Pour commencer mon sujet de thèse est le suivant : « la théorie de la politique budgétaire : du régime de domination monétaire à la crise des dettes souveraines ». L’objet de ma thèse est d’analyser l’évolution théorique de la politique budgétaire de 1980 jusqu’à la crise des dettes souveraines. De ce fait, je dois analyser le statut de la politique budgétaire dans le cadre d’un régime de domination monétaire. Pourquoi la politique budgétaire est sous un régime de domination monétaire ? Pourquoi est-elle considérée comme, inefficace, neutre et inutile (équivalence ricardienne, théorie du revenue permanent, effet d’éviction, incohérence intertemporelle) ? Quelle est dans ce cas l’articulation entre le politique budgétaire et la politique monétaire sous un régime de domination monétaire (la théorie budgétaire du niveau des prix et la théorie des jeux) ? Par ailleurs, lors de la crise de 2008, la politique budgétaire a été mobilisée, à travers la mise en œuvre de plan de relance pour éviter un effondrement des économies avancées. De ce fait, s’agit-il d’un retour de la politique budgétaire comme étant le principal instrument de régulation de la conjoncture économique (un régime de domination budgétaire), ou une exception à la règle (le nouveau consensus macroéconomique est-il remis en cause) ? S’agit-il d’une remise en cause du régime de domination monétaire ? / To begin my thesis topic is the following: "the theory of fiscal policy: from the regime of monetary domination to the crisis of sovereign debt". The object of my thesis is to analyze the theoretical evolution of fiscal policy from 1980 to the crisis of sovereign debt. Therefore, I must analyze the status of fiscal policy within the framework of a regime of monetary dominance. Why is fiscal policy under monetary rule? Why is it considered as inefficient, neutral and unnecessary (Ricardian equivalence, permanent revenue theory, predatory effect, intertemporal incoherence)? What is the relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy under a regime of monetary domination (budgetary price theory and game theory)? Moreover, during the 2008 crisis, fiscal policy was mobilized, through the implementation of a recovery plan to avoid a collapse of advanced economies. Hence, is it a return to fiscal policy as the main instrument for regulating the economic situation (a regime of fiscal dominance), or an exception to the rule (is the new macroeconomic consensus challenged) ? Is this a questioning of the regime of monetary domination?

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:12:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 68495.PDF: 623504 bytes, checksum: eb05af002fc2cb01af5aff8e1bed3f6a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-04-08T00:00:00Z / The work investigates the determinants of the public finances of the Brazilian state governments in the Nineties, staring from the hypothesis that, despite the economic elements will be prominent, the neoclassical conception of management of the public finances is not adequate to treat the fiscal question as a whole, requiring it be understood as a political economy problem. From the analysis of available literature on the subject, a model is considered to investigate the effective importance of noneconomic variables on the public deficit and on the expenses of the Brazilian states. To analyze the influence of the political and institutional variables chosen – the ideology of the party in the state government; ideological coincidence with the party in the federal executive; fragmentation of the political representation of the executive, and of the legislative power; electoral competitiveness; participation of the electorate in the elections; and electoral cycle – the models were estimated through the econometrical technique for panel data, with data of the twenty-six states and the Federal District in the 1990 to 2000 period. To represent the public expenses, it was been used the not financial current expenses divided by the state GDP and to represent the public deficit, the primary fiscal result (not financial expenditures and revenues) divided by the state GDP. For the public expenses, the econometrical work showed up the existence of significant influence of all the proposed variables, while for the primary fiscal result only three variables (electoral cycle, fragmentation of the executive power and ideological coincidence of parties in the state and federal executive) revealed acceptable in statistical terms. / O trabalho investiga os elementos condicionantes das finanças públicas dos governos estaduais brasileiros nos anos noventa, partindo da hipótese de que, a despeito dos elementos econômicos serem relevantes, a concepção neoclássica de gestão das finanças públicas não é adequada para tratar a questão fiscal em toda sua extensão, exigindo que ela seja entendida como um problema de economia política. A partir da análise da literatura disponível sobre o tema, é proposto um modelo para se investigar a importância efetiva de variáveis não econômicas sobre o déficit público e sobre os gastos dos estados brasileiros. Para analisar a influência das variáveis políticas e institucionais escolhidas ¿ ideologia do partido no governo estadual, coincidência ideológica com o partido no poder executivo federal, fragmentação da representação política do poder executivo, e do poder legislativo, grau de competitividade eleitoral, participação do eleitorado no pleito e ciclo eleitoral os modelos foram estimados através da técnica econométrica para dados de painel, com dados dos vinte e seis estados e Distrito Federal no período de 1990 a 2000. Para representar os gastos públicos foram utilizadas as despesas correntes não financeiras divididas pelo PIB estadual e para representar o déficit público, o resultado fiscal primário (despesas e receitas não financeiras) dividido pelo PIB estadual. Para os gastos públicos o trabalho econométrico evidenciou a existência de influência significativa de todas as variáveis propostas, enquanto para o resultado fiscal primário, apenas as variáveis: ciclo eleitoral, fragmentação partidária do poder executivo e coincidência ideológica de partidos no poder executivo estadual e federal mostraram-se estatisticamente aceitáveis.