Canadian geography and the development of Canada since Confederation have dictated that the Dominion should be divided into several almost distinct regions with different views regarding rates for the transportation of their products. In this essay the author endeavours to trace the history of the strong representations which the provincial governments, independently or in groups, have made to the Dominion Government, from time to time, regarding various freight questions or the need for railway facilities and also what they have attempted to do on their own behalf. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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In the absence to date of substantial published material on Canadian railway marketing, this thesis represents an initial overview study of the subject. It examines the origins, development overtime and current status of the freight marketing organizations and practices of CN and CP Rail. The first part of the thesis is an examination of the post-second World War economic and regulatory environment and developments in the CN and CP Rail organization and practices of the time. Evidence indicates that the appearance of railway marketing was a response to post-war commercial competitive forces. The second part consists of a discussion of today's integrated CN and CP Rail marketing organizations and traces the development from the earliest forms of railway marketing. The analytic framework for this discussion is basic marketing theory. Evidence from the analysis suggests that Canadian railway marketing has developed in a similar manner to that experienced in other industries and reflected in marketing theory. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

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No description available.

National transport policy should be determined by choosing among existing policy and alternatives to it on the basis of national and regional development objectives. This approach to transport policy formulation is explored within one important transport sector: high-bulk, long-haul freight in Western Canada. The implications of national rail policy are most pertinent, and most keenly felt, in economic regions dependent upon the export of primary resources, and it is in these markets which rail displays an enduring natural competitive advantage. The two transcontinental rail carriers are in fact dominant in Western freight movement. The methodology rests upon an analysis of the theoretical literatures, federal legislation, published statistics, empirical studies, regulatory decisions, and various position statements pertaining to rail policy. The analysis is augmented by a case study of "policy in action" with regard to Saskatchewan's potash industry. Four policy options are presented, comprised of existing policy and three recommended changes advocated by various interests. Each policy option represents a cumulatively greater degree of government intervention, and each is evaluated against five criteria, developed out of the facts of Western Canadian economic geography, stated objectives of the 1967 National Transportation Act and Bill C-33 (1977), and basic development objectives on which there is broad national consensus. Application of the evaluative criteria to the four policy options leads to the following conclusions: 1) Integration of the two national railroads is a requisite for achieving maximum economic and operating efficiency within the rail industry itself. Despite increasing competition from trucking, rail continues to constitute a natural monopoly in the markets for which it has an inherent advantage, and these in turn remain a significant proportion of total rail markets. In these bulk commodity markets, intramodal competition is weak or non-existent, and a policy response of encouraging the two national carriers to compete under conditions of commercial freedom results in duplication of capital investment, loss of cost and quality-of-service benefits to users, retardation of technological innovation, skew-ness of industrial location patterns, and an inhibition of rail's ability to compete intermodally in other markets. The history of the CNR is a testimony to the inappropriateness of contrived competition as a policy response in a natural monopoly market. 2) National transportation policy must serve the goals of national and regional policy. The railways' exclusive pursuit of economic efficiency impedes the achievement of allocative efficiency by its inattention to the significant externalities (both positive and negative) attendant the rail industry, and by its potential to thwart existing national policies and programs whose goals go beyond economic efficiency. Second, rationalization of routes and services arising from legislative directives to provide only compensatory rail service is resulting in atrophy of a developed rail network which may later be required to meet increased demand for rail service. 3) The unified national rail system must come under public ownership. Canadian history shows that the two favoured remedies for abuse of rail monopoly power (contrived competition and regulation) have proved in- effective. Alternatively, public ownership provides the best opportunity for ensuring performance of public duties by rail, and for achieving public accountability for the considerable sum of public-sector investment that rail will require within the next decade. 4) Planning for rail must be decentralized, participatory and integrated with planning for other modes. At present, no clear demarcation of policy-making authority exists between the legislative and judicial functions of the federal government with respect to rail transport: in the absence of unambiguous directives from the Ministry (Transport Canada), the Canadian Transport Commission is, in practice, assuming a policy role through its semi-judicial decisions. The Ministry must re-establish its full responsibility for transport policy, and: a) revise the CTC's regulatory mandate to include only the making of regulatory and appeal decisions on a case-by-case basis, according to directives or criteria from the Ministry; b) reorganize the structure of the CTC to permit both regional representation and an intermodal approach to regulation; c) provide clear policy directives to the management of the rail company; and d) provide an institutional mechanism by which provincial governments and labour can participate in the formulation of transport policy affecting them. 5) A unified, publicly-owned national rail system will deliver its full promise only when accompanied by public-sector economic planning. Employing transport as a policy tool re-introduces the opportunity for "political interference" in the rail industry, but future intervention should take place only in the form of formally-adopted economic strategies. To have the railways respond to the demands of regional populism or special-interest lobbies per se invites squander of scarce resources, but to have them respond to public duties required in the service of planned economic development enhances the probability of a rational, economic and politically responsible allocation of those resources. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Community and Regional Planning (SCARP), School of / Graduate

It is proposed in this thesis to advance a solution for the settlement of labour disputes in the Canadian railway industry. The constant recurrence of strike threats and three actual strikes since the end of World War II, have caused concern from time to time because of the possibility of railway transportation being unavailable. It is the intention, therefore, to examine collective bargaining in the industry, with special attention to the factors which must be considered in any "solution" to the problem of labour disputes. [...]

While all four of the main modes of intercity passenger transportation in Canada (air, automobile, bus, and rail) are currently subsidized, rail recovers from its users a considerably lesser portion of the total cost of service than any of the other three modes. This thesis estimates the effect this imbalance has on the passenger network in two ways: i) in physical terms -- the change in modal volumes given full-economic-cost pricing and the implications this has on network configuration; and ii) in financial terms -- the dollar cost of the economic efficiency losses suffered due to non-full-economic-cost pricing. The first element is estimated by calculating modal fares based on full cost recovery for 52 intercity routes between Winnipeg and Quebec City. The changes represent from the actual fares charged is translated into volume changes based on a set of demand elasticities developed for this thesis. The second element is estimated for these same 52 routes using the standard deadweight loss triangle methodology which measures the loss in aggregate social welfare that exists when non-optimal prices are being charged. This result is then extrapolated to a national level. The calculations show that given full-economic-cost pricing, air volumes would increase by 4.76%, automobile volumes by 0.32%, and bus volumes by 3.47%. Rail volumes would decline by 56.67%. While the changes are marginal for the non-rail modes and would not likely result in any changes to the network, rail would cease to be a viable mode on many routes. The economic efficiency distortion caused by the failure to charge fares based on full economic costs amounted to about $130 million in 1986. This cost, along with the subsidy itself, is what the social and political benefits of continued VIA Rail subsidization must be compared to, not simply the amount of the subsidy, as is currently done. This estimate of deadweight loss ignores positive tourism, energy, safety, and environmental externalities of rail, and thus overestimates somewhat the detrimental effect of VIA rail subsidies. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

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No description available.