Public-to-private (PTP) refers to the strategic action of consciously leaving the stock market. The delisting decision may be made when the benefits of being listed no longer outweigh the costs. The private environment offers multiple benefits firms may be expected to seek post-PTP such as reduced regulations, less quarterly performance pressures and fewer demands on the financial reporting. Such benefits correlate with expected changes made in firms post-PTP. Due to a limited amount of research available upon the topic of PTP, a research gap upon the deliberate changes made post-PTP exists. Family firms differ from non-family firms when making strategic decisions. Therefore, it is expected that the strategic changes made in family firms differ from those in non-family firms. Furthermore, the Continental European context exhibits special characteristics such as high levels of concentrated ownership, characteristics that may be vital for the changes made post-PTP.  The thesis explores deliberate changes made in firms post-PTP, and how these changes might have impacted the delisting decision. This phenomenon is explored within both family and non-family firms in a Swedish context, as a representation of the Continental European market. The research is conducted through a multiple case study. Based on a number of criteria, three case firms are selected as representations of the relevant ownership types within the study. The data collection takes place through eight in-depth interviews with key informants from the selected cases. The results of the data collection are presented through descriptive narratives, supported by secondary data. The data is analysed through within-case and cross-case analysis. The presented data is then further analysed using the literature presented in the frame of reference. Throughout the thesis, a number of changes made post-PTP are presented and discussed, finding great heterogeneity of results among the studied case firms. We find that a strategic delisting decision is mainly connected to firm ownership and financing methods for growth and development. Our findings suggest firms delisting for strategic reasons do not make in-depth changes in the firm post-PTP. Furthermore, we find that there is some connection between the perceived benefits of the private environment and the delisting decision.

: Pourquoi ce tel engouement pour les opérations de Public to Private au cours des dernières années ? Cette question nous a conduits à identifier d'une part les motivations qui incitent les sociétés à sortir de la bourse et à évaluer d'autre part l'impact qu'elles ont sur la richesse des actionnaires. Notre recherche porte sur la période 2000-2007 selon différentes zones géographiques : les Etats-Unis, l'Europe et l'Asie. Elle est organisée en deux parties. La première partie est consacrée au cadre théorique. Une analyse de la mise en place d'une telle opération et son évolution dans le temps font l'objet de notre chapitre 1. La revue de la littérature (chapitre 2) montre les limites de la recherche française et internationale en la matière, ce qui nous a encouragés à développer cette analyse internationale. Ensuite, nous avons formulé dans le chapitre 3, les différentes hypothèses à tester ainsi que la méthodologie employée. La deuxième partie est réservée aux analyses empiriques basées sur les motivations des opérations de Public to Private (chapitre 4). Ces dernières sont déterminées en faisant une comparaison entre l'échantillon de notre étude et un échantillon de contrôle dont ce dernier est constitué de sociétés cotées en bourse. Tous les deux comportent 413 firmes. L'évaluation de la richesse des actionnaires est mesurée par deux indicateurs : la prime et la rentabilité anormale moyenne cumulée (chapitre 5). Ces derniers représenteront les variables dépendantes de notre modèle étudiant l'impact des opérations de Public to Private sur la richesse des actionnaires (chapitre 6). Nos analyses confirment le rôle important de l'économie fiscale, du contrôle au sein de la société, des perspectives de croissance faibles, de la sous-évaluation comme déterminants des sociétés à sortir de la bourse et comme sources de richesse pour les actionnaires.

