In the past 20 years the defence of provocation has shifted from the periphery of South African law to a fully developed defence available to those who kill when provoked. Not only is the defence available to the provoked, but it has been extended to those who kill when subjected to emotional stress. However, the defence is mirred in controversy and bad decisions. Not only has the precise nature of the defence not been clarified, but this lack of clarity has been exacerbated by confusing decisions of our courts. This confusion is partly a result of the development of the defence of incapacity, particularly its extension to cases involving provocation and mental stress, and partly a result of its application in practice. Three major problems have plagued the provocation defence. Firstly, the courts have confused the defence of sane automatism with that of non-pathological incapacity. Secondly, there has been an implied use of an objective test in determining criminal incapacity where the enquiry has clearly been a subjective one. Thirdly, it has been held that the problem may not so much be the subjective aspect of provocation, but rather its application. The real problem seems to lie in the theoretical confusion as to the precise meaning of lack of “selfcontrol”. Lastly, on occasion the courts have failed to distinguish lack of capacity from diminished responsibility. Thus, in order to gain clarity concerning this “grey” area of the law these problems have created, it is necessary for South African law to consult more authoritative sources to receive guidance for the problems identified. One of those sources that has been consulted is that of English law. English law, however, deals with the defence of provocation in a different manner. Raising a defence of provocation here does not result in an acquittal but rather in a reduction of the charge to manslaughter. However, the English law on provocation is also 7 plagued by various problems. Firstly, there is the issue of cumulative provocation. Generally, there is little difficulty in cases where there is no “immediate trigger”. Secondly, the fundamental flaw with the current test of the reasonable man is that the courts have had to swing between the two aims of taking a compassionate view of human frailty while endeavoring to maintain an objective standard of the reasonable man. Lastly, it can be said that the problem with the proportionality requirement is that it makes the provocation defence dependant upon the assessment of the accused’s conduct after he or she lost his or her selfcontrol rather than on his or her giving way to passion and losing control in the first place. It is clear that from the problems identified in both South African law and English law concerning the defence of provocation the courts in each jurisdiction will have to pay careful attentio n to the problems highlighted and apply the law in such a way so as to ensure clarity and legal certainty.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2000.

Thesis (LLM)-University of Pretoria, 2008. / Abstract in English. Includes bibliographical references .

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.