During the Cold War, war by proxy was a key strategy of indirect conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of these proxy wars was to either maintain or change the balance of power between the superpowers/great powers in conflict areas outside the central front in Europe. Within the condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to avoid direct confrontation between their conventional military forces in regional conflicts out of a fear that it would escalate to an all out nuclear war.

During the Cold War, war by proxy was a key strategy of indirect conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of these proxy wars was to either maintain or change the balance of power between the superpowers/great powers in conflict areas outside the central front in Europe. Within the condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to avoid direct confrontation between their conventional military forces in regional conflicts out of a fear that it would escalate to an all out nuclear war.

This dissertation analyzes patterns of power and influence in the context of proxy alliances between states and armed, non-state groups. In particular, I explore the following questions: Why do some states have leverage over their non-state proxies, while others find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Put differently, why doesn't a state's enormous material advantage systematically translate into an ability to influence the behavior of proxy groups? Governments often find themselves stymied by belligerent proxies and drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with adversaries--precisely what states sought to avoid by relying on covert, indirect alliances in the first place. I argue that the very factors that make proxy warfare appealing to states--its clandestine, informal nature--threaten to undermine governments' abilities to exert leverage over their proxies. Governments seek out proxy alliances when the material or political costs of directly confronting an adversary are unappealingly high, driven by the logic that proxy groups can help states achieve their foreign policy objectives "on the cheap" and in a way that allows states to plausibly deny involvement in a conflict. However, the actions states must take to ensure plausible deniability, specifically the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage and oversee a proxy ally, can undermine their leverage. The decisions political leaders make about alliance design and management, which have negative effects on their bargaining power, are fundamentally driven by two related logics: the requirements of plausible deniability, and attempts to navigate the preferences of domestic political veto players and bureaucracies. Plausible deniability requires establishing as much distance as possible between a decision maker and a proxy and/or operating with a minimal footprint on the ground. To do so, political leaders often delegate authority for managing tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance to covert organizations with the security sector (e.g., intelligence organizations). However, this clandestine and informal delegation is problematic in two respects. First, the bureaucratic actor to whom the political leader delegates authority for carrying out tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance has a general incentive to ensure its organization is abundantly resourced. Therefore, it has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the proxy alliance. Second, bureaucratic leaders (as well as all of the other individuals to whom authority is delegated) may have personal, political, or ideological preferences that differ substantially from those of the political leadership. If the effects of delegating authority in this way are so perverse, why do leaders do it? And why don't they reign in wayward bureaucrats? At the most basic level, leaders have a high valuation for plausible deniability for international or domestic political reasons (to avoid retaliation from an adversary or keep things secret from domestic political actors), and powerful, entrenched bureaucracies are difficult to control. Digging deeper, however, there is a compelling domestic political story that existing accounts of proxy alliances have neglected to tell. Political leaders often abdicate authority to other bureaucratic actors or individuals--even when they may foresee the issues identified above--as a strategy for protecting themselves from domestic political veto players with strong policy preferences that diverge substantially from their own. To evaluate the explanatory scope of the theory, I explore patterns of influence in proxy alliance in a series of comparative case studies, in which I use process tracing and structured, focused comparison to assess whether and to what extent decisions about alliance management affect a state's leverage over its non-state proxy. Specifically, I analyze bargaining power in six different proxy alliances: the Syria-Fatah alliance in the 1960s-70s; the alliance between the FNLA and UNITA in Angola and the United States from 1975-76; the India-Mukti Bahini alliance in East Pakistan in 1971; the United States-UNITA alliance in Angola in the 1980s; the alliance between the United States, Iran, and Israel, and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s; and the alliance between India and Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. I compare the explanatory scope of my theory to the interstate alliance politics literature, and find that my theory not only accounts for the unexplained variation in the universe of cases, but also offers a more complete understanding of the dynamics of state-proxy relationships.

Detta arbete är en fallstudie som undersöker konflikten i Ukraina. Syftet med denna studie är att studera kriget i Ukraina utifrån begreppet proxy war och Sveriges utrikespolitik gentemot Ukrainakriget. Metoden är av kvalitativ karaktär till följd av en vetenskaplig litteraturinsamling och semi-strukturerade intervjuer som empiriskt material. Intervjupersonerna är universitetslektorer på svenska universitet. Arbetet är avgränsat till det upptrappade kriget år 2022, med en viss djupdykning i krigets början, vilket är år 2014. Studiebidraget med detta arbete är en djupare förståelse kring olika krigsaspekter.Det finns huvudsakliga slutsatser som resultat av undersökningen. Den ena är att Ukrainakriget inte är en isolerad konflikt mellan Ukraina och Ryssland. Det finns olika inslag av ombudskrig i konflikten med externa aktörer som försöker nå ett önskat strategiskt utfall med krigsutvecklingen. Externa aktörer deltar som icke-krigförande genom att stödja Ukraina utan att själva direkt ingå i direkta krigshandlingar. Den andra huvudsakliga slutsatsen är att svensk utrikespolitik nått en historisk brytpunkt. Det svenska stödet till Ukraina och de utrikespolitiska åtgärderna är utmärkande. Till följd av kriget har Sverige antagit en positiv inställning till NATO-anslutning och lagt sina säkerhetspolitiska kort på ett lyckat ukrainskt försvar. Sverige bidrar med ett omfattande stöd till Ukraina, sanktionerar ryska aktörer och är i linje med den västerländska enheten. Därmed har Sverige överlämnat alliansfriheten.

This Bachelor’s thesis explores the relationship between borders, boundaries and migration, and their effect on identity making from a diasporic perspective. The study focuses on notions of national, regional, cultural, tribal and ethnic identity, and set in relation to the influence borders and boundarieshave on these processes. It investigates this topical realm within the specific conditions of the Angolan-Namibian border, following the developments from the era of colonization, independence struggle and decolonization and the transformation of Angola and Namibia into self-asserting and sovereign states, in which it focuses on the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in the border town of Rundu, northern Namibia. In doing so, it sets out to investigate the connection between macro variables and processes such as colonialism, the Cold War in Africa, and independence movements, to micro processes focusing on the living conditions and experiences of border residents. The study aims at a holistic approach drawing from theoretical developments within border and boundary studies stemming from disciplines such as political geography and anthropology, along with migration studies and social psychology. The results suggest that differing dominant conditions of the Angolan and Namibian states in terms of historical and political development, living conditions and the manifestation of the border and political assertion of the nation-states, has indeed helped to inform and construct different social categories and identities. In terms of the Angolan diaspora, the results indicate that migrants acquiring Namibian citizenships and thereby rights, did redefine their national identity to a greater extent than those denied documentation as their agency has become curtailed, leaving this group in an identity-limbo. The main contribution of this study is an investigation of what the border-migration-identity nexus means in terms of the Angolan diaspora and the Kavango region.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o papel do estreito de Ormuz nas dinâmicas de competição no Golfo Pérsico. Ormuz é um estreito geograficamente estratégico, uma vez que é a única via marítima entre o Golfo Pérsico, o Golfo de Omã e o Oceano Índico e encontra-se em uma área rica em hidrocarbonetos. Em vista disso, o primeiro capítulo busca analisar o conceito e as características que qualificam a relevância que alguns estreitos possuem para o Sistema Internacional, caracterizando-os como Pontos de Estrangulamento e, nesse sentido, averiguar as razões que definem o estreito de Ormuz como o principal ponto de estrangulamento marítimo no mundo. Já o segundo capítulo tem como foco o estudo da Competição Estratégica, estabelecida entre Estados Unidos e Irã (2003-2013), que somente tornou-se possível graças às características de Ormuz (e, à assimetria de capacidades). Por fim, o terceiro capítulo procura averiguar o papel do estreito na escalada das rivalidades entre Arábia Saudita e Irã que deflagram a Guerra Proxy, e o seu transbordamento para outros pontos de estrangulamento do Oriente Médio. Espera-se como resultado oferecer uma melhor contextualização e compreensão sobre o tema de Ormuz em particular, bem como dos pontos de estrangulamento, contribuindo dessa forma para a instrumentalização dessas categorias no estudo das Relações Internacionais contemporâneas. / This study aims to analyze the Strait of Hormuz role in the competition dynamics in the Persian Gulf. Hormuz is a strait geographically strategic, since it is the only maritime way between the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean and is located in an area rich in hydrocarbons. In view of this, the first chapter analyzes the concept and characteristics that qualify the relevance of some straits to the International System, characterizing them as Choke points and, accordingly, find out the reasons that define the Strait of Hormuz as the main maritime choke point in the world. The second chapter focuses on the study of the Strategic Competition, established between the United States and Iran (2003-2013), which only became possible because of the characteristics of Hormuz (and because of capacity asymmetry). Finally, the third chapter seeks to ascertain the strait role in escalating rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran that trigger the Proxy War and its spillover to other bottlenecks in the Middle East. It is expected as a result provide better context and understanding of Hormuz particular theme and bottlenecks, thus contributing to the exploitation of these categories in the study of contemporary international relations.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o papel do estreito de Ormuz nas dinâmicas de competição no Golfo Pérsico. Ormuz é um estreito geograficamente estratégico, uma vez que é a única via marítima entre o Golfo Pérsico, o Golfo de Omã e o Oceano Índico e encontra-se em uma área rica em hidrocarbonetos. Em vista disso, o primeiro capítulo busca analisar o conceito e as características que qualificam a relevância que alguns estreitos possuem para o Sistema Internacional, caracterizando-os como Pontos de Estrangulamento e, nesse sentido, averiguar as razões que definem o estreito de Ormuz como o principal ponto de estrangulamento marítimo no mundo. Já o segundo capítulo tem como foco o estudo da Competição Estratégica, estabelecida entre Estados Unidos e Irã (2003-2013), que somente tornou-se possível graças às características de Ormuz (e, à assimetria de capacidades). Por fim, o terceiro capítulo procura averiguar o papel do estreito na escalada das rivalidades entre Arábia Saudita e Irã que deflagram a Guerra Proxy, e o seu transbordamento para outros pontos de estrangulamento do Oriente Médio. Espera-se como resultado oferecer uma melhor contextualização e compreensão sobre o tema de Ormuz em particular, bem como dos pontos de estrangulamento, contribuindo dessa forma para a instrumentalização dessas categorias no estudo das Relações Internacionais contemporâneas. / This study aims to analyze the Strait of Hormuz role in the competition dynamics in the Persian Gulf. Hormuz is a strait geographically strategic, since it is the only maritime way between the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean and is located in an area rich in hydrocarbons. In view of this, the first chapter analyzes the concept and characteristics that qualify the relevance of some straits to the International System, characterizing them as Choke points and, accordingly, find out the reasons that define the Strait of Hormuz as the main maritime choke point in the world. The second chapter focuses on the study of the Strategic Competition, established between the United States and Iran (2003-2013), which only became possible because of the characteristics of Hormuz (and because of capacity asymmetry). Finally, the third chapter seeks to ascertain the strait role in escalating rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran that trigger the Proxy War and its spillover to other bottlenecks in the Middle East. It is expected as a result provide better context and understanding of Hormuz particular theme and bottlenecks, thus contributing to the exploitation of these categories in the study of contemporary international relations.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o papel do estreito de Ormuz nas dinâmicas de competição no Golfo Pérsico. Ormuz é um estreito geograficamente estratégico, uma vez que é a única via marítima entre o Golfo Pérsico, o Golfo de Omã e o Oceano Índico e encontra-se em uma área rica em hidrocarbonetos. Em vista disso, o primeiro capítulo busca analisar o conceito e as características que qualificam a relevância que alguns estreitos possuem para o Sistema Internacional, caracterizando-os como Pontos de Estrangulamento e, nesse sentido, averiguar as razões que definem o estreito de Ormuz como o principal ponto de estrangulamento marítimo no mundo. Já o segundo capítulo tem como foco o estudo da Competição Estratégica, estabelecida entre Estados Unidos e Irã (2003-2013), que somente tornou-se possível graças às características de Ormuz (e, à assimetria de capacidades). Por fim, o terceiro capítulo procura averiguar o papel do estreito na escalada das rivalidades entre Arábia Saudita e Irã que deflagram a Guerra Proxy, e o seu transbordamento para outros pontos de estrangulamento do Oriente Médio. Espera-se como resultado oferecer uma melhor contextualização e compreensão sobre o tema de Ormuz em particular, bem como dos pontos de estrangulamento, contribuindo dessa forma para a instrumentalização dessas categorias no estudo das Relações Internacionais contemporâneas. / This study aims to analyze the Strait of Hormuz role in the competition dynamics in the Persian Gulf. Hormuz is a strait geographically strategic, since it is the only maritime way between the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean and is located in an area rich in hydrocarbons. In view of this, the first chapter analyzes the concept and characteristics that qualify the relevance of some straits to the International System, characterizing them as Choke points and, accordingly, find out the reasons that define the Strait of Hormuz as the main maritime choke point in the world. The second chapter focuses on the study of the Strategic Competition, established between the United States and Iran (2003-2013), which only became possible because of the characteristics of Hormuz (and because of capacity asymmetry). Finally, the third chapter seeks to ascertain the strait role in escalating rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran that trigger the Proxy War and its spillover to other bottlenecks in the Middle East. It is expected as a result provide better context and understanding of Hormuz particular theme and bottlenecks, thus contributing to the exploitation of these categories in the study of contemporary international relations.

Diploma thesis Interests of parties to the Sino-Vietnamese War 1979 deals with the lesser know topic of the semi-forgotten war which had been fought during the Cold War era. The most interesting in this conflict is, that it had been fought by former mutual allies. The thesis isn't focused on the course of war, with the beginning on the 17th of February 1979. The form of war so called "limited". It means, that the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, had its objectives, when they had been reached, the Chinese military units turned back to China. The last Chinese soldier crossed the border on the 16th of March 1979, after four week of harsh fighting's. But the aim of this work is to analyze the interests of the parties involved in the conflict and to prove the hypothesis, that the war was actually proxy war between PRC and USSR.

Proxy conflict seems to be on the rise as the contemporary form of armed conflict, particularly manifesting itself in the Middle East and North Africa. While proxy conflicts enjoy increased attention in academia, little research has focused on the type of support a sponsor provides to its proxy. This thesis contributes to the literature by asking under what circumstances does sponsor provide soft power support to proxies in proxy conflict? I employ a qualitative most-similar case design of Iran’ssupport to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and its military wing the Badr organization in Iraq, as well as United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya. The theoretical argument posits that mobilized sectarian bonds between sponsor and proxy facilitate a trust that induces the sponsor to provide soft power support in addition to the baseline support of hard power. The empirical findings give mixed support for the argument, as both sponsors provided soft power support, albeit at somewhat various degrees. Notably, Iran mobilized deeper and broader amongst the organizational structure of the proxy and its followers, while UAE arguably only engaged with Haftar as a strong leader but less so with NLA as an organization and its followers. Therefore, there seems to a difference in how the two sponsors penetrated their mobilization of proxies.