Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-101).

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-101). Also available in print.

Why do some businesspeople run for political office, while others do not? Sending directors into elected office is one of the most powerful but also resource-intensive ways firms can influence policymaking. Although legislative bodies are populated with businesspeople in countries worldwide, we know little about which firms decide to invest in this unique type of nonmarket strategy. In response, I argue that businesspeople run for elected office when (1) they cannot trust that the politicians they lobby will represent their interests and (2) their firms have the resources available to contest elections. My theory predicts the probability of politician shirking (reneging on their promises) depends on whether rival firms have representatives in parliament and political parties are capable of enforcing informal quid pro quo agreements. Evidence to test my arguments comes from an original dataset of 8,829 firms connected to candidates to regional legislatures in Russia from 2004-2011. I find that both greater oligopolistic competition and weaker political parties incentivize businessperson candidacy, while the ability to cover campaign costs depends on the level of voter income and firm size. Do firms with directors holding elected political office then benefit from political connections? Using the same dataset but restricting the analysis to elections in single-member districts, I next employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of gaining political ties, comparing outcomes of firms that are directed by candidates who either won or lost close elections to regional legislatures. I first find that a connection to a winning politician can increase revenue by roughly 60% and profit margins by 15% over their time in office. I then test between different mechanisms potentially explaining the results, finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats and reducing information costs, and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers. Finally, winning a parliamentary seat is more valuable for firms where democratization is greater, but less valuable when firms face acute sector-level competition. This finding suggests that the intensity of economic rivalry, rather than the quality of political institutions, best explains the decision to send a director into public office.

Why do voters change their political behavior after negative events such as natural disasters and crime victimization? The extant literature tends to focus on how citizens punish or reward the incumbent based on a model of (mis)attribution of responsibilities. This approach overlooks the fact that affected voters might change their political preferences after the negative shock. Departing from the existing literature, I argue that affected citizens, in addition to evaluating incumbent performance, are also selecting the political leader they believe can most enhance their well-being after the negative event. In particular, I hold that affected voters focus on improving their living conditions, which leads them to pay attention to the policy issues that can help them achieve that goal. As a consequence, victims are more likely to prefer candidates better able to address these new policy preferences. Under adverse conditions, these individuals will vote for political candidates whom they would not select under other circumstances. In each of the three chapters of this dissertation, I provide evidence to support different aspects of this main argument. In the first chapter, I study the political consequences of natural disasters. According to my theory, citizens affected by catastrophes seek to reduce the gap between their living conditions before and after the disaster. This leads them to focus on welfare and social policies – for example, the construction of new housing. Consequently, they are more inclined to vote for parties or persons associated with those measures, typically left-wing candidates. To test this argument, I use a natural experiment created by flash floods that occurred in Chile in 2015, which produced random variation in exposure to the natural disaster. I then measure voters’ political preferences using a conjoint survey experiment, and find that disaster victims are more likely to prefer left-wing candidates. In addition, grounded in two months of fieldwork in the affected area, I provide qualitative evidence that illustrates how disaster victims emphasize the importance of welfare policies that can improve their standard of living. In the second chapter, I show how disaster victims after the 2010 earthquake in Chile select housing and not infrastructure as a top priority after the catastrophe. These results help us better understand why disaster victims are more likely to vote for left-wing politicians: affected citizens are particularly concerned about the reconstruction of their houses, and in consequence, should be more likely to vote for candidates who can be linked with those specific welfare policies. To study how the earthquake modified victims’ political priorities, I rely on survey data before and after this negative event comparing exposed and unexposed counties. In the third chapter, I study how crime victims change their policy preferences. I show that affected citizens are more likely to support strong-handed measures to reduce crime, such as allowing state repression. These results reveal that exposure to crime can change what people think the state should be allowed to do, which can have important political implications. To study the impact of crime on victims’ preferences, I use panel data from Brazil and I implement strategies for reducing sensitivity to hidden biases, such as focusing on individuals who were not crime victims during a previous wave.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Mississippi State University. Department of Political Science and Public Administration. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2009. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-109). Issued in print and online. Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2008. Graduate Programme in Political Science. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 378-413). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR39007

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-92). Also available in print.

Magister Legum - LLM

Thesis (M.Dev.) --University of Limpopo, 2008 / Aim: Although a lot of money is spent on training in the Office of the Premier, such training programmes are never evaluated to determine the efficacy. Thus it is not clear whether such training improves service delivery or not, and if there is visible improvement, and how much of that improvement was in fact brought about by such training programmes. The aim of the study is to investigate whether employees’ training programmes are aligned with the training needs. Furthermore, the aim is to determine if the compilation of the workplace skills plan is informed by the employees’ skills needs. The National Skills Development Strategy (2005-2010) for the Public Service states that for the public service to succeed in its mandate of providing effective and efficient service delivery to the citizens, the government needs to invest in the training and development of the public service. Participants: A total number of 70 (seventy) officials from the Transversal Human Resources and Corporate Services participated in the study. In addition 7 (seven) managers from these sub branches were interviewed. Instruments: The study used both qualitative and quantitative approaches. For the qualitative approach, the researcher used structured interviews. The quantitative approach involved a data collection procedure based on structured questionnaires administered to both the Transversal Human Resources and Corporate services. Results: The study revealed that training programmes are not always aligned to the employees’ training needs. Although employees indicated their training needs in specific skills, they received training in skills that they did not require, but yet v identified as crucial. The study confirmed that of the two sub-branches, employees from the Corporate services are the ones who receive more training compared to employees from Transversal Human Resources. Conclusion: The study concludes that the development of the skills plan is partially aligned to the training needs of employees in the Office of the Premier. This conclusion is based on the fact that the respondents’ skills were audited in the past two years whereas the skills development plan is compiled and submitted to Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) every year. This study’s conclusion is based on the findings that, the respondents’ skills were not audited this financial year and that in instances where respondents attended training intervention evaluation was never conducted. However, there is the challenge of ensuring that all employees attend some training at least once per year.