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This paper analyzes the the past and current security landscape in Northeast Asia with particular emphasis on the Korean Peninsula and the United States' involvement there. The paper assess policy successes and failures and presents several new policy options. The proposals include economic and diplomatic solutions to encourage the normalization of relations on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea twice conducted ballistic missile tests close to Japan in 1998 and 2006. While Japan responded with non-coercive condemnations to demonstrate its disapproval in 1998, it imposed unilateral economic sanctions in 2006, marking the first instance in post-World War II of applying a substantial coercion to punish a neighbouring state. The research asks why Japanese policy toward the North shifted for a seemingly identical type of provocation. The dissertation seeks contextual explanations by using inductive process-tracing, a type of ‘middle approach’ between historical narratives and parsimonious theories. It is applied to highlight the underlying mechanism through which public discursive changes concerning national security and North Korea during this eight-year period influenced the subsequent policy shift in 2006. The dissertation concludes that the unilateral sanctions were not necessarily a calculated strategic response to punish the missile launch (or North Korean nuclear programs) per se, but were a direct consequence of a deeper shift in societal discourse taking place beforehand. During the eight-year period, there had been other visible provocations and shocks originating from the North, especially the sensational revelation in 2002 of past North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. These highly-publicized incidents facilitated the Japanese public to be increasingly conscious about Japan’s security weaknesses and re-evaluate its historical relations with its neighbour, leading to a hardened domestic environment in which the new idea of pressuring the North became a feasible option even before 2006. These North Korean provocations and the resulting societal security discourse, along with concurrent structural changes in the Japanese government and mass media which made them both highly susceptible to discursive currents among citizens, mutually interacted to produce the policy result when the opportunity arose. The research, however, also challenges the popular view that the sanctions are the first example of the wholesale transformation of Japan’s post-war ‘pacifist’ security principles. It argues that the confined means (economic) by which the sanctions were imposed reflects the highly nuanced discourse, which endorses Japan’s legitimate right to specifically punish the North for the harms done, but that the societal momentum is not equally supportive of the more controversial areas concerning military usage and the current constitution.

North Korea twice conducted ballistic missile tests close to Japan in 1998 and 2006. While Japan responded with non-coercive condemnations to demonstrate its disapproval in 1998, it imposed unilateral economic sanctions in 2006, marking the first instance in post-World War II of applying a substantial coercion to punish a neighbouring state. The research asks why Japanese policy toward the North shifted for a seemingly identical type of provocation. The dissertation seeks contextual explanations by using inductive process-tracing, a type of ‘middle approach’ between historical narratives and parsimonious theories. It is applied to highlight the underlying mechanism through which public discursive changes concerning national security and North Korea during this eight-year period influenced the subsequent policy shift in 2006. The dissertation concludes that the unilateral sanctions were not necessarily a calculated strategic response to punish the missile launch (or North Korean nuclear programs) per se, but were a direct consequence of a deeper shift in societal discourse taking place beforehand. During the eight-year period, there had been other visible provocations and shocks originating from the North, especially the sensational revelation in 2002 of past North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. These highly-publicized incidents facilitated the Japanese public to be increasingly conscious about Japan’s security weaknesses and re-evaluate its historical relations with its neighbour, leading to a hardened domestic environment in which the new idea of pressuring the North became a feasible option even before 2006. These North Korean provocations and the resulting societal security discourse, along with concurrent structural changes in the Japanese government and mass media which made them both highly susceptible to discursive currents among citizens, mutually interacted to produce the policy result when the opportunity arose. The research, however, also challenges the popular view that the sanctions are the first example of the wholesale transformation of Japan’s post-war ‘pacifist’ security principles. It argues that the confined means (economic) by which the sanctions were imposed reflects the highly nuanced discourse, which endorses Japan’s legitimate right to specifically punish the North for the harms done, but that the societal momentum is not equally supportive of the more controversial areas concerning military usage and the current constitution.

<p>This project examines the events from 1866 to 1871 in Korea between the United States and Joseon, with a specific focus on the 1866 <i>General Sherman</i> Incident and the United States Expedition to Korea in 1871. The project also examines the present memory of those events in the United States and North and South Korea. This project shows that contemporary American reactions to the events in Korea from 1866 to 1871 were numerous and ambivalent in what the American role should be in Korea. In the present, American memory of 1866 to 1871 has largely been monopolized by the American military, with the greater American collective memory largely forgetting this period. </p> <p>In the Koreas, collective memory of the five-year crisis (1866 to 1871) is divided along ideological lines. In North Korea, the victories that Korea achieved against the United States are used as stories to reinforce the North Korean line on the United States, as well as reinforcing the legitimacy of the Kim family. In South Korea, the narrative focuses on the corruption of Joseon and the Daewongun and the triumph of a “modernizing” Korean state against anti-western hardliners, and is more diverse in how the narrative is told, ranging from newspapers to K-Dramas, leading to a more complicated collective memory in the South. </p> <p>This Thesis shows that understanding the impact that the first state-to-state encounters had on the American-Korean relationship not only at the time but also in the present, is key to analyzing the complicated history of the Korean-American relationship writ large.</p>