Pendant la guerre d'Algérie (1955-1962), le gouvernement général de l'Algérie met en place dans les campagnes et les banlieues des grandes villes d'Algérie une structure de pacification, les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées) et les SAU (sections administratives urbaines), dont on trouve le prolongement au sein des SAT (Service d'assistance technique) en métropole (Paris, Lyon, Marseille) et au niveau de la Force de police auxiliaire de Paris. Les officiers SAS, officiers de carrière, de réserve en situation d'active, et appelés, recrutent des supplétifs (moghaznis) et mènent une politique de pacification dans les domaines administratif, politique (promotion d'élus musulmans), économique (Plan de Constantine), social (aide aux indigents et résorption des bidonvilles), médical, scolaire, et militaire. Au cœur de la politique de la France en Algérie de 1955 à 1959, ces officiers se retrouvent, dès 1960, en porte-à-faux de la nouvelle politique du général de Gaulle. Si certains démissionnent ou partent amers de leur période de SAS, d'autres s'opposent au général de Gaulle lors du référendum sur l'autodétermination de l'Algérie de janvier 1961, du putsch d'avril 1961, voire ont la tentation de basculer dans l'organisation subversive de I'OAS. L'indépendance de l'Algérie risquant de menacer la vie des supplétifs, certains officiers SAS organisent des filières clandestines de rapatriement des supplétifs et de leurs familles, et les aident à s'insérer en France grâce à des associations, des initiatives individuelles et du soutien administratif et financier de l'État (SAT de Paris et de Marseille). / The mission of the SAS in Algeria is the current equivalent in NATO parlance civil-military cooperation. The SAS, the special administrative sections and SAU the city administrative sections were created by the governor general J. Soustelle. Its mission was to maintain contact with the population and collect the intelligence necessary for successful operation. The SAS and SAU would be irnplemented to administer the villages in Algeria to combat the economic misery and political inequality that were the root causes of the insurgency. With their civilian personnel and Muslin auxiliary troops (moghaznis), they were the administrative intermediaries responsible for development of their districts. They rebuilt schools. They cared for the sick by establishing fee medical assistance. They conducted censuses to establish welfare services and organized elections for municipal officials. They improved agriculture and husbandry, built roads and bridges. In military terms, the SAS officiers dismantled the FLN cells and collected intelligence on the ALN. They protected the village with their auxiliaries (moghaznis). ln three cities of metropolis, we find the presence of similar structures, with for Paris, an auxiliary police force. The SAS was an important policy to preserve French Algeria from 1955 to 1959, but then the new policy who wants to give at Algeria her independence (1960-1962) changed the SAS officer policy opinion. They try to oppose them during the referendum of Algerian auto determination (January 1961), at the time of the putsch (Apri11961), by tipping over to the terrorism (OAS), or by organizing Mussulmen auxiliary secret repatriation in France (April-May 1962).

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The United States has spent over $2 billion during the last six years to reconstruct and stabilize Afghanistan through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). This effort is only one of several simultaneous programs attempting to stabilize Afghanistan using approaches including providing humanitarian aid, education, government and security reform, and construction. Construction often involves simple infrastructure development with tangible benefits including increased access, growing commerce and better security. Construction projects can also employ the local population and, if done correctly, develop a sense of community and social capital. What causes construction projects to miss the mark failing to result in creating a stable community? This research compares four different construction programs including CERP, National Solidarity Program (NSP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to determine their potential impact on Afghan stability. It uses a combination of statistical regression, correlation, geospatial and temporal analysis to compare completed construction with recorded SIGACTs (Significant Acts) reported by U.S. forces and NGOs. The results imply that the identified stabilization programs are not using construction effectively to create social capital and stability.