I re-examine “rating shopping” and “rating catering” in the market for AAA rated collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) by replicating the study of Griffin and Tang (2013) using post-crisis data. I find a sharp increase in the amount of CDOs that received a single rating, suggesting that CDO underwriters were more cautious about formally soliciting multiple ratings. However, I also find a decrease in AAA rating disagreements between S&P and Moody’s, implying that issuers shopped their CDOs through informal conversations with agencies. Finally, I find investors correctly accepted tighter credit spreads for dual-rated CDOs because dual-rated CDOs experienced fewer rating downgrades than single rated deals. These results differ from the pre-crisis findings of Griffin and Tang (2013) and are consistent with the existence of rating shopping and disappearance of rating catering during the post-crisis period.