximately 450 tribes and 250 ethnic groups in a territory of 2 345 095 km2,1the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the world's largest, populous, and multiethnolinguistic countries. Since the departure of the Belgian coloniser in 1960, this Member State of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is facing a myriad of institutional crises, bloody conflicts and wars, mainly caused by the design of political institutions and the side-lining of some ethnic groups from political institutions. For many decades, Congolese provinces have seen numerous violent ethnic-driven conflicts, which led to institutional instability, political crisis, secessions, massacres and wars. The bloodiest of them all were the first and second Congolese wars. From 1996 to 2002, these so-called "African first world war" cost the DRC the lives of millions of people, divided it into many small "republics" and destroyed the few political and economic infrastructures that survived four decades of institutional instability and dictatorship.

Page generated in 0.0603 seconds