Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Zürich.

During the Cold War, war by proxy was a key strategy of indirect conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of these proxy wars was to either maintain or change the balance of power between the superpowers/great powers in conflict areas outside the central front in Europe. Within the condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to avoid direct confrontation between their conventional military forces in regional conflicts out of a fear that it would escalate to an all out nuclear war.

During the Cold War, war by proxy was a key strategy of indirect conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of these proxy wars was to either maintain or change the balance of power between the superpowers/great powers in conflict areas outside the central front in Europe. Within the condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to avoid direct confrontation between their conventional military forces in regional conflicts out of a fear that it would escalate to an all out nuclear war.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Mainz, 1973. / Bibliography; p. 127-130.

Serving dynamic web pages raises higher load of web servers and associated technologies. This can to some extent eliminate setting up reverse proxy with cache in front of the web server. The primary goal of this thesis is to implement this technique via presently most popular web server -- Apache. These Apache's proxy features were at first well tested and described, later practically applied in real LAMP software bundle enviroment (Linux, Apache, PHP, MySQL).

Corporate increase their competitive advantage by M&A. It is a recent trend over the world. It is important to make a distinctive plan for M&A. In addition, the process of M&A must follow the rules of business and corporate governance. The study analyzes the re-election of the board of the directors of China Development Financial Holding Corporation. In the perspectives of corporate governance, politics, economics, and social-culture, we study that Chinatrust Financial Holding Company acquired the control of China Development Financial Holding Corporation by the proxy contest. And we discuss some issues of government¡¦s role, ¡§Chinatrust rule¡¨, and other investor¡¦s role.

In the 21st century's today, because of the computer and the telecommunication are combined with each other, VOIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) substitute for PSTN(Public Switched Telephone Network) stage by stage according to its cost and the quality of voice. VOIP digitizes analogic voice by software and hardware, and uses Packet Switching to transmit the packets in the IP network, its standard protocol are H.323, SIP, etc. H.323 is more complex and has more sub-protocol such that it is restricted by technicality. To compare with H.323, SIP is free. It can achieve the goal communication with PSTN through Gateway, and constructs a simple structure of VOIP. SIP has become the important protocol of NGN (Next Generation Networks) and 3G mutimedia systems. The structure of Client-Server of SIP is simple, but as long as the users increase, the Server may cause some trouble because of the great deal of information, and the VOIP network which depends on the Server will stop its service. For this reason, we will improve the Client-Server structure in the paper, we wish that clients could communication with the others without the service of SIP Server to reduce the load, and improve the perfomance of SIP signaling.

Since its foundation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has developed its relationship with non-state allies throughout the Middle East and beyond, often using them to engage in proxy warfare with its enemies. This topic has seen increasing attention by academics and policy-makers. Using the proxy groups as case studies and classical comparison, this thesis analyzes what drives Iran to deploy these proxies to wage war on its enemies, and under which circumstances Iran does not engage in proxy warfare, as well as the factors that make Iran develop lasting and deep relationships with its proxies and under which circumstances these relationships stay superficial. Three main hypotheses are tested: first the identity-based hypothesis, that Iran feels compelled to help fellow Shias and the Palestinians in their struggles against local oppressors, the West and Israel, being driven by a responsibility to protect them born out of Shia religion and Khomeinist revolutionary ideology, together forming the Axis of resistance. Second the power-based hypothesis, that Iran is primarily driven by realist concerns to defend and secure itself and its sphere of influence, making proxies Iran’s pawns. Lastly a factionalism-based hypothesis, an alternative explanation is competition between the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Foreign Ministry as causing the IRGC to engage with proxies to pursue their foreign policy. By testing these three hypotheses in several case studies spanning four decades and geographically the Middle East and beyond, this thesis presents a comprehensive approach to the reasons behind Iranian proxy warfare as well as a contribution to a more identity and ideology focused approach to the study of proxy wars.

