This dissertation investigates the impact that a duopoly of a multinational firm and local firm has on a closed economy as they engage in Bertrand competition involving quality and price. It answers the question: Does helping a minor firm reduce welfare? Using a different framework than the existing literature, I examine the following: 1. The welfare effect of a reduction in the R\&D cost parameter induced by ``help'' from the government to one of the firms within a closed economy. 2. The effects of government policy instruments (taxes or subsidies) on welfare considering different ownership of the firms and trade pattern - closed economy and export-oriented economy as government institutes a unilateral policy, discriminatory policy, or non-discriminatory policy. 3. How marginal cost of production of the local firm affects welfare within a closed economy when all consumers are either served or partially-served. In chapter 1, we provide a review of past literature that have studied the endogenous choice of quality by firms and describe how this dissertation is organized. In chapter 2, we examine effect on national welfare from competition in quality between a multinational firm and a local firm operating in a vertically differentiated oligopolistic industry given their strategic use of R\&D costs without any possibility of spillover effects. The model assumes that the multinational firm produces high quality product and the local firm produces low quality product. Both firms have zero marginal production cost. Assuming a closed-economy, we determine the effect of a change in the local firm's R\&D cost parameter on the endogenous variables (prices and qualities) as well as national welfare. We found that a reduction in the cost parameter of the local firm do increase national welfare. Chapter 3 extends the work of Chapter 2. It investigates the incentives to a government for instituting strategic trade policy (unilateral, discriminatory or non-discriminatory) mechanism that would induce R\&D within the duopoly of a multinational and local firms and thereby promote national welfare, under varying assumptions with respect to the ownership structure of the firms and their trade patterns. It determines which policy mechanism would be socially optimal to strategically affect the quality of the target firm (local). We find under an open-economy situation when government policy is unilateral, the optimal policy tool to pursue is a subsidy for the local firm. When the economy is partially-closed, it is optimal for the government to tax the local firm. Besides, under a discriminatory policy mechanism, it is best for government to subsidize the local firm and tax the foreign firm when both export to a third country. However, if both sell to a third country, but profit is retained in the domestic economy, it becomes optimal for the government to tax the local firm. Under a non-discriminatory policy by government when the firms operate within an open-economy, the optimal tool is a tax policy for government that affects both firms. Moreover, when the firms operate within a partially closed-economy, the optimal policy is also a tax policy on both firms. Whereas, given a non-discriminatory policy under a closed-economy framework, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the firms. As a result, these mechanisms by government do promote social welfare as well as correct any distortion that might result into making the multinational firm having a significant market power within the industry. In Chapter 4, we relax the assumption of Chapter 2 that the firms have zero production cost. The duopoly is considered to operate under the condition that one of the firms (local firm) has a production cost disadvantage. The firms are assumed to served the entire market. Hence, the firms compete within a fully covered market scenario. Considering a variable unit (constant marginal) cost of production of the local firm, we determine the effect of an increase in production cost of the local firm on national (total) welfare. We find that within a closed-economy, due to strategic substitutability of the products of both firms, an increase in the marginal cost of production by the local firm would bring about reduction in national social welfare. Chapter 5 continues our welfare analysis. It assumes the firms have asymmetric production costs. The cost of production depends on investment in R\&D to produce an output of quality, $q_i$. Now, we do not associate the output quality to a specific firm in the beginning of our analysis. Notwithstanding, we assume the firms are required to meet a minimum quality standard in the industry. Then, we seek to find the effect of the marginal cost of production of the local firm on national welfare. We find unlike previous chapters, an increase in marginal cost of production by the local firm results into increase benefits to consumers. Hence, national social welfare is improved (positive).

生技產業乃二十一世紀的十大重要產業之第一位，而台灣雄厚電子產業的發展根基，非常適合發展生物科技領域中之醫療器材產業，而電子醫療器材產品與一般電子產品最大的不同處，在於產品開發期較長，尤其在驗證與確效上的作業最為繁複，往往臨床驗證所花費的資源比實際開發設計工作更多，除少數家用電子醫療器材產品外，皆具少量多樣之產品特性，以台灣在電子產業研發技術的實力，加上業界快速應變能力，公、私部門若能投入更多資源，則產業榮景可期。 基於產業特性之不同，歷年來有許多有關作業基礎成本制產業別適用性之研究，但卻少有對醫療器材產業之適用有深入的研究。因此本研究將經由個案實例，建構與導入作業基礎成本制度，確認作業基礎成本制度是否適用於醫療器材產業，並探討醫療器材產業研發部門導入作業基礎成本制度時之相關事項。 本研究擬以國內某一上市櫃之醫療電子廠商為研究對象，以個案研究之方式，探討以下主題: 1. 作業基礎成本制度是否適用於醫療器材產業。 2. 為個案公司研發管理流程建構作業基礎成本制度。 3. 經由建構與導入作業基礎成本制度嘗試分析找出最佳動因之方法與相關應注意事項。 4. 經由建構與導入作業基礎成本制度分析動因選定與資料收集效率之間的平衡取捨。 / Biotechnology is at the apex of the top-ten industries list of the 21st century. The profound foundation of electronics in Taiwan is suitable for the development of medical equipment industry in the field of biotechnology. Long product development time is the trait that separates electronic medical products from electronics (consumer, IT ,etc) , especially, the complicated and lengthy validation and certification process. The process of clinical testing consumes more resources in comparison to actual product development and design. Except for homecare device, medical equipment is small in volume and big in diversity. In addition to R&D capability and quick response to market, Taiwan’s electronics industry will be able to achieve more if additional resources are invested. Each industry is unique in its own way. There are many studies furnished on activity-based costing system of various industries ,but they are lacking for medical equipment industry. It is the attempt of this research to construct and introduce activity-based costing system with a case study in order to confirm whether the activity-based costing system is applicable for medical equipment industry and what the influences of activity-based costing system on medical equipment industry. 1. Whether the activity-based costing system is applicable for medical equipment industry or not? 2. Construct an activity-based costing system for R&D management procedure of the subject in this research. 3. Try to analyze and seek for the best driver by constructing and introducing an activity-based costing system. 4. Try to analyze the balance between driver selection and data collection efficiency by constructing and introducing an activity-based costing system.