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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Realismus und Semantik bei Putnam /

Burri, Alex. January 1991 (has links)
Diss. phil.-hist. Bern (kein Austausch).
2

Referenz und Fallibilismus : zu Hilary Putnams pragmatischem Kognitivismus /

Mueller, Axel. January 2001 (has links)
Diss.--Universität Frankfurt am Main, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 441-449. Index.
3

Die Sprachphilosophie Hilary Putnams /

Noske, Rainer, January 1900 (has links)
Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Bonn--Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1995.
4

Understanding at limits : the relevance of learning in the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Putnam /

Doğuoğlu, Ulvi. January 1900 (has links)
Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2005.
5

Putnam on naturalism and metaphysics : the possibility of rational, objective and non-scientific knowledge

Coates, Ashley Stephen 28 February 2012 (has links)
M.A.
6

Análisis de las versiones de funcionalismo en Hilary Putnam

Bravo Lizana, Rubén January 2008 (has links)
El presente informe tiene por objetivo comprender el surgimiento del funcionalismo como teoría, y desde allí, abordar qué ocurre en su desarrollo, para llegar a delinear las razones que pudo haber tenido Putnam para abandonar el funcionalismo, planteando como opción el sociofuncionalismo, que, desde su génesis, ya no es una teoría plausible. El afán es el de unir cabos en el cambio de perspectiva que se puede leer en los textos de Hilary Putnam, quien formaliza el funcionalismo para llegar a convertirse con el tiempo en uno de sus más ávidos críticos.
7

Putnam et la critique de la dichotomie fait/valeur : la critique de quoi au juste?

Corriveau-Dussault, Antoine 13 April 2018 (has links)
"Hilary Putnam conteste vivement ce qu'il appelle la "dichotomie fait/valeur". Il nuance toutefois en avoir contre une dichotomie fait/valeur, mais pas contre une distinction fait/valeur. Le problème est que Putnam n'est jamais clair sur la différence qu'il perçoit entre "distinction" et "dichotomie" fait/valeur. Cela a pour conséquence que le lecteur qui reconnaît la force des arguments de Putnam ne sait pas trop ce à quoi il doit renoncer après sa lecture. J'entreprends dans ce mémoire de lever cette ambiguïté. En exposant et analysant les principaux arguments de Putnam, et en tirant ensuite les conséquences qui en découlent, je détermine quel impact ceux-ci ont sur la distinction fait/valeur telle qu'elle est habituellement employée. Cela me permet de constater que l'impact réel des arguments de Putnam sur la distinction fait/valeur est très faible."
8

A case for epistemological realism.

Cook, Victoria Bancroft. January 1998 (has links)
A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts / The Epistemological Realist (ER)project, recently initiated by John McDowell in Mind and World and Hilary Putnam in his 1994 series of Dewey Lectures, is an extremely promising one. This project aims to show how a 'commonsense realism' about the world and our relationship to it can be made tenable in a philosophical climate increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. At least part of the reason for the prevalence of anti-realism is the unsatisfactory way in which realism has traditionally been developed. Epistemological Realism departs from Traditional Realism in at least three key areas: (a) its account of how perception enables empirical knowledge, (b) its account of perception itself and (c) its account of how our empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. The ability of the ER theorist to give perfectly satisfactory accounts of (a)-(c) does much to reinstate 'commonsense realism' as a philosophically respectable position. Epistemological Realism 'commonsense realism' Traditional Realism antirealism perception empirical knowledge reality John McDowell Mind and World Hilary Putnam / AC2017
9

Forgetting foundationalism /

Wellon, Christopher, January 1997 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.), Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998. / Bibliography: leaves 130-131.
10

The semantic role of narrow content hope for Swampman /

Saint, Nicholas. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

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