This dissertation analyzes patterns of power and influence in the context of proxy alliances between states and armed, non-state groups. In particular, I explore the following questions: Why do some states have leverage over their non-state proxies, while others find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Put differently, why doesn't a state's enormous material advantage systematically translate into an ability to influence the behavior of proxy groups? Governments often find themselves stymied by belligerent proxies and drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with adversaries--precisely what states sought to avoid by relying on covert, indirect alliances in the first place. I argue that the very factors that make proxy warfare appealing to states--its clandestine, informal nature--threaten to undermine governments' abilities to exert leverage over their proxies. Governments seek out proxy alliances when the material or political costs of directly confronting an adversary are unappealingly high, driven by the logic that proxy groups can help states achieve their foreign policy objectives "on the cheap" and in a way that allows states to plausibly deny involvement in a conflict. However, the actions states must take to ensure plausible deniability, specifically the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage and oversee a proxy ally, can undermine their leverage. The decisions political leaders make about alliance design and management, which have negative effects on their bargaining power, are fundamentally driven by two related logics: the requirements of plausible deniability, and attempts to navigate the preferences of domestic political veto players and bureaucracies. Plausible deniability requires establishing as much distance as possible between a decision maker and a proxy and/or operating with a minimal footprint on the ground. To do so, political leaders often delegate authority for managing tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance to covert organizations with the security sector (e.g., intelligence organizations). However, this clandestine and informal delegation is problematic in two respects. First, the bureaucratic actor to whom the political leader delegates authority for carrying out tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance has a general incentive to ensure its organization is abundantly resourced. Therefore, it has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the proxy alliance. Second, bureaucratic leaders (as well as all of the other individuals to whom authority is delegated) may have personal, political, or ideological preferences that differ substantially from those of the political leadership. If the effects of delegating authority in this way are so perverse, why do leaders do it? And why don't they reign in wayward bureaucrats? At the most basic level, leaders have a high valuation for plausible deniability for international or domestic political reasons (to avoid retaliation from an adversary or keep things secret from domestic political actors), and powerful, entrenched bureaucracies are difficult to control. Digging deeper, however, there is a compelling domestic political story that existing accounts of proxy alliances have neglected to tell. Political leaders often abdicate authority to other bureaucratic actors or individuals--even when they may foresee the issues identified above--as a strategy for protecting themselves from domestic political veto players with strong policy preferences that diverge substantially from their own. To evaluate the explanatory scope of the theory, I explore patterns of influence in proxy alliance in a series of comparative case studies, in which I use process tracing and structured, focused comparison to assess whether and to what extent decisions about alliance management affect a state's leverage over its non-state proxy. Specifically, I analyze bargaining power in six different proxy alliances: the Syria-Fatah alliance in the 1960s-70s; the alliance between the FNLA and UNITA in Angola and the United States from 1975-76; the India-Mukti Bahini alliance in East Pakistan in 1971; the United States-UNITA alliance in Angola in the 1980s; the alliance between the United States, Iran, and Israel, and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s; and the alliance between India and Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. I compare the explanatory scope of my theory to the interstate alliance politics literature, and find that my theory not only accounts for the unexplained variation in the universe of cases, but also offers a more complete understanding of the dynamics of state-proxy relationships.

Java's Remote Method Invocation (RMI) architecture allows distributed applications to be written in Java. Clients can communicate with a server via a local proxy object that hides the network and server implementation details. This loosely coupled architecture makes it difficult for client-side enhancements, such as method caching and validation, to obtain useful information about server state and implementation. Statically-generated custom proxies can provide a limited solution, but are troublesome to deploy and cannot change dynamically at runtime. This thesis presents a framework for Java RMI smart proxies using a distributed aspectoriented platform. The framework allows server-controlled dynamic changes to Java RMI proxy objects on the client, without requiring changes to the client application code or development cycle. The benefits of this framework are demonstrated with three practical examples: method caching, client-side input validation, and load balancing.