In this study I tackle the problem of justifying criminal punishment. Although I take heed of a traditional line of theorizing which says that punishment is an expressive and communicative endeavour, my theory breaks away from traditional approaches. This break is motivated by a recognition that theorists working in the traditional framework have failed to resolve the tension between retributivist and consequentialist reasons for punishment. I argue that punishment is justified as a type of communication from those affected by the crime to distinct and varied audiences. My naturalistic theory is structured around two fundamental themes, naturalism and pluralism about aims. The naturalism consists in the fact that the theory takes an empirically informed descriptive approach to the problem of justifying punishment. This foundation provides the resources for developing a balanced view of the moral agent which takes into account not only cognitive but also emotional capacities. This broader, deeper view of agency permits, indeed calls for, an analysis of the moral psychologies of those involved in the social practice. That analysis leads to the explanation that punishment is a type of communication of, among other things, strong but justified moral sentiments. Further development of this view suggests that punishment's various messages are intended for a variety of audiences - not just the wrongdoer but also the victim and community. That explication supports my other fundamental theme, pluralism about aims. The social institution of punishment is a complex one involving stakeholders who have differing motives and needs. Consequently, we should reject strategies which claim that punishment's justification can be reduced to one reason such as, for example, that the criminal deserves it. I argue that punishment's justification is multifaceted and complex. The arguments I put forward to justify punishment also bring to light aspects of the existing social institution that need reform. In general, they point to the need to design penal measures that promote communication among wrongdoer, victim and community. But I also call for a specific reform. I argue that the victim, whose concerns have traditionally been disregarded, should also be given a voice within the social institution.

In this study I tackle the problem of justifying criminal punishment. Although I take heed of a traditional line of theorizing which says that punishment is an expressive and communicative endeavour, my theory breaks away from traditional approaches. This break is motivated by a recognition that theorists working in the traditional framework have failed to resolve the tension between retributivist and consequentialist reasons for punishment. I argue that punishment is justified as a type of communication from those affected by the crime to distinct and varied audiences. My naturalistic theory is structured around two fundamental themes, naturalism and pluralism about aims. The naturalism consists in the fact that the theory takes an empirically informed descriptive approach to the problem of justifying punishment. This foundation provides the resources for developing a balanced view of the moral agent which takes into account not only cognitive but also emotional capacities. This broader, deeper view of agency permits, indeed calls for, an analysis of the moral psychologies of those involved in the social practice. That analysis leads to the explanation that punishment is a type of communication of, among other things, strong but justified moral sentiments. Further development of this view suggests that punishment's various messages are intended for a variety of audiences - not just the wrongdoer but also the victim and community. That explication supports my other fundamental theme, pluralism about aims. The social institution of punishment is a complex one involving stakeholders who have differing motives and needs. Consequently, we should reject strategies which claim that punishment's justification can be reduced to one reason such as, for example, that the criminal deserves it. I argue that punishment's justification is multifaceted and complex. The arguments I put forward to justify punishment also bring to light aspects of the existing social institution that need reform. In general, they point to the need to design penal measures that promote communication among wrongdoer, victim and community. But I also call for a specific reform. I argue that the victim, whose concerns have traditionally been disregarded, should also be given a voice within the social institution. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

My aim in this thesis is to examine whether there are some mitigating factors, i.e. reasons to punish an offender less for his crime than an otherwise similar offender (other than that the offender suffered from mental disorder or disturbance or other forms of irrationality at the time of offence), that are more applicable to socially deprived offenders than to non-socially deprived offenders. I will answer the thesis question through a critical examination of twelve arguments for claiming that there is a mitigating factor that is more applicable to socially deprived offenders, each proposing a different mitigating factor. My conclusions are as follows: (1) Most of the arguments that I examine fail, i.e. they either fail to highlight a genuine mitigating factor, or we do not have much evidence that the mitigating factor highlighted by the argument has a greater applicability to socially deprived offenders than to non-socially deprived offenders. (2) However, one argument, which can be called the no violation of natural duties argument, is successful. (3) Moreover, the improvement of the worst off argument, an argument that is not often discussed in the literature, is particularly noteworthy. If my discussion about that argument is correct, then even if, as I will argue, the mitigating factor highlighted by that argument may not be more applicable to socially deprived offenders than to non-socially deprived offenders, the remaining parts of that argument would still have profound influence on punishment in our unjust societies.

The purpose of this study was to develop a survey that would provide professionals with an idea as to the thoughts, feelings, and values that social workers held regarding physical punishment towards a child. Social workers stand in a position to intervene in the intergenerational transmission of violence.