Cette thèse prend la forme de quatre essais. Elle présente une analyse de la performance ex-post des entreprises européennes qui ont fermé leur capital en le privatisant. Le sujet de la « trajectoire ex-post des Buyouts européennes » est assez vaste, c’est pour cela que nous avons essayé de l’étudier et de l’analyser à travers des perspectives différentes et en utilisant différentes méthodes quantitatives.Au cours de notre étude nous utilisons à la fois des mesures objectifves et perceptuelles pour établir les performances de ces entreprises et pour trouver les raisons pour lesquelles elles ont une meilleure performance. Ce recueil d’essais aborde ces problématiques, assez reliées les unes avec les autres, qui concernent la performance ex-post des sociétés européennes qui ont subi un procès de privatisation de leur capital avec des transactions qui les font passer du domaine publique au domaine privé (PTP). Les trois premiers essais concernent leurs performances économiques ; et les relations de leurs performances financières avec : l'évaluation de l'innovation ; l'application des techniques de gestion comme l’organisation apprenante (LO) ; et la mise en œuvre de la Responsabilité Social des Entreprises (RSE). Le comportement du marché dans quatre pays européens pendant le même période est également étudié dans le quatrième essai. Un comportement grégaire de ces marchés pendant la crise a été observé.Les résultats présentés sont soutenus par des preuves descriptives et quantitatives importantes et substantielles. L'hypothèse sous-jacente commune testée qui est celle que établient les entreprises ayant subi un procès PTP ont de meilleurs résultats dans la période ex-post, et qu’elles obtiennent une meilleure performance dans les champs de l'innovation, des LO et de la RSE, est bien prouvé / This dissertation, takes the form of four essays. It presents an analysis of the ex-post performance of the European companies that have gone private. “Ex-post journey of the European Buyouts” is a broad topic, which we tried to investigate and analyze through different perspectives using different quantitative methods.We have used both objective and perception based measures to dig out the performance and reach out the possible reasons behind their better performance. This collection of essays addresses the research questions, which are much related to each other, concerning the ex-post performance of European companies after public-to-private (PTP) transactions. The first three essays concern their economic performance, and linkage of their financial performance with: the assessment of innovation and application of management techniques like Learning Organization (LO), implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The market behaviour in the Four European countries during the similar period is also investigated in the fourth essay. We found the herd behavior in these markets during crisis.The results presented are supported by large and substantial descriptive and quantitative evidence. The common underlying hypothesis which we wished to test, that PTP firms perform better in the ex-post period and show better on the scales of innovation, LO and CSR, is well

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas / Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-05-21T20:09:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-23T11:37:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-23T11:39:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-23T12:18:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100021.pdf: 1579434 bytes, checksum: 48ff2e28230b8ab64ed6919d82c68a84 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-15 / This study investigates the dynamics of earnings management of Brazilian companies previously to their going private operations in the period of 1999 from 2009. Three main issues are investigated: the type of operation (LBO or Acquisition), the periods in which occur significant manipulation and the legislation change in 2001, which main goal was to cohibit the abusive rebuying of shares by the companies that wanted to go private prior to the going-private operation. The sample is composed of 132 companies that went private from 1999 to 2009 and the data were quarterly collected ranging five years. We found evidence that the sample firms manipulated their earnings approximately two years before going private. Also, some results show that there are differences in the direction of earnings management depending on the type of public-to-private operation: LBOs firms tended to manage their earnings up, as well as the companies that were acquired by their controlling firms, while the other acquisitions showed signs of downward manipulations. Finally, we found evidence that the legislation change in 2001 not only might have changed the pattern of firm´s manipulation but has also increased earnings management right after its effective date. / Esse trabalho investiga a dinâmica da manipulação de resultados de empresas brasileiras que fecharam o capital no período de 1999 a 2009. Dentre os fatores investigados estão o tipo de fechamento (OPA, aquisição, aquisição por controladoras), o período de manipulação e a mudança que a Lei nº 10.303/2001 (cujo objetivo era coibir o fechamento branco de capital) teria sobre o gerenciamento. A amostra utilizada é composta de 132 empresas que realizaram o fechamento no período citado, sendo o ciclo de dados coletado para cada empresa de vinte trimestres. Foram achados indícios de que essas empresas manipularam seus ganhos aproximadamente dois anos antes de seu fechamento. Além disso, foram encontradas evidências de diferença de direção de manipulação para os tipos de fechamento: empresas cujos fechamentos ocorreram através de OPA, assim como as que sofreram aquisição por suas controladoras, tenderiam a manipular seus ganhos para baixo, enquanto que as demais aquisições se caracterizariam por terem seus resultados adulterados para cima. Por fim, foram achados indícios de que a Lei nº 10.303/2001 tenha alterado o comportamento de manipulação contábil das empresas e de que houve um aumento de manipulação logo em seguida à sua vigência.