• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 1
  • 1
  • Tagged with
  • 4
  • 4
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Tokyo calling : Japanese overseas broadcasting 1937-1945

Robbins, Jane M. J. January 1998 (has links)
Although largely ignored by Western historians, Japanese overseas radio propaganda during World War Two was sophisticated and wide-ranging. Regular overseas radio broadcasting began in Japan in 1935, after several European powers had already begun such services. Following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, research into short-wave radio broadcasting was expanded, and after Japan left the League of Nations in 1933, overseas radio was considered essential to present the Japanese government's views abroad. Radio Tokyo broadcasts began in Japanese and English and were initially directed at the United States. Other languages were soon added and the range of broadcasts extended to Europe, South America and the Pacific region. At its height in 1944, Radio Tokyo broadcast to fifteen transmission regions in thirty-three languages. In addition, Japanese-controlled short-wave stations broadcast from fifteen Asian cities under Japanese occupation Themes used in broadcasts varied according to the war situation and the target country. However, certain common themes were used in broadcasts throughout the war, and to most regions. The Japanese analysis of the war situation often formed the central element of news broadcasts, and reconstruction in occupied regions under Japanese administration was frequently emphasised to indicate the benevolence of Japanese rule. Within Asia, independence from colonial rule was advocated, whilst in broadcasts to the enemy the strength of Japanese combat forces was emphasised. Entertainment programmes were developed gradually from 1935. Most such broadcasts were based on Japanese domestic broadcasts and consisted of serious talks, news and some classical music. It was recognised that this was not the format of popular Western broadcasts and several attempts were made to lighten the output of Radio Tokyo. It was allowed to play jazz music, which was banned within Japan, but it was only by using prisoners-of-war in the production of programmes that the Japanese created truly ''Western-style'' broadcasts. This thesis traces the development of Japanese overseas broadcasting from the first experimental broadcasts to the closure of Radio Tokyo by the American occupation forces in 1945. It also analyses the common themes of radio broadcasts in the China Incident and Pacific War and to assess how successful they were as propaganda. The thesis concludes that Japanese overseas radio propaganda was both sophisticated and flexible in its approaches. It showed little resemblance to the propaganda of Nazi Germany, but more to the propaganda of the wartime B.B.C. Many of its broadcasts contained a high degree of "truth," albeit "selective truth," favourable to Japan. The exception was the propaganda issued by the Army and Navy Ministries, which showed little of the sophistication of regular broadcast material.
2

On the Crest of a (Short) Wave: The Rise and Fall of International Radio Broadcasting

Dunn, Robert L. 18 May 2007 (has links)
Since 1927 international broadcasters have spanned oceans and transcended borders through the use of shortwave radio. In the beginning of the 21st century, some longtime shortwave stations have sharply cut back their English language services, particularly to North America and the Pacific region; at least one station has signed off forever. This paper examines the history of shortwave broadcasting--how it came to be, how it was used and by whom. Through interviews with broadcasters and listeners, it also explores the nature of the shortwave "experience"--especially how shortwave listening is different from listening to other media. Finally, this paper looks at what forces have precipitated such rapid and drastic changes in an 80-year old medium, why some adherents say new technologies are not necessarily suitable substitutes for shortwave, and what the near future holds for international radio broadcasting.
3

From World War to Cold War: Music in US-Korea Relations, 1941-1960

Park, Hye-jung 24 June 2019 (has links)
No description available.
4

Der „Charakter" des deutschen Feindes

Amr, Firas 25 July 2016 (has links)
Der Zweite Weltkrieg war von neuer Technik und damit auch von neuen Möglichkeiten in der Propaganda und Psychologischen Kriegsführung geprägt. Speziell in der britisch-deutschen Auseinandersetzung wurden aus den Erfahrungen des Ersten Weltkrieges neue Konzepte entwickelt, mit denen eine Manipulierung feindlicher Soldaten und Zivilisten ermöglicht werden sollte. Die Dissertation setzt sich mit den Mentalitäts- bzw. Charaktereinschätzungen der Deutschen aus Sicht der britischen Akteure auseinander, die für eine effiziente Propaganda und Psychologische Kriegsführung gegen das sogenannte ''Dritte Reich'' sorgen sollten. Die oftmals präzisen Einschätzungen der Propagandisten, teils auch unter Verwendung psychologischer und psychiatrischer Dossiers hatten jedoch nicht immer den gewünschten Effekt. Auch aus diesem Grund wurden neue Strategien im Rahmen der sogenannten ''schwarzen'' Propaganda entwickelt, die den Gegner in den Grundfesten seiner Seele erschüttern sollte (und zu Teilerfolgen führte). Auch wenn die Briten auf beeindruckende Art und Weise die Deutschen hinsichtlich politischer, sozialer, religiöser oder lokaler Zugehörigkeit analysierten und Versuche unternommen wurden, diese Gruppen anhand dieser vermeintlichen Schwächen zu manipulieren, wurde nie das Ziel erreicht, via der Provokation von Differenzen innerhalb der Bevölkerung oder zwischen Bevölkerung und NS-Regime den Krieg zu verkürzen. Dabei ist die britische Effizienz im Einzelnen wiederum schwer messbar, festzustellen ist jedoch eindeutig, dass die britischen Propaganda-Maßnahmen keinen durchschlagenden Erfolg hatten, da die Autorität des NS-Regime zu keinem Zeitpunkt durch Massenaufstände oder Meutereien bzw. Massendesertionen an der Front gefährdet waren. Im Großen und Ganzen war die Entwicklung der mentalitätsorientierten ''geistigen Kriegsführung'' ein beeindruckendes Kapitel der britischen Geschichte, jedoch ohne messbare Auswirkung auf den Kriegsverlauf bzw. seiner Verkürzung. / The beginning of the Second World War imposed a new kind of warfare on the battlefield. The progress of radio and flight techniques permitted measures to manipulate the enemy with a combination of propaganda and psychological warfare. Furthermore, an analysis of his character was needed to spot the weak points in German psychology, to support the enemy population and soldiers in enmity towards their own government and to the war and to induce political uprising, sabotage and desertion. But the economic rebirth of Germany had created a strong connection between the Germans and Hitler, that would not be easy to weaken. British attempts to manipulate the German mind were wholly unsuccessful. Even the best analysis, very often close to the truth, could not jeopardize the efforts of Nazi propaganda, that drummed successfully into the German mind that the intentions of the Allied forces would be to destroy and enslave Germany. Furthermore, efforts to drive a wedge between the Germans and their leaders failed. Even in decline and defeat, the average German remained incapable of drawing his own conclusions and rising up against the Nazis. The history of the British attempts to manipulate the German mind was yet an impressive chapter of the Second World War, even if not entirely successful. The propaganda-organization of those measures and the confirmation of at least some of the estimates proved the efficiency of a well-organized brain-pool. For the totalitarian regime, it was easier in the end to oppress opposition, and for the democratic system too difficult to penetrate the German minds.

Page generated in 0.0597 seconds