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Essays in International TradeJiatong Zhong (6997745) 16 August 2019 (has links)
<div>The first chapter quantitatively examines the impact of exporting countries' reputations for product quality on aggregate trade flows. I introduce a novel data set in which recall incidences retrieved from the Consumer Product Safety Commission are matched to U.S. import data from 1990-2009. Using a model of learning I construct a measure for exporter reputation where consumers internalize product recalls as bad signals. Structural estimation of the model finds that reputation is important and especially impactful for products used by children. The market share elasticity of exporter's reputation is around 1.49 across products, similar in magnitude to the average price elasticity, which is around 1.51. Improving reputation can increase export value, but reputation is sluggish: increasing reputation by 10\% can take decades for most exporters. Counterfactual exercises confirm that quality inspection institutions are welfare improving, and quality inspection is especially important for consumers of toys. </div><div> </div><div> The second chapter summarizes the correlation between export decisions of Chinese firms and product recalls for Chinese products. I use a new data set where I link recall data scraped from CPSC to monthly Chinese Customs Data. I found that recalls from previous months correlates negatively with the decision of export participation, but not with export value. </div><div> </div><div><br></div><div> The third chapter, coauthored with Kendall Kennedy and Xuan Jiang, analyzes how China's industrialization and the immediate export growth due to the Open Door Policy change Chinese teenagers' education decisions, which explains the education decline. We find that, middle school completion rates increased and high school completion rates decreased in response to export growth. This suggests a tradeoff between education and labor market opportunities in China. These education effects are more prominent for cohorts who were younger when China's Open Door Policy began, even though these teenagers also faced a stronger education system compared to the earlier cohorts. </div>
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The Effects of Quality Uncertainty on the Choice of Timing of RewardsNilsson, Max, Dahl, Axel January 2017 (has links)
Background- Today online subscription based information products are becoming all the more common. A lot of them are using a immediate reward to compensate the quality uncertainty customer's experience. Even though an immediate reward creates a lot of customer attraction, some services today struggle with customer retention. Purpose- The purpose of this study is to examine how timing of rewards and quality uncertainty affects the choice of products. Method- For this study, four different surveys were conducted all representing one condition each. The survey was distributed to a total of 120 industrial workers from two different companies. A deductive reasoning lay as foundation for the construction of surveys. Result- Our result shows that under specific circumstances an immediate-and-delayed reward is preferable over an immediate reward alone. Also, when it comes to customer retention, a immediate-and-delayed reward is better at retaining customers when quality uncertainty becomes a factor. Conclusion- If customers have a reward upcoming, it is less likely they switch to the uncertain service even if there are an immediate reward present for the competing service. If they are going to switch service and have to give up their upcoming reward, they demand a significantly better quality at the competing service. Delimitations- This study focuses on the effects of timing of reward and quality uncertainty when customers choose or switch to an online subscription based information product. The study isolates timing of reward and quality uncertainty as major drivers for affecting purchase behaviour. / Bakgrund- Idag blir abonnemangsbaserade informationsprodukter allt vanligare. Många av dem använder en omedelbar belöning för att kompensera för kundens kvalitetsosäkerhet. Trots att en omedelbar belöning skapar stor kundattraktion, klarar flertalet av tjänsterna idag inte av att behålla kunder i samma utsträckning. Syfte- Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka hur timing av belöningar och kvalitetsosäkerhet påverkar valet av produkter. Metod- För denna studie genomfördes fyra olika enkätundersökningar med olika villkor. Undersökningen distribuerades till totalt 120 industriarbetare från två olika företag. Ett deduktiv resonemang låg som grund för utformandet av enkäterna. Resultat- Vårt resultat visar att under specifika omständigheter skulle en omedelbar-ochuppskjuten belöning vara att föredra framför enbart en omedelbar belöning. När det gäller att bibehålla kunder är det emellertid en omedelbar-och-uppskjuten belöning som bättre bibehåller kunder om kvalitetsosäkerhet är en faktor. Slutsats- Om kunderna har en kommande belöning, är det mindre troligt att de byter till tjänsten med osäker kvalité även om det finns en omedelbar belöning hos den konkurrerande tjänsten. Om de dock ska byta tjänst och måste ge upp sin kommande belöning, kräver de en betydligt bättre kvalitet vid den konkurrerande tjänsten. Avgränsningar- Denna studie fokuserar på effekterna av timing av belöning och kvalitetsosäkerhet när kunder väljer eller byter till en abonnemangsbaserad informationsprodukt. Studien isolerar timing av belöningar och kvalitetsosäkerhet som viktiga faktorer som påverkar köpbeteendet.
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Selected or Rejected? : Assessing Aspiring Writers’ Attempts to Achieve PublicationFürst, Henrik January 2017 (has links)
In many markets for cultural goods, gatekeepers select the cultural goods, relatively few cultural goods are selected, and the criteria for selection are unclear to both artists and gatekeepers. Not knowing whether cultural goods are of the 'right' quality to be selected, artists and gatekeepers become preoccupied with handling quality uncertainty. This thesis studies such handling of quality uncertainty before, during, and after aspiring writers attempt to succeed in the publishing market. Drawing on eighty interviews with mainly aspiring writers and publishers in Sweden, three papers investigate three phases of handling quality uncertainty in the publishing market. First, in attempting to get published, writers handled uncertainty about how the quality of their work would be evaluated in the publishing market by using appraisal devices: trusted, knowledgeable appraisals of their work’s chances of success or failure on the publishing market. Second, publishers responded to uncertainty about the quality of manuscripts by learning to consider means before ends, such that certain qualities of their reading experience became the necessary means for realizing that the manuscript might be publishable. This realization moved the manuscript from the discovery phase to justification phase, in which publishers made a final decision to select or reject the manuscript. Third, for the rejected writer, the uncertainty of not knowing how the publisher had determined the quality of the manuscript made it possible to excuse the course of events. Writers gave reasons why their manuscript had been rejected based on how they imagined publishers had determined its quality. They accepted the occurrence of failure but dismissed the responsibility for having failed. Writers also engaged in justifications, refusals, and concessions of the perceived failure. These concepts for analyzing the publishing market are based on a perspective that takes into account subjectivity, temporality, and the condition of quality uncertainty. The perspective and concepts are useful for understanding other market situations in the cultural industries, wherein the successful hiring of cultural workers and the acquisition of cultural goods are rare relative to the number of aspirants, and wherein assessments are conditioned by quality uncertainty that needs to be handled. / ERC 263699-CEV
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