(no abstract available) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

In order to find out why energy-not-supplied in Norway - the most important indicator for the quality of service in the quality-regulation regime there - decreased more pronounced before the introduction of quality-regulation in 2001 than after it, we develop a dynamic quality-DEA-model and apply it to a representative sample of distribution-net operators. Our model enables us to calculate a counter-factual and thus to tentatively answer the question: What would have happened, had there been no quality-regulation? This way we find strong evidence that the quality-regulation in Norway did not have an effect on the behavior of the firms. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

We investigate empirically the usefulness of price-cap and quality regulation in terms of allocative efficiency and welfare. An analytical framework allows us to determine sufficient conditions for an increase in welfare. We propose Malmquist productivity indices and their decomposition to check the conditions and to see whether it was a better-solved trade off between quality and costs that caused the welfare increase. The application of this method to a representative sample of Norwegian distribution system operators yields strong evidence for a positive effect of quality regulation on welfare. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

Fiber-deployment of telecommunications networks is currently a great challenge for sector-specific regulators, national governments, as well as for investing operators. One of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether the emerging next generation access (NGA) infrastructure should be subjected to cost-based access regulation or whether at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations ("regulatory holidays") should be granted. In answering this question we examine the current and foreseeable EU regulatory framework and show that it does not provide positive incentives for NGA deployment and increasing penetration rates. On the basis of an international comparison with the most recent data on NGA deployment and penetration, it appears, in turn, that deregulatory and/or state aid driven approaches targeted at the demand (subscribers) and supply side (coverage) are more promising. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

We estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and (national) calls services for private users and cross-price elasticities to mobile using time series data from 2002-2007 from the Austrian market. Using instrumental variable estimates and taking into account the possibility of cointegration we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation. / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics