<p>This project advocates an urgent role for neurobiological evidence and models in the study of altruism. I argue for two claims: that neurobiological evidence should be used to constrain candidate scientific accounts of altruistic behavior, and that neurobiological techniques can be used to elucidate component mechanisms of altruistic behavior. </p><p>Chapter 1 reviews the historical progression of theories of altruism, and the empirical observations that motivated their development. A distinction is drawn between evolutionary altruism -- any self-sacrificial, fitness-reducing behavior, and psychological altruism -- self-sacrificial behaviors that are caused by psychological states like desire and motivation. Three theories of psychological altruism are described, and it is argued that the crucial difference between these theories is their conceptions of the role of affect in motivation, and how the processes of affect and motivation contribute to psychological altruism.</p><p>Chapter 2 describes dominant theories of motivation and the neurobiological and psychological mechanisms that support motivated behavior. Although the evidence is not conclusive, I argue that our best scientific models and neurobiological evidence support affective models of psychological altruism, and that other models are at best incomplete and possibly implausible in light of neurobiological considerations.</p><p>Chapter 3 introduces mind reading approaches to altruism, which argue that the capacity for altruistic motivations depends upon the capacity to represent the psychological states or circumstances of others. I conclude that altruism requires at a minimum the ability to attribute affective experiences to others. Further, I argue that the representations produced by mind reading processes provide a means for distinguishing between self-regarding and altruistic motivations. In contrast with the dominant philosophical theory of psychological altruism, the mind reading model I propose is compatible with the affective theory of motivation depicted in Chapter 2. My own empirical work is described as an example of how neurobiological techniques can reveal the differential role of neural systems in producing self-regarding and altruistic behavior.</p><p>Chapter 4 departs from the mechanistic approach to altruism discussed in the previous chapters, and presents an overview of how the fields of philosophy, psychology, psychobiology and genetics, have investigated altruism as a stable characteristic or personality trait. Recent technological advances make this a promising approach for investigating the psychological and neurobiological systems supporting altruistic behavior.</p> / Dissertation

The scientific aim which distinguishes applied social psychological research from basic social psychological research is that of using social psychological theory to develop interventions meant to rectify social and practical problems in hopes of fostering a flourishing or thriving social sphere. In developing their interventions, however, many applied social psychologists have failed to consider their pre-investigatory philosophical commitments, commitments which imply the kind of flourishing social life that may come as a result of interventions rooted in them. The aim of this dissertation is to invite applied social psychologists to consider if their frequently noted, yet often unexamined, commitment to psychological egoism (i.e., human nature is inescapably self-interested) and instrumentalism (i.e., human rationality is inherently calculative towards self-interest) imply the kind of thriving social life they truly intend for their interventions to foster, or if other philosophical commitments might allow them to better fulfill that scientific aim. To do this, a comparative analysis is given between the vision of social flourishing implied in psychological egoism and instrumentalism, as illustrated in the prevalent Social Exchange Theory and its interventions, referred to as the modern vision, and an alternate vision implied in the Aristotelian understanding of human nature with its concomitant interventions, referred to as the Aristotelian vision. Overall, this dissertation suggests that the Aristotelian vision of a flourishing social life shies away from the instrumentalizing of human relationships implied by the egoistic vision and thus provides more fertile ground for applied social psychologists to accomplish their aim.